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ABSTRACT 
The problem this dissertation seeks to solve is the lack of a principled decision-making 
process for courts to consider claims of religious free exercise. The problem arose with the initial 
First Amendment claim: polygamy in 1879. Since then, Courts have engaged in jurisprudential 
gymnastics to deal with Reynolds v. United States. I reject both the Reynolds division of religious 
belief from practice, and its consideration of religious practices as exceptions to neutral laws.  
To refocus the discussion, I create a definition of religion that begins with the 
metaphysical implications of death. There is a fact of the matter about what happens at death but 
it cannot be accessed to determine which religious claim is correct. Therefore, the government 
must adopt a stance of ontological agnosticism. Governments are composed of individuals 
situated in specific cultural and historical contexts. Therefore, neutrality is as impossible as 
objectivity, so they must employ epistemic perspectivism, adopting the point of view of the 
impacted religious individual. Toleration relates to the accommodation clause: all religions are 
permitted but none may be favored. For religious expression, however, it would mean that the 
state puts up with the religious identity of its citizens, and is inappropriate. I situate religious 
personal identity as similar to race or sexual orientation. Shifting the attitude to accommodation 
creates new legal perspectives. 
I look to José Ortega y Gasset for a response to relativism: we get closer to truth by 
accumulating perspectives. The concern that all religious acts must then be permitted is 
addressed through Ibn Khaldun’s concept of social/cultural identity that I use to locate the 
contours of community toleration and address changes over time. The potential hazard of using 
social/cultural identity as an outer boundary of toleration suggests two constraints: first, a 
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Supreme Court ruling that would not be supported or enforceable, and second, any prohibition 
loses its justification if relevant social mores change.  
To test my framework, I apply it to polygamy in Reynolds and in 2017. Morocco’s 
regulatory scheme suggests how participants could be better protected. Accommodation of 
Islamic veils in the U.S. demonstrates the success of my philosophical refocus. 
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PREFACE 
The roots of this dissertation were planted in a Spring 2007 Law and Religion course 
taught by Richard Collins in the law school of the University of Colorado at Boulder. As we read 
the “Mormon cases,” I was astounded at the ferocity of the campaign against the Church of Jesus 
Christ of the Latter-day Saints (LDS) in Civil War-era United States. My final paper for that 
course traced the legal and procedural history of a then-current lawsuit seeking a marriage 
license for a religious plural marriage (which failed). I concluded that any successful legal 
challenge to the polygamy ban created by the U.S. Supreme Court in Reynolds v. U.S would have 
to come on non-religious grounds. Philosophically, that seemed backwards.  
At the time, I was a masters student with a focus on philosophy of religion. As I read the 
cases and articles for the law course, I realized that the LDS concepts of God, Jesus Christ, 
humans, and souls are significantly different from those of Protestant Christianity or Roman 
Catholicism, even though they use the same words. For my MA thesis, I explored a Mormon 
response to the problem of evil (why bad things happen in the world if there is a God who is all 
powerful, loving, and knowing). I had discovered a robust philosophical debate between 
Mormon and evangelical philosophers on this and other theological themes. My interest was not 
only in how the LDS Church responds to natural and moral evil, but also in how that reveals why 
the problem of evil poses such a dilemma for Protestant Christianity. 
The centrality of polygamy to the early LDS Church was connected to its concept of 
identity, which precedes embodiment and continues after death. The family is a central 
component of this eternal entity. I was intrigued by the impact of laws that sought to prevent 
polygamous marriages upon this view of human life. I combined what I had learned in the law 
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class and my MA thesis into a paper called: “Mormon Metaphysics and the Politics of 
Polygamy,” which I used as my writing sample in applying to the philosophy PhD program at 
the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. My philosophical interests began in philosophy of religion 
but include philosophy of law, and especially their interaction. At UH, I sought to ground both in 
a global perspective, which I found in Islamic philosophy. 
I returned to the problem I had identified in Professor Collins’ classroom: if this is how 
the U.S. government can treat religion, what could the words of the First Amendment possibly 
mean? As I wrote these chapters, the perfect legal challenge to Reynolds arose. The case worked 
its way through the courts using an approach similar to what I had suggested might be successful 
in the 2007 law school paper. It failed.  
In this dissertation, I stepped back from precedent and procedure to ponder the 
philosophical issues at the heart of the Reynolds decision. In the process, I developed a 
framework that I believe is far more satisfactory for analyzing religion/law conflicts. It holds 
great promise for resolving present and future religious free exercise challenges. Yet, when I 
applied that framework to the facts of Reynolds, it did not produce the result I had expected. It 
did, however, provide an answer to my philosophical quest: 
what the words of the First Amendment could possibly mean. 
 
Cindy Scheopner 
Honolulu, 2017 
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Congress shall make no law 
 respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof …  
-- First Amendment, U.S. Constitution 
  1 
INTRODUCTION 
Laws are made for the government of actions and while 
they cannot interfere with mere religious beliefs and opinions, they 
may with practices. 
-- Reynolds v. United States at 166 
 
As the states sprung from English colonies tried to unite into a new nation, one of the 
items of agreement was that religion would be neither compelled nor compromised by 
government. Yet, the first time this guarantee of the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution was tested, all three branches of government read its language to permit a sustained 
governmental campaign against a central tenet of American-born Church of Jesus Christ of the 
Latter-day Saints
1
 that ended only when the Mormons changed one of their core doctrinal 
beliefs. In the process, individuals were imprisoned and sentenced to hard labor for freely 
exercising their religious beliefs; church property and other assets were seized; and military 
forces were poised near a civilian settlement: all to emphasize the determination of the United 
States government to grind out the practice of polygamy by the Mormons. It won. But one 
cannot read the court cases of that time without feeling that the church and the First Amendment 
came away from their confrontation equally bloodied. 
                                                 
1
The Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints traces its beginning to an 1830 vision 
received by Joseph Smith in western New York. Members of the faith are  commonly referred to 
as Mormons, after The Book of Mormon scripture (Taylor, S., n.p.) 
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One legacy of that encounter is that polygamy
2
 remains illegal in the United States. 
While the practice may have been “odious” over a century ago, it now produces a conundrum 
(Reynolds v. United States at 165).
3
 The Mormon family in Reynolds sought an exception to the 
law enforcing monogamy as the sole acceptable form of marriage. In the intervening years, laws 
criminalizing sexual activity outside marriage have largely been repealed, or are rarely enforced. 
Marriage between individuals of different races is no longer banned, and same-sex marriages are 
common. Rather than an exception from common practice based upon religious belief, polygamy 
now is only illegal because it has a religious connotation. Non-marital intimate relationships 
among multiple partners are no longer criminalized. Such behavior may not be the norm, but it is 
not considered shocking and would likely fall under the same personal liberty protections 
extended to same-sex relationships.  
Contemporary practitioners of religious polygamy are now excluded from the right to 
marry that has been extended to others, regardless of race or sexual orientation. They are unable 
to have non-licensed commitment ceremonies similar to those used by same-sex couples after 
their relationships were decriminalized but before the Supreme Court ruled that they must be 
permitted to marry. Any plural relationship that is considered by the participants to be a marriage 
runs afoul of anti-bigamy statutes. 
                                                 
2
Although the issue has arisen in the legal cases cited in this work with one husband and 
multiple wives, “polygamy” refers to marriage in which a spouse of either sex has more than one 
mate at the same time. 
3 “Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe 
and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life 
of Asiatic and of African people” (Reynolds at 165). 
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The legal status of polygamy illustrates the difficulty of putting into practice the free 
exercise of religion in a nation with diverse beliefs. The approach that the Supreme Court took in 
Reynolds was to divide religious beliefs from practices. It held that laws may not restrict 
religious belief, but may forbid practices based on those beliefs. In the case of polygamy, that 
approach has produced the opposite result in two ways. First, banning the practice of polygamy 
contributed to a change in the belief by members of the LDS Church that it is required for 
salvation. Religious belief and practice are not severed without impacting both. Second, laws 
against polygamy now target practices only when they have religious beliefs attached. 
Not all religious groups with roots in the prophecies of Joseph Smith have abandoned the 
practice of plural marriage. Some have sought to remove the ban, but direct challenges based 
upon religious exercise have failed. Courts have held that Reynolds is controlling. The state of 
Utah also created a legal Catch 22 when it stopped arresting individuals for being in polygamous 
relationships, absent other charges such as child abuse (Bronson v. Swenson).
4
 Because the 
families could not show that they were at risk of being arrested, they could not challenge the 
criminal penalties.  
A reality television program produced the first challenge to the criminalization of 
polygamy to succeed in Utah courts. Sister Wives featured a family composed of a husband with 
four wives who base their relationship upon fundamentalist religious beliefs.
5
 The notoriety of 
                                                 
4
 “Plaintiffs subscribe to the religious doctrine of plural marriages, which they define as a 
"man having more than one wife," similar to that practiced by the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints in Utah prior to 1890.” 
5
 The series began airing in 2010. Shortly thereafter, the family appeared on national 
television news and talk shows. 
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weekly television exposure prompted the state of Utah to begin an investigation into the family’s 
legal status. Based upon that fear of prosecution, the family moved to Nevada and filed a court 
case (Brown v. Buhman). The husband had only one civil marriage – the additional marriages 
were religious, spiritual marriages but no governmental license was sought.  
In a landmark ruling, a Utah federal district judge ruled in favor of the family on their 
challenge to the part of the Utah statute that criminalizes cohabitation. However, he determined 
that Reynolds was controlling on the issue of legal marriage. A three-judge panel of the 10
th
 U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Denver refused to reach the merits of the case, ruling in early 2016 
that the family was not in fear of arrest for their relationship(s), so could not qualify for relief 
from the courts.
6
  The case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which refused to hear it. 
Because the lawsuit did not rely upon the First Amendment free expression clause, even a 
successful resolution would not have shed light on what the Reynolds court should have done 
differently, nor provide guidance for a future court when faced with a religious practice that 
nonbelievers still find abhorrent. 
Problems in practice 
The Reynolds belief/practice distinction has never been a workable formula, but has 
neither been abandoned, nor replaced with a better framework. An equally-problematic legacy of 
that case is the idea that individuals must seek an exception for religious practices. Laws that are 
neutral and apply equally to everyone have an unwarranted presumption of fairness that operates 
                                                 
6
 The Utah district court ruling was vacated for mootness by the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Brown v. Buhman 10
th
 Cir. 14-4117 May 13, 2016; request for en banc ruling denied, 
April 11, 2016. The U.S. Supreme Court denied the Petition for certiorari on January 23, 2017. 
This result is discussed in Chapter Four. 
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to penalize unpopular religions. A philosophical re-examination of the issues that confronted the 
Reynolds court will both clarify the problems and suggest a solution. The court considered issues 
that remain key to First Amendment jurisprudence, such as: What is religion? How can 
conflicting demands among religions be resolved? How much does society have to tolerate?  
The goal of this project is to (1) identify conditions for any adequate legal approach to 
problems of religious exercise, and (2) make a case for treating religious exercise as a component 
of personal identity. Any adequate philosophical framework for restricting religious practices 
must respect both the constitutional promise of free exercise and the need for people of different 
faiths to live peacefully in the same political state.  
The starting place for this inquiry must be one of perspective. I argue that there is no 
neutral perspective when considering religion. When individuals or Courts pretend to be neutral, 
they privilege their metaphysical view as “normal,” making it the accepted starting point from 
which other religious views must seek an exception. Rather, I set two initial premises. First, 
conflicting claims about the metaphysics of ultimate reality cannot be settled by courts, so the 
appropriate legal approach to religious free exercise is one of ontological agnosticism. I use this 
phrase to mean bracketing the validity of claims about whether actions while embodied have an 
impact on a future self that survives physical death. Courts consider the religious requirements as 
though they are correct. The answer to a restriction on action cannot be that it arises out of an 
erroneous religious belief. Second, the impact of the restriction on religious activity must be 
evaluated from the perspective of the impacted believer. I call this epistemic perspectivism. The 
answer to a restriction on action cannot be that it does not trouble my religion so it should not 
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trouble yours. I argue that both of these perspectives must be part of any successful evaluative 
framework to replace the Reynolds dichotomies of belief/practice and exception to neutral rules. 
The success of an approach to the free exercise of religion can be tested by considering 
how well it can accommodate Islam. Islam presents a direct contradiction to the Reynolds belief-
practice rubric, in that the requirements of the faith all include actions/practices. Adopting an 
Islamic perspective also helps to reveal religious influences in law and legal theory. Laws in the 
United States that are presumed to be neutral often privilege Protestant Christianity, which is  
either unarticulated as a perspective or presumed to be neutral. 
Viewing the interaction of religion, individuals and society from an Islamic perspective 
suggests a new approach. Morocco is an example of a country with an official religion, which 
most citizens observe. And yet, not all acts permitted by Islam are permitted by civil laws. 
Polygamy is limited in a recent revision of the family code that followed adoption of a new 
Constitution in 2011. The difference between the Moroccan and U.S. Constitutions helps to 
illustrate a key concept that I will use to determine the limits of toleration.  
Philosophical perspective 
This concept comes from philosopher Ibn Khaldun, who analyzed the history of North 
African civilizations in the fourteenth century. His family had emigrated to Spain from south 
Arabia (now Yemen). They served in important administrative and political posts under the 
Umayyad, Almoravid and Almohad dynasties, but fled to the northern coast of Morocco just 
before the Christian conquest of Seville and Córdoba. Ibn Khaldun was born in Tunisia in 1332 
and died in 1406 in Cairo, Egypt. He held posts in Spain and North Africa during a politically 
tumultuous time following the collapse of the Almohad Empire. 
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Ibn Khaldun lived in a time and place that experienced differences in religious beliefs and 
practices. “At the intersection of Jewish, Christian, and Muslim influences, heir to Greek science 
and Arabic poetry, and connected by trade and history to Asia, the Mediterranean Sea had 
become the nexus of Muslim cosmopolitanism by the fourteenth century” (Lawrence, vii). Amid 
these influences, he developed a philosophy of history that accounts for societal change. 
More than half a millennium after Ibn Khaldun, another philosopher with an interest in 
history, society, and change wrote during equally tumultuous times. José Ortega y Gasset
7
 spent 
much of his childhood in Córdoba or Málaga, the same parts of southern Spain that remained 
under Muslim rule during Ibn Khaldun’s life. During Ortega’s lifetime, Spain was a 
constitutional monarchy under King Alfonso XIII, who lost power to dictator Miguel Primo de 
Rivera. When his government resigned, the Second Republic was formed; an unsuccessful coup 
attempt resulted in the Spanish Civil War, which led into the Second World War, and the iron 
rule of Francisco Franco. 
Ortega studied classical philology and philosophy in Germany, as well as neo-
Kantianism. He also pursued an interest in phenomenology, later saying that he “abandoned 
                                                 
7
 Much of Ortega’s thought was first produced as essays published in newspapers or 
magazines, or lectures given in university courses. It was later collected into the twelve volumes 
of his complete works (Obras Completas), some posthumously. At least two dozen books have 
been published containing one or more essays around a theme. His works have multiple 
publication dates in the original language (Spanish except for a few written originally in 
German) as well as translations into multiple languages. To indicate the source, therefore, I have 
used the title of the source material and the page number in that version. The dates reflect 
publication, which was generally much later than the works were first written or presented as 
lectures. 
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phenomenology at the very moment of accepting it” (Obras Completas 8, 273).8 Ortega 
developed his own philosophy of life that includes individuals and their interaction in history. 
From him, I borrow a concept of personal identity that is amenable to religious identity. His 
philosophy of point of view, or perspective, also suggests a workable way to accommodate 
religious difference. 
Method 
Throughout this work, my method is in the spirit of Ortega. Although discussing 
technical themes in philosophy and law, I have attempted to use clear language accessible to a 
non-specialist. Foreign language terms are discussed and equivalencies proposed. For ease of 
reading, non-English words are italicized only on first use. Similarly, diacritics commonly used 
with Arabic transliteration are omitted. The Arabic letter ‘ayn is represented by c to distinguish it 
from the hamzah represented by ’. 
I have undertaken a philosophical examination of the original Reynolds decision using 
two key concepts: Ortega’s concept of personal identity and Ibn Khaldun’s concept of social 
cohesion. This work employs these concepts from philosophers steeped in their respective 
traditions to analyze contemporary problems in jurisprudence. The focus is on how U.S. law 
treats religion, not the resources that religion may employ to respond to regulation, such as the 
Islamic concept of (maslaha) community welfare (mentioned in Chapter Three).  
                                                 
8
 I use the MLA citation style as middle path between the footnotes of traditional 
philosophical works and the legal Bluebook style. Sources are noted inline by author and page 
number, footnotes are used for editorial comments or additional information. A Table of Cases is 
included for case citations, but law review articles are cited in MLA style in the References 
section. Although MLA style no longer requires it, I use the notation “n.p.” to indicate an online 
source with no page numbers. 
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This is a work of comparative philosophy, in that it draws from both Western and Islamic 
traditions. It contextualizes the thought of Ortega and Ibn Khaldun, rather than merely extracting 
their theories from their surroundings and influences. The concept of perspectival personal 
identity from Ortega helps to explain the role that religious belief plays in lived experiences. I 
argue that his view of a person in the world is under-nuanced in that it fails to account for 
components of personal identity that are unchosen, such as sex/gender and race. Ibn Khaldun’s 
concept of casabiyya provides both a theory of group identity and of change in that identity over 
time. Together, these concepts provide the philosophical underpinnings of a new jurisprudential 
approach to resolving claims of religious free expression in the United States. 
This dissertation is rooted in place and time: post 9/11 United States. For that reason, I 
undertake a discussion of contemporary Islam before considering how Islamic head coverings 
may serve as a contemporary example of religious conduct. I do not presume that readers have a 
pre-existing background in either Islamic theology, history, or philosophy, but some knowledge 
of each is important to understanding the perspective of the women who are impacted. 
About veils 
Choosing which term to describe Islamic head coverings is far from simple. Anna-Mari 
Almila and David Inglis use “veils” and “veiling” as a general term for religiously-motivated 
head coverings for both men and women in their International Handbook to Veils and Veiling. 
However, Katherine Bullock rejects the word “veil” as laden with negative colonial stereotypes. 
She uses “ḥijāb” to refer to the concept of covering, which includes apparel and actions such as 
lowering the gaze with the opposite sex (xli). She uses “headscarf” for women who cover all but 
their face and hands, and niqāb for the face covering that exposes only eyes. Although she 
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employs this vocabulary in her analysis, the title of her book is: Rethinking Muslim Women and 
the Veil and it drew from her PhD dissertation entitled: The Politics of the Veil.  
In addition to the question of how the head coverings are described, there is the issue of 
how they are regarded. Bullock distinguishes two feminist approaches against the simplistic, pop 
culture view that the veil is a symbol of the complete subjugation of Muslim women. The school 
she calls “liberal feminists” includes Muslim and non-Muslim women. They argue that Islam 
subordinates women, like any patriarchal religion. Although informed about Islamic history and 
practice, they see veiled women as Other.  
[T]hese writers do not ultimately find Muslim women’s arguments for the 
meaning of covering persuasive. They remain convinced that a satisfying life in 
the veil is still an oppressed life. Like the mainstream view, their assumptions are 
also ultimately grounded in liberalism. The concepts most at play are liberal 
concepts of individualism, equality, liberty, and oppression. 
The second school of feminists also includes Muslim and non-Muslim women, many 
trained in anthropology or history. It attempts to understand the meaning of the social practice of 
veiling as it is experienced by women. “These feminists may also be grounded in liberalism to 
some extent, but their methodological approach leads them away from using mainstream 
Western liberal categories to judge the Other’s voice” (Bullock, xvii). She calls this a ‘contextual 
approach’ and counts herself as a member of this group. Bullock converted to Islam and wears a 
hijab, so her perspective is from the within the Other. 
My own view of the veil is strongly influenced by my participation in the postgraduate 
studies program “Islamic Critical Thinking: Ethics and Sensitive Contemporary Issues” of the 
Center for Islamic Legislation and Ethics (CILE) in Granada, Spain. June 16-20, 2014. The 
director of CILE is philosopher Tariq Ramadan. The focus of the annual summer school is upon 
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Islamic responses to ethical issues, using theological and philosophical resources. I attended the 
first year, during which participants were predominantly female. Photos of the next two cohorts 
show more male participants, but still over half are female. They also show nearly every 
configuration of head covering imaginable: traditional hijab, turbans, and several fashionable 
variations. The year that I participated, all of the women wore some sort of head covering except 
a Moroccan woman now working for the French government in Paris, a Ukrainian Christian 
Scientist and me (we were the only two non-Muslims). Some also wore the jilbab, but many did 
not.
9
 The women were well-educated professionals, many in higher education, government or 
diplomatic corps. They were far from subordinate or submissive, regardless of their choice of 
head covering. They were undaunted in challenging our male instructors, including religious 
leaders, and sexist interpretations of textual sources. 
The discussion in this dissertation regards the legal treatment of women who are 
motivated by religion to cover their heads. It is not upon how they have come to that decision or 
what it represents to them. I use veil as a generic term to encompass the many types of Islamic 
head coverings. It applies to non-Islamic religions, as well. Although beyond the scope of this 
work, a courtroom or school yard ban on all head coverings would implicate Catholic or 
Episcopalian nuns who still wear veils, as well as Amish prayer caps. 
                                                 
9
 The term jilbab can refer to any cloak worn in public, but often means a long tailored coat 
(in a wide variety of colors and fabrics). An abaya is a loose over-garment with sleeves that 
opens in front. A chador is common among Shica Muslims. It is a floor-length covering that 
hangs from the top of the head and is open in front. A burqa is a veil and robe combination that 
covers all of the body, including the eyes. The word is often used incorrectly to refer to a niqab, 
which is a veil that covers the head and lower face but exposes the eyes (Taylor, n.p.). 
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Chapter overview 
The quotation at beginning of this chapter describes the approach to religious free 
expression the Reynolds court used to prohibit polygamy. It imagined that a line could be drawn 
between religious belief and practices. In this dissertation, I demonstrate how that approach is 
not feasible from a religious perspective and has not been workable from a jurisprudential 
perspective. I reject the belief/practice distinction and make two claims. First, that any adequate 
approach to religious free exercise must employ ontological agnosticism and epistemic 
perspectivism, and second, that the framework I propose meets my first requirement and is an 
improvement upon the Reynolds dichotomy both for that case and for contemporary issues in 
religious practice. The entire Reynolds opinion is included as an Appendix for ease of reference. 
Each chapter evaluates a key philosophical component of the Reynolds opinion and introduces a 
part of my new framework. 
Can a man excuse his practices … because of his religious belief? To permit this would 
be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect 
to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself (Reynolds v. United States at 167). 
In Chapter One, I first describe the religious and political situation for polygamy as 
practiced by the early LDS Church in the United States. I then review the Reynolds opinion to 
highlight the legal issues and philosophical concerns, including the relativism articulated in the 
opening quote. The chapter’s review of court cases sets the problem for this dissertation: the lack 
of a principled decision-making process for evaluating claims of religious free exercise. The First 
Amendment to the Constitution sets the goal of religious exercise unrestricted by Congress in a 
country with no officially-sanctioned religion. The cases demonstrate the many ways laws that 
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seemingly do not target religious belief still impinge upon the practices of some religions. The 
chapter concludes with an analysis of the contemporary Brown polygamy legal challenge and the 
philosophical issues it raises. 
The precise point of the inquiry is, what is the religious freedom which has been 
guaranteed (Reynolds v. United States at 162). 
In Chapter Two, I create a three-part definition of religion based upon the way religion is 
lived. First, as Reynolds recognized, religion is a competing normative authority with civil 
government. Second, religion makes a claim about the metaphysics of ultimate reality. In the 
case of Mormons, that a deity exists; that heavens are populated with the essences of people who 
once lived on this earth. This leads to the third relevant aspect of religion that Reynolds 
mentioned but did not explore: religion includes an account of embodiment. I also examine the 
concept of toleration and how it should be applied to the three aspects of religion. 
The account of personal identity that I develop looks to the “perspectivism” of José 
Ortega y Gasset for a concept of self as not only embodied, but also embedded in time and place. 
From Ortega, we take the approach that each person participating in the process does so from a 
point of view, and identifying that point of view makes it possible to compare it with others. 
Collecting additional points of view helps to complete the picture.  
With this definition, I seek to locate religious identity along side other components of 
personal identity, such as race and gender. This changes the language from toleration to 
accommodation and changes the perspective from requiring an exception to full acceptance. I 
draw a parallel between religious identity and sexual orientation. The discussions of this chapter 
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create an account of identity for religious individuals that can be recognized in court and produce 
more just outcomes for religiously-motivated conduct.  
 [T]here cannot be a doubt that, unless restricted by some form of constitution, it is 
within the legitimate scope of the power of every civil government to determine whether 
polygamy or monogamy shall be the law of social life under its dominion (Reynolds v. United 
States at 166). 
Chapter Three situates contemporary Muslim practices in religious and U.S. history. It 
roots Ibn Khaldun in the Islamic philosophical tradition and introduces his concept of casabiyya, 
a sort of community consciousness or cohesion. While there are issues of translation for this 
term, it is used to describe the animating force of a group. In the context of religious exercise, it 
helps to characterize the limits of toleration. I am using it to describe the social/cultural identity 
that changed between Reynolds and Brown in the attitude toward polygamy in the United States.  
Morocco’s approach to religious exercise and polygamy provides an illustration of 
casabiyya that is useful in exploring the impact of community on identity and locating the limits 
of toleration. It permits limited polygamy, based upon Islamic tradition. This differs from the 
polygamy practiced by the early LDS Church, which required it of men who were designated by 
religious authorities. Mormon polygamy also had an impact on the after life, which Muslim 
polygamy does not. However, the model of Morocco will prove helpful in dealing with both. 
The framework for evaluating religious expression that I propose is in penultimate form 
in Chapter Three. Situated, enculturing individuals with eternal identities have a First 
Amendment protection for religious practices in the United States. When the free exercise of 
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those practices violates a social/cultural norm, the government adopts an attitude of ontological 
agnosticism and employs epistemic perspectivism to accommodate the fullest possible exercise. 
The next chapter considers what limits on exercise may be needed and how to determine them. 
 [T]he question is raised whether religious belief can be accepted as a justification of an 
overt act made criminal by the law of the land (Reynolds v. United States at 162).  
In Chapter Four, I address the approach of considering religious practices as exceptions 
to neutral laws. I use the example of Islamic head coverings as belief/acts connected to personal 
identity. This illustrates the power of accommodating religious identity rather than tolerating 
exceptions to societal norms. In this chapter, I propose two constraints on the use of 
social/cultural identity to justify limits on behavior. The first is the strength of the opposition that 
must be demonstrated to compromise a belief/act (ability to enforce). The second is the necessity 
for review when social conditions change. 
With the framework complete, I revisit Reynolds to consider what approach the court 
could have taken in the existing social and historical situation. I propose three possible outcomes, 
only one of which was viable at the time and also likely to produce a better result in 2017. I also 
consider whether the approach taken by Morocco would have worked for the marriages of 
George Reynolds or Kody Brown. 
This project refocuses religious exercise as a component of personal identity to be 
accommodated, rather than tolerated, in legal analysis. As a work in philosophy of law, this 
approach rejects the search for a neutral perspective, inserting social situation as a critical 
component of any evaluation of religious exercise. It does not require any particular social, moral 
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or political theory. It inserts religious identity along side race, gender and sexual orientation, so 
is compatible with varying views of the self across philosophical points of view. It challenges 
any legal or philosophical approach that is silent with regard to race or sex as relevant to 
personal identity theory. 
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CHAPTER ONE: FROM POLYGAMY TO PEYOTE AND BACK 
Can a man excuse his practices … because of his religious 
belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of 
religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to 
permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. 
-- Reynolds v. United States at 167 
The Supreme Court case that presented polygamy as a Constitutional challenge arose 
amid a prolonged cultural battle pitting the government of the United States against the Church 
of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints (LDS) at a critical time for both the religion and the 
nation. The church had taken refuge in the Salt Lake Valley of what was then Mexico after 
having been violently driven out of every state it entered. By the time Utah became a territory in 
1850, polygamy had become a national political issue. The 1856 Republican Party platform 
called polygamy and slavery the “twin relics of barbarism” (Republican Party Platform. 1856, 
.np.)  The political battle with the LDS church at the western edge of the United States took place 
at the same time as the secession by states to the South that precipitated the Civil War.
10
 
The LDS Church 
In 1820, a teen-aged Joseph Smith found the variety of religious offerings so 
overwhelming that he knelt in prayer to ask God which church he should join. Smith’s early 
writings record that the Methodists didn’t like the Baptists, Baptists didn’t like the Methodists 
and neither group liked the Presbyterians (Williams 2003, 101). He reported having a vision in 
                                                 
10
 The chronology that follows is synthesized from several sources, including: Van 
Wagoner, McConnell, Garvey, & Berg, Gordon, Drakeman, and Harmer-Dionne. 
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which God the Father and his son Jesus Christ told him that none of the existing churches was 
true. Over the next ten years, Smith recorded more visions and angelic visits that led him to find 
and translate gold plates, which formed the basis for the Book of Mormon and a new religion. 
The church was organized in April 1830 when Smith and a few converts met in a small house in 
upstate New York.  By the end of that year, several hundred converts had joined, making the 
Saints successful and immediately controversial. 
The new church was both socially and theologically radical:  It challenged many 
cherished American beliefs, including the importance of individual private 
property, the traditional family, the separation of church and state, and the 
sufficiency of the Bible as a source of revelation (McConnell, Garvey 
and Berg, 111). 
  The controversy intensified with the growth of the church. The community moved from 
New York to Pennsylvania, to Ohio, on to Missouri, where thirty LDS church members 
(including women and children) were killed, and then to Illinois. In each state, followers were 
forced out by hostile citizens. Missouri issued an order that allowed Mormons to be shot on 
sight. In response, Joseph Smith formed his own militia and decided to run for President of the 
United States. He and his brother were killed in 1844 by a mob while in an Illinois jail. 
The centrality of polygamy 
Polygamy is uniquely identified with the LDS Church in the United States, and “the 
principle” held a central place in Mormon theology at the time of Reynolds.11 Smith’s views on 
polygamy developed as part of his focus on the Old Testament. In 1843, Smith announced two 
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 A detailed analysis of the Mormon cosmology is explored in my philosophy of religion 
thesis Deity, Dogma and Doubt:  A Mormon Response to the Problem of Evil. MA Thesis, 
University of Colorado, 2008. ProQuest. 
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revelations that called for the restoration of Biblical polygamy within the framework of marriage 
to be solemnized (or sealed) for eternity.  The Church did not publicly declare adoption of the 
practice until 1852 when Brigham Young accepted the Smith revelations as part of the Church’s 
official canon. 
Smith taught that polygamy was central to the work of the church on this earth, and to 
salvation in the next life. More wives meant more children and greater future glory.  Although 
first wives had to consent to additional wives, their salvation depended upon being in a 
relationship with a polygamist male. (Aitman & Ginat, 26). 
Politics of polygamy 
After the death of Joseph Smith, Brigham Young led the group to the Salt Lake Valley of 
what was then still officially a territory of Mexico.
12
 As a frontier area distant from Mexico City, 
little effort was expended in enforcing marriage laws. The land had been captured by the U.S. in 
the Mexican War and was ceded in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which allowed LDS 
leaders to attempt statehood. A constitutional convention in 1849 created a proposed state of 
Deseret that included the present state of Utah, along with most of what is now Nevada and 
Arizona, and parts of California, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Oregon and Idaho. 
Congress refused to recognize the state because it was so large and it lacked the requisite 60,000 
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 The interaction of polygamy and politics in the US is detailed in my article “Equal Yet 
Plural? Polygamy and the Status of Women in the United States.” Conference Proceedings of the 
International Family Conference III: International Family Policies, Ed. Cüneyt Dinç. The 
Journalists and Writers Foundation Press, 2015, 140-153. 
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voters to be eligible for statehood. It later passed a bill authorizing a much smaller Utah Territory 
in 1850.  
When the LDS church publicly acknowledged the practice of plural marriage, it became 
an obstacle to statehood. The 1856 Republican National Convention declared that it was the 
“duty of Congress to prohibit in the territories those twin relics of barbarism – polygamy and 
slavery” (Republican Party Platform, 1856, n.p). Soon, a law did just that. The Morrill Anti-
bigamy Act was passed in 1862, outlawing plural marriages in the territories.
13
 Initially, 
polygamy was asked only of church leadership, but when it came under attack, the practice 
spread as bishops called more men to polygamy. During the “Mormon Reformation” of 1856 – 
1857, 65% more polygamous marriages took place than during any other two-year period 
(Aitman & Ginat, 33). Although it had been difficult to enforce, the LDS Church decided to 
challenge the anti-bigamy law it believed to be a clear violation of the First Amendment.  
The Reynolds test case 
The man whose name has become synonymous with polygamy was the personal 
secretary to Brigham Young. George Reynolds was an English immigrant to the United States 
who married soon after settling in Utah Territory in 1865. Nine years later, he took another  
spouse, which resulted in arrest. At trial, his second wife was placed in the position of admitting 
either that she was in a plural marriage, or was participating in an illicit relationship with a 
married man (Davis, 288). Amelia Jane testified that she had been married in a church (not civil) 
ceremony. The jury found Reynolds guilty of bigamy, sentenced him to a year in prison and a 
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 After many attempts, Utah finally achieved statehood in 1896 on the stipulation that its 
constitution banned the practice of polygamy “forever.” 
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$300 fine.  A retrial was conducted due to confusion over the number of jurors required, which 
also resulted in a finding of guilty and an increased punishment of two years imprisonment at 
hard labor and a $500 fine (the statutory maximum).  
On appeal to the territorial supreme court, George Reynolds argued that taking a second 
wife was a mandate of his church and that punishment deprived him of his first amendment right 
to the free exercise of religion. His conviction was affirmed without reference to religious 
liberty. Two years later, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on January 6, 1879. 
Opinion of the Court 
Six questions were presented to the high court for review (Reynolds at 153).
14
 All of the 
questions dealt with procedural issues except number 5: “Should the accused have been acquitted 
if he married the second time, because he believed it to be his religious duty?” Justice Waite, 
writing for the court, rephrased the question as, “whether religious belief can be accepted as a 
justification for an overt act made criminal by the law of the land” (Reynolds at 162). This 
restatement put the focus on the justification for an exemption, rather on the legitimacy of the 
law, itself. 
Waite affirmed that Congress cannot pass a law (in this case, for a Territory) that 
prohibits the free exercise of religion, and continued “The question to be determined is, whether 
the law now under consideration comes within this prohibition” (Reynolds at 162). There was no 
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doubt that the First Amendment applied to this situation. The law had been passed by Congress 
and, as a territory, Utah was under federal jurisdiction.  
There also was no question of fact about the conduct at issue. The high court accepted 
that Reynolds had proved to the lower court that he was a practicing member of a church that 
required polygamy upon the penalty of “damnation in the life to come.” Reynolds had asked for 
a jury instruction that if they found he was married in pursuance of what he believed to be a 
religious duty, the verdict must be ‘not guilty.’ He had acted with the firm conviction that a 
second marriage was not criminal because it was required by his religion, which was protected 
by the First Amendment. 
When faced with this direct conflict, the Court made an odd turn. To decide this case, it 
began by discussing what qualified as a religion and then “what is the religious freedom which 
has been guaranteed.” Because the word “religion” is not defined in the Constitution, Justice 
Waite felt justified in looking elsewhere to determine its meaning, “and nowhere more 
appropriately, we think, than to the history of the times in the midst of which the provision was 
adopted” (Reynolds at 162). In the next paragraph, he mentioned concerns about citizens being 
taxed against their will to support a religion they may not have believed, and citizens being 
punished for failing to attend public worship or for entertaining heretical opinions. We would 
now consider those concerns to be directed at the establishment clause, as would the specific 
case he next discussed, a bill in Virginia to provide for teachers of the Christian religion. 
In response to this Virginia bill, James Madison wrote his Memorial and Remonstrance, 
which the Court described as follows: “[I]n which he demonstrated ‘that religion, or the duty we 
owe the Creator,’ was not within the cognizance of civil government” (Reynolds at 163). The bill 
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was defeated at the next session of the Virginia House of Delegates and another, authored by 
Thomas Jefferson, passed. The Court found the definition of religion it sought here:  
In the preamble of this act (12 Hening’s Stat. 84) religious freedom is defined; 
and after a recital ‘that to suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the 
field of opinion, and to restrain the profession or propagation of principles on 
supposition of their ill tendency, is a dangerous fallacy which at once destroys all 
religious liberty,’ it is declared ‘that it is time enough for the rightful purpose of 
civil government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt 
acts against peace and good order.’ In these two sentences is found the true 
distinction between what properly belongs to the church and what to the 
state (Reynolds at 165, emphasis added). 
While not mentioned in the Reynolds opinion, Jefferson believed that the Virginia Act for 
Establishing Religious Freedom ”was meant to be universal … to comprehend within the mantle 
of its protection the Jew and the Gentile, the Christian and Mahometan the Hindoo, and Infidel 
of every denomination” (Choper, 587 fn 53). This Virginia statute was passed a year before the 
Constitutional Convention, which the Court next summarized. Noting that Jefferson did not 
participate because he was in France as a government minister, the opinion cited correspondence 
between Jefferson and a friend: “[Jefferson] expressed his disappointment at the absence of an 
express declaration insuring the freedom of religion (2 Jeff. Works, 355), but was willing to 
accept it as it was, trusting that the good sense and honest intentions of the people would bring 
about the necessary alterations” (Reynolds at 164) Several states proposed amendments to the 
Constitution that included some sort of declaration of religious freedom, so the first session of 
the First Congress considered how to respond. The Court said, “[T]he amendment now under 
consideration was proposed with others by Mr. Madison. It met the views of the advocates of 
religious freedom, and was adopted” (Reynolds at 164). The procedure was not quite so clear cut 
as that, but the Court continued on to its next supporting text. 
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In the next sentence, the Court quoted Jefferson’s address to the Danbury Baptist 
Association at length. Because the Court relied so heavily upon its language, I will do so as well: 
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his 
God; that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship; that the 
legislative powers of the government reach actions only, and not opinions, -- I 
contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people 
which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus building a 
wall of separation between church and State. Adhering to this expression of the 
supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with 
sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore man to 
all his natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social 
duties.’ Coming as this does from an acknowledged leader of the advocates of 
the measure, it may be accepted almost as an authoritative declaration of the 
scope and effect of the amendment thus secured. Congress was deprived of 
all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions 
which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order (Reynolds 
at 164, emphasis added). 
The first text advanced (Virginia statute) would have given state support to teachers of 
religion. Madison’s objection was that religious duty is personal, between an individual and his 
Creator, not to be compelled or supported by the State. The second text (Constitution) is silent as 
to any religious relationship, other than to say that a religious test may not be required for public 
office. Jefferson’s concern, echoed by the States, was that the new federal government might still 
try to force some sort of support for religion or religious conduct. The First Amendment was in 
response to that concern – it left open the possibility that individual states might favor one 
religion and not another, as many continued to do for a time.  
The third text (Danbury Baptists) is Jefferson’s personal view. Remember that he did not 
directly participate in the Constitutional Convention. Further, he supported language protecting 
freedom of conscience (repeated here) rather than freedom of religion, which was not adopted. 
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The letter is far from the “authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment” 
(Reynolds at 164) that the Court pronounced. Even if it were, it was written to a religious 
congregation and the language quoted could easily be interpreted as saying that the First 
Amendment protects religion from a federal government that could favor one over another 
through taxes, forced attendance, or paying teachers.  
The Court concluded “that Congress was … left free to reach actions which were in 
violation of social duties or subversive of good order” (Reynolds at 164). The documents it cited 
were concerned with religious belief or practice being compelled by the government, not with 
whether the government could prevent the free exercise of religion through force. The Reynolds 
Court took documents that reflected the public will to limit intrusion of the federal government 
into religion, and turned them into a grant of power for the federal government to trod upon any 
religion so long as the target is religiously-motivated actions and not “mere belief.” Rather than 
protecting religion from government interference, the threshold suggested for regulating 
religious acts puts every religion at the mercy of judicial popularity.
15
  
The Court may have struggled with the definition of religion, but it had a specific 
religious act clearly in its sights, revealed in the next paragraph: “Polygamy has always been 
odious among the northern and western nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the 
Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and African people” 
(Reynolds at 164). The Court did not further flesh out the significance of this inaccurate 
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historical claim or how it related to the case at hand.
16
 The Court could easily have found 
polygamy in Judeo-Christian history, especially since it was the practice of polygamy by Biblical 
patriarchs that inspired Smith’s adoption of the practice. The practice of a male having more than 
one wife was permitted in Judaism well into the Middle Ages. Catholicism did not explicitly 
reject the practice until the 16
th
 century.
17
 Some openly advocated polygamy during the 
Protestant Reformation of the 1500s, including a community of Protestant Anabaptists in 
Münster, Germany – a nation of northern and western Europe (Aitman & Ginat, 41-41). 
Although the Court’s earlier query “What is religion?” was answered by contrasting 
religion to the State, there seemed no question that the LDS Church qualified as a religion and 
was appropriately seeking refuge in the protection of the First Amendment. The LDS Church 
was founded in the United States and was then flourishing in one of its Territories. The Court 
seemed to consider it relevant that the Mormon polygamists were white and culturally English-
American. 
Next, the Court reviewed English common law prohibiting polygamy, which originated 
in the ecclesiastical courts. The opinion never considered that English courts were operating in a 
country with an official state religion, unlike the United States. Even if these courts considered 
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 “Nowhere in either the Hebrew Bible or the New Testament is polygamy forbidden. 
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polygamy to be an offense against society, that would not automatically apply to a society in a 
nation with no established church and a guarantee of religious free exercise. The one reference to 
religion in the original text of the Constitution (before the Amendment at issue) was to prohibit a 
religious test for holding public office, a direct repudiation of the English religious test designed 
to sort out Catholics from Protestants.
18
 
The Court found special significance in the fact that Virginia enacted a statute making 
polygamy punishable by death in 1788, after it passed Jefferson’s Virginia Bill for Establishing 
Religious Freedom. “From that day until this we think it may safely be said there never has been 
a time in any State of the Union when polygamy has not been an offence against society … In 
the face of all this evidence, it is impossible to believe that the constitutional guaranty of 
religious freedom was intended to prohibit legislation in respect to this most important feature of 
social life” (Reynolds at 165). 
It is quite possible to believe that the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom was 
intended to prohibit the federal government from enacting legislation with regard to marriage as 
a most important feature of social life. As the court noted, most colonies and then states had 
enacted local laws outlawing polygamy. Marriage, divorce and child custody (family law) are 
traditionally governed by states, with sometimes-significant differences among them. If it were 
within the power of states, such as Virginia, to prohibit polygamy, it would be presumably within 
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their power to permit it. The unstated problem was that Utah Territory permitted polygamy, and 
had an extensive set of laws and customs that supported it. Had Utah already been a state, it 
would have been more difficult for the court to pre-empt its authority over domestic matters. 
Congress had passed the Morrill Act specifically to outlaw polygamy as permitted in 
Utah Territory and as practiced by members of the Mormon Church. Some sort of argument was 
necessary to justify this direct conflict with the First Amendment, but none was attempted. This 
was the Court’s justification: “In our opinion, the statute immediately under consideration is 
within the legislative power of Congress. It is constitutional and valid as prescribing a rule of 
action for all those residing in the Territories, and in places over which the United States have 
exclusive control” (Reynolds at 166). 
Waite balanced the interest of Mormons in practicing polygamy with society’s interest in 
marriage. This balancing approach has continued in every subsequent religious free exercise 
case; the First Amendment was not considered to be absolute. In such a context, the way the 
competing interests are described often makes a decisive difference in how the weights are 
balanced. As framed by the Court, the balance was between the future of the United States as a 
democratic nation and the right of Mormons to multiple wives. Waite found that society was 
built upon marriage; quoting Professor Lieber for the proposition that polygamy leads to the 
patriarchal principle, which “fetters the people in stationary despotism” (Reynolds at 166). 
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Although not further qualified in the opinion, Lieber was influential in U.S political and 
legal thought (Soifer, “Francis Lieber”).19 In the article that may have informed the Chief 
Justice’s opinion, Lieber called religion “a purely mental or psychological matter,” saying 
“religious liberty means that no one shall be troubled about his faith – his inner man; but acts 
remain for ever subject to the law” (232). He cataloged crimes and vices that have “at some time 
or other formed an avowed element of religious systems” (233) aiming particular venom at 
Mormons throughout the article, and especially in an extended footnote: “Mormonism, from its 
very beginning, has been encrusted with vulgarity, jugglery, license and muddy materialism. 
That our propositions are loathsome, cannot be urged as a fair objection to them – at least not by 
the Mormons” (233). Attributing monogamy to Greeks, Romans, and Germans, Lieber said “It is 
one of the primordial elements out of which all law proceeds, or which the law steps in to 
recognize and to protect” and is “the foundation of all that is called polity. It is one of the pre-
existing conditions of our existence as civilized white men …” (234). The article concluded that 
the Mormons must not be admitted to the Union. It considered what might be done if an existing 
state “should become as foul and festering as they [Mormons] now are” perhaps by adopting 
French communism, or becoming filled with Chinese so that the whites were absorbed, or 
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Africanized. He stopped short of advocating that such a state could be expelled from the Union, 
only because it would be speculative and he would wait until a specific case arose (236). 
One contemporary Mormon writer criticized the Reynolds opinion for opening what 
became a culture war on all Mormons whether or not they were polygamous,
20
 for the vagueness 
of its belief-conduct distinction, and for the “excessively eclectic” reasoning employed, saying 
that Waite “sifted through both Jefferson’s writings and Lieber’s books to find what was 
supportive while rejecting equally compelling material from these same authors which supported 
the Mormons’ case… Nor did Waite tell his audience that Jefferson was not a Christian but a 
Deist, suspicious of all revealed religion, or that Lieber was as blatantly anti-Mormon as he was 
anti-Catholic – hardly unbiased sources on the duties of the faithful” (Clayton, 50). 
Application 
Although the literal language of the statute limits it to territories, the Reynolds opinion 
has been enforced as applicable within the individual states, as well. However, the opinion gave 
no consideration to issues of federalism or justification for usurping the traditional control of 
states over domestic relations. By enforcing monogamy as the official definition of marriage, the 
Supreme Court established Christianity as the de facto state religion, with Protestant Christianity 
as the preferred expression. 
The Reynolds Court found itself stymied by what is essentially a philosophical puzzle: 
                                                 
20 Idaho Territory enacted a test oath provision that stripped the right to vote from all 
Mormons, whether or not they were involved in plural marital relationships. Idaho Terr. Rev. 
Stat. (1887) § 508. 
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Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief?  To 
permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior 
to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto 
himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances 
(Reynolds at 167). 
Nested within this paragraph are two related concerns: how can one religious belief be 
compromised or privileged when all receive the same Constitutional guarantee, and how can 
government survive if it cannot regulate the religious conduct of its citizens when it conflicts 
with civil laws?  
The idea that every citizen would become a “law unto himself” could be described 
philosophically as relativism:  the concern that what is true, or in this case, morally permissible, 
is not a single objective standard but rather is relative to what different cultures or religions 
allow. In the case of religion, however, religious believers generally agree that truth is objective 
and accessible through belief in a divinity. So, secular thinkers could see the conflicting religious 
claims as relative while the religious adherents see them as one objective truth with competing 
false accounts.  The “law unto himself” worry could be a sort of double-relativism:  what is 
morally permissible is relative to the province of religion generally rather than something else 
(civil law, cultural practice) and, within the set of all religions, some practices are permitted by 
one religion while constrained by another. 
The language of the Court indicates a belief that there is a single, objective standard of 
truth and that Mormons have gotten it wrong:  God does not require polygamy of white 
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Christians in the United States.
21
 At the time of Reynolds, the Court and the country held firmly 
to the social framework of Protestant Christianity; it was the default social construct against 
which other religions and practices were measured. The Court was not quite able to say that the 
LDS church was not a religion within the meaning of the Constitution (although Congress did),
22
 
but it was fully willing to say that polygamy is un-American and a threat to the nation. Further, 
given the historical setting, the concern about a “law unto himself” could have been directed at 
the head of the LDS Church, rather than the individual believer.
23
 
The Court’s choice of a standard also betrays a religious bent: “Laws are made for the 
government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, 
they may with practices“ (Reynolds at 166). Religions that require practices, then, are at a 
disadvantage over religions that require mere belief and opinion. If a creed requires only that a 
person acknowledge Jesus Christ as his/her personal lord and savior, its members are not in 
eternal jeopardy if a civil law requires them to work on the Sabbath or salute the flag or forbids 
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 Chief Justice Waite’s biographer commented that the Chief Justice referred to his opinion 
in Reynolds as his “sermon on the religion of polygamy, one of the most scathing indictments of 
what he considered an immoral practice which he ever delivered from the bench” (Trimble 244 
n. 18). 
22
 The House Judiciary Committee Report on the Morrill Act said that the framers of the 
Constitution and First Amendment “did not mean to dignify with the name of religion a tribe of 
Latter Day Saints disgracing that hallowed name, and wickedly imposing upon the credulity of 
mankind” and “If the odious and execrable heresy of Mormonism can be honored with the name 
of religion” then Utah has established one form of religious worship to the exclusion of all others 
(Brown at 19, fn. 27) 
23
 Vice President Schuyler Colfax, after visiting Salt Lake City in the fall of 1869, argued 
that “it is time to understand whether the authority of the nation or the authority of Brigham 
Young is the supreme power in Utah; whether the laws of the United States or the laws of the 
Mormon Church have precedence within its limits.” (Van Wagoner) 
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multiple marriage partners. Rather than a neutral division of thought and practice, this standard 
privileges Protestant Christianity over almost all others.  
At the time of the Reynolds decision and for decades following, there also was an idea 
that a common “American” culture was to be developed, that the “melting pot” of American 
society would assimilate immigrants into the dominant culture.  More recently, both cultures and 
religions have resisted the pressure to meld into a white, Protestant Christian definition of 
citizenship and have retained individual and group differences. This approach more nearly 
reflects the philosophical idea of pluralism; that groups with differing belief systems coexist and 
maintain unique traditions. The worry about each person being a “law unto himself” is especially 
troubling to civil harmony if there is no prospect of eventual assimilation or agreement on norms 
of conduct. 
Philosophical considerations 
To serve as a contemporary guide to analysis and action, the Reynolds philosophical 
puzzle must answer how we can mediate among various religious beliefs while granting each an 
equal claim to both validity and Constitutional protection. This requires that religious 
belief/acts
24
 have constitutional protections on par with beliefs and opinions. It must also address 
the concerns of those with no religious faith. They existed at the times of the Constitutional 
Convention and later Reynolds decision but not with the openness and comfort of contemporary 
                                                 
24
 I am indebted to Dan Demetriou for suggesting the term “belief/act” to denote an action 
either arising out of a religious belief or constituting the belief itself (i.e., fasting, honoring 
parents). 
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atheists and agnostics. Further, it must develop a ground of legitimacy and authority for civil 
laws that constrain belief/acts by religions that give a higher authority to deity than civil law. 
Post-Reynolds precedent 
 Reynolds began the tortuous path of Constitutional protection for religious free exercise, 
and the philosophical puzzles at the heart of the decision remain unresolved. However, it is 
important to look at two more recent key cases to clear the ground for a new approach. Most of 
the issues that make it to the Supreme Court involve minority religions, due at least in part to 
societal conventions that automatically accommodate mainstream religions. It has been 
unnecessary for Protestant Christians to challenge laws that either favored them or did not 
trouble a religion that requires little in the way of daily practice. These two cases mark the poles 
of religious free exercise jurisprudence. 
Wisconsin v. Yoder 
 Wisconsin v. Yoder stands as a legal high-water mark for accommodation of religion. 
While it is more expansive than other cases that precede or follow it in allowing a religious 
practice to conflict with civil law, it is philosophically troubling. Members of two conservative 
Amish orders challenged Wisconsin’s compulsory secondary school attendance law. According 
to the Supreme Court, the religions “are characterized by a fundamental belief that salvation 
requires life in a church community separate and apart from the world and worldly influence” 
(Yoder at 210). This belief grounds their objection to formal education beyond the eighth grade 
as an impermissible exposure to worldly influences. The trial court determined that the 
Wisconsin law did interfere with sincere Amish religious belief, but found that a law requiring 
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high school attendance for all children was a “reasonable and constitutional exercise of 
governmental power.” 
 The Supreme Court established this standard of evaluation: 
The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those 
interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance 
legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion. We can accept it as settled, 
therefore, that, however strong the State’s interest in universal compulsory 
education, it is by no means absolute to the exclusion or subordination of all other 
interests (Yoder at 215). 
This sets a very high burden for government intrusion upon religion. For the Amish to succeed, 
however, the Court said they must be able to show that their religious faith and way of life are 
“inseparable and interdependent” (Yoder at 215). A virtuous and admirable way of life that is 
based on secular considerations, such as Thoreau’s Walden Pond experience, is not protected by 
the Religion Clauses of the Constitution.   
The Court was persuaded that the Amish met this first obstacle, saying their claim was 
one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately 
related to daily living. … Moreover, for the Old Order Amish, religion is not 
simply a matter of theocratic belief. As the expert witnesses explained, the Old 
Order Amish religion pervades and determines virtually their entire way of life, 
regulating it with the detail of the Talmudic diet through the strictly enforced 
rules of the church community (Yoder at 216). 
… 
In sum, the unchallenged testimony of acknowledged experts in education and 
religious history regarding almost 300 years of consistent practice, and strong 
evidence of a sustained faith pervading and regulating respondents’ entire mode 
of life support the claim that enforcement of the State’s requirement of 
compulsory formal education after the eighth grade would gravely endanger, if 
not destroy, the free exercise of respondent’s religious beliefs (Yoder at 219). 
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For its part, the State of Wisconsin argued that religious beliefs are absolutely free from control 
by the State, but that actions, even if grounded in religious belief, are outside the protection of 
the First Amendment.  
The Supreme Court noted that religiously-grounded conduct is often subject to the police 
power of the State, but that belief/action is not the bright line that Reynolds suggested. “[T]here 
are areas of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and thus 
beyond the power of the State to control, even under regulations of general applicability” (Yoder 
at 220). The compulsory attendance law applied to everyone, not just the Amish, but that didn’t 
automatically save it. A regulation that seems to be neutral might still “unduly burden” the free 
exercise of religion, but a religious exception to a general rule might also be seen as violating the 
Establishment Clause. The Court said this is a tightrope that can be “successfully traversed” by 
charting a course that preserves the autonomy and freedom of religious individuals while 
avoiding a semblance of established religion. 
In its consideration of the arguments advanced by the State of Wisconsin, the Court 
waxed rhapsodic about the virtues of the Amish lifestyle, saying its members are productive and 
very law-abiding members of society, that Congress recognized their self-sufficiency by 
exempting them from social security taxes, that their system of “learning by doing” is an “ideal 
system” of education, comparing them to religious orders in the Middle Ages that preserved 
important values of the civilization of the Western World by isolating themselves from worldly 
influences and to the virtues of Thomas Jefferson’s ‘sturdy yeoman’ who would form the basis 
of an ideal democratic society. 
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The Court found that the Amish were able to establish that they are an identifiable 
religious sect, that their religious beliefs are sincere and interrelated with their daily lives, that 
the Wisconsin law would have a severe impact on their religion, and that their alternative 
“informal vocational education” also met the interests of the State in educating high school 
stuents to contribute to society. “In light of this convincing showing, one that probably few other 
religious groups or sects could make” (Yoder at 236) the Court found that the State failed to 
show how granting an exception would adversely affect its interest in compulsory education. 
It certainly seems plausible that the polygamous Mormons of Reynolds could make the 
same showing. There was no doubt that plural marriage was based upon a sincerely-held 
religious belief, that the law as enforced would result in the extermination of the LDS religion, 
and that the social/legal infrastructure of Utah Territory could meet any State concern about the 
administration of marriage laws. Whereas the Reynolds Court believed that the Mormons had 
gotten their faith wrong, the Yoder Court seemed convinced that the Amish have gotten it right. 
The sets of religious practices differ in that one religion is seen as worthy of admiration and the 
other not. 
Yoder, then presents two questions: did it change the Reynolds analysis, and how do we 
evaluate future claims of religious free exercise? Perhaps the answer to the first question is that 
public attitudes changed from 1878 to 1972, and Reynolds no longer applied as a standard. (It 
certainly seems to apply on the facts, as outlined above). That possibility was raised in Justice 
Douglas’ dissent, “What we do today, at least in this respect, opens the way to give organized 
religion a broader base than it has ever enjoyed, and it even promises that in time Reynolds will 
be overruled” (Yoder at 247). However, Douglas also suggested a less optimistic interpretation: 
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I think the emphasis of the Court on the “law and order” record of this Amish 
group of people is quite irrelevant. A religion is a religion irrespective of what the 
misdemeanor or felony records of its members might be. I am not at all sure how 
the Catholics, Episcopalians, the Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Unitarians 
and my own Presbyterians would make out if subjected to such a test (Yoder 246). 
 On this reading, the Court’s sympathy for both the content and the conduct of the Amish 
religion influenced its result. It made a value judgment about whether Amish belief and practice 
constitute a good religion, entitled to extended protections based upon an affirmative finding. In 
extending benefits to one religion, then, the Court decided whether a group was a religion and 
then whether it was a religion entitled to deference – both determinations that the First 
Amendment denies to the State in the context of free exercise claims. 
 Douglas was also disturbed by the Court’s exclusion of Thoreauean claims of conscience. 
He embraced a more expansive view of religion as outlined in United States v. Seeger in 
determining the meaning of  “religious training and belief” in the Selective Service Act.  
The test might be stated in these words: a sincere and meaningful belief which 
occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by God of those 
admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory definition. 
This construction avoids imputing to Congress an intent to classify different 
religious beliefs, exempting some and excluding others … (Yoder at 248). 
Douglas saw “no acceptable alternative … now that we have become a Nation of many religions 
and sects, representing all of the diversities of the human race” (Yoder at 249, citing Seeger, at 
192-193, concurring opinion). 
In answer to the second question, it would seem that the Yoder Court: removed the belief-
action distinction of Reynolds, kept the requirement that religious conduct be part of an 
identifiable sect (contra Seeger), and required religions to show both that the legally prohibited 
conduct would have a severe impact on their religion and that allowing it would either cause 
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little disruption to the State interest or that there was an alternative method of meeting the State 
interest. The extended paean to the Amish mode of life could be considered as nonbinding dicta 
(in a harmless interpretation) or could open the door to an evaluation of the merits of religion (in 
a pernicious reading). The revelatory test occurred when a less exalted religion sought First 
Amendment protection in the face of a more pressing State interest before a far less sympathetic 
Supreme Court. 
Employment Division vs. Smith. 
Two members of the Native American Church were fired from their jobs with a private 
drug rehabilitation organization in 1983 and 1984 because they ingested sacramental peyote 
during religious ceremonies. They applied for unemployment benefits, which were denied 
because their firing was considered work-related misconduct. The court case arose amid two 
protracted battles, one national and one in Oregon. The national battle was the War on Drugs 
declared by President Nixon in 1971. Although not part of the official case, a far different 
religious issue likely spurred the Oregon Attorney General’s insistence in pursuing it.  
In Oregon, a prolonged religious battle was waged between followers of Bhagwan Shree 
Rajneesh and local residents of Wasco County. The religious followers incorporated 
Rajneeshpuram as a city that reached a population of 7,000 for a time. Disputes with neighbors 
frequently played out in court, but also included charges of poisoning hundreds to prevent them 
from voting by infecting restaurant salad bars with salmonella. That extended political and legal 
battle began in the early 1980’s and ended at the Oregon Supreme Court in 1987 (1000 Friends 
of Oregon v. Wasco County Court). The Oregon Court of Appeals ruled on Employment Division 
v. Smith in 1987; the Oregon Supreme Court ruled on it in 1986 and again in 1988 (between the 
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two rulings, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the case and remanded it for clarification of the 
basis for the Oregon Supreme Court’s judgment). 
The ongoing dispute between followers of Rajneesh and other local residents involved 
planning, zoning, state land-use plans and nearly every function of municipal government, as 
well as criminal charges. If every law at every level could be abrogated by a mere claim of 
religious purpose, it would leave long-time local residents legally defenseless against the newer 
religious arrivals. On a superficial view of the parallel cases, it might have seemed necessary to 
state officials that they dig in against the drug-use exception for peyote in order to remain 
consistent in their opposition to religiously-cloaked misbehavior in and around Rajneeshpuram. 
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion for the Supreme Court, noting at the outset that 
the exercise of religion can include not only belief and profession, but also “The performance of 
(or abstention from) physical acts: assembling with others for a worship service, participating in 
sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing, abstaining from certain foods or certain modes 
of transportation” (Smith at 877). He speculated that the free exercise of religion would be 
implicated if the State tried to ban acts only because of their religious character: “It would 
doubtless be unconstitutional, for example, to ban the casting of ‘statues that are to be used for 
worship purposes,’ or to prohibit bowing down before a golden calf” (Smith at 877-878). The 
problem for the dismissed drug counselors was that their activity violated criminal laws when the 
purpose of the anti-drug laws was not to prevent religious behavior. If the purpose of the law is 
not to prohibit religious free exercise but “merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable 
and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended,” Scalia wrote (Smith 
at 878). The Smith opinion returned to Reynolds, quoting with approval the distinction between 
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belief and practice, including the specific worry: “To permit this would be to make the professed 
doctrines of religious belief superior to the laws of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen 
to become a law unto himself” (Smith at 879). 
How, then, to deal with Yoder? Scalia grouped it with other First Amendment cases that 
combined two Constitutional claims (a free exercise claim along with interests of parenthood or 
with freedom of speech or press) as hybrid situations. Decades of religious free exercise rulings 
were dispensed with by this felicitous definition. 
Respondents urge us to hold, quite simply, that when otherwise prohibitable 
conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, not only the convictions but the 
conduct itself must be free from governmental regulation. We have never held 
that, and decline to do so now. … [T]he rule to which we have adhered ever 
since Reynolds plainly controls (Smith at 882, emphasis added) 
Scalia rejected the idea that the government must show a “compelling state interest” to be 
permitted to burden religion, even though that is the standard for different treatment on the basis 
of race or the content of speech. He said that in those cases, the standard produced equality of 
treatment and free speech, which are core constitutional norms. Applied to religion, however, the 
standard would produce “a private right to ignore generally applicable laws”-- a constitutional 
anomaly. He also rejected a move to require a compelling state interest only when the conduct at 
issue is “central” to the religion, saying it is inappropriate for a Court to determine how central a 
belief is to any religion: 
What principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a believer’s 
assertion that a particular act is “central” to his personal faith? Judging the 
centrality of different religious practices is akin to the unacceptable “business of 
evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims.” … Repeatedly and in 
many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not presume to 
determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a 
religious claim (Smith at 887). 
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Following a fine apocalyptic tradition in Constitutional scholarship, Scalia presented a 
parade of horribles that if the “compelling state interest” test were applied in a society as diverse 
as the United States: “[P]recisely because we value and protect that religious divergence, we 
cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, 
every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order.” To do so 
would allow exemptions from: compulsory military service, payment of taxes, health and safety 
regulation such as manslaughter and child neglect laws, compulsory vaccination laws, drug laws, 
social welfare legislation such as minimum wage laws, animal cruelty laws, environmental 
protection laws, and laws providing for the equality of opportunity for races (Smith at 888-889). 
     Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion said those prior cases demonstrate that the 
court has been quite capable of striking “sensible balances” between religious liberty and 
competing state interests (Smith at 902). In response, Scalia said, “It is a parade of horribles 
because it is horrible to contemplate that federal judges will regularly balance against the 
importance of general laws the significance of religious practice” (Smith at 891). 
He suggested that religious practices instead seek protection in the legislature, giving as 
an example that many states had exempted religious use of peyote from drug laws. He admitted, 
“It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative 
disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in,” but he saw the alternative 
as worse, because this “unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to 
a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social 
importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs” (Smith at 890).  
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In the push to the legislature, Scalia ignored two counterexamples, both noted in the case 
before the Court. During Prohibition, an exemption for communion wine was written into the 
governing administrative rules.
25
 It was unnecessary for Christians or Jews to seek protection 
from the legislature because a sympathetic government automatically provided it. The use of 
peyote for the Native American Church holds a metaphysical position similar to the communion 
wine of Catholicism.
26
 The difference in protections illustrates the religious bias in favor of 
majority religions built into the government (and, that by the time of Prohibition, Roman 
Catholics were considered more favorably than they were at the time of Reynolds). 
The second counterexample is Minersville School District v. Gobitis. The Supreme Court 
ruled that Jehovah’s Witnesses could be required to salute the flag in school. At the end of the 
decision, Justice Frankfurter suggested that, while judicial review is an important limitation on 
popular government, the legislature is also committed to the “guardianship of deeply cherished 
liberties. … To fight out the wise use of legislative authority in the forum of public opinion and 
before legislative assemblies, rather than to transfer such a contest to the judicial arena, serves to 
vindicate the self-confidence of a free people.” The problem for Scalia is that Frankfurter’s 
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 National Prohibition Act, Title II, § 3, 41 Stat. 308, cited in footnote 6 of Justice 
Blackmun’s dissent. 
26
 While wine is used in Jewish traditions and some Protestant communion services, it is 
considered to be symbolic for most. Lutherans hold a view called consubstantiation, in which the 
body and blood of Jesus Christ coexist with the bread and wine. The Roman Catholic Church 
teaches that the bread and wine transform into the actual body and blood of Christ through a 
doctrine called transubstantiation. This metaphysical transformation is a culminating moment in 
the Catholic Mass and cannot take place if substitutions are made, for example, grape juice rather 
than wine (or non-wheat bread). I have written on the philosophical significance of this in my 
2007 article: Transubstantiation in Aquinas and Ockham, NEXT: Emerging Voices in Religious 
Studies Scholarship, Vol. 1.  University of Colorado. 
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position was overturned three years later when the Court reversed itself and responded directly 
by saying: 
The very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the 
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities 
and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. 
One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of 
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to 
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections. (West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette (1943) 319 U.S. 624). 
The retreat to the belief-action distinction of Reynolds got judges out of the business of 
evaluating religious content and conduct, towards which Yoder teetered. But it came at a high 
price.  Smith allowed government again to forbid religious belief/acts as long as the offending 
law is not explicitly and directly aimed at them. While some laws will still be so inartfully drawn
 
as to be invalid,
`27
 it is far more common that religion is burdened as an incidental side effect of 
an otherwise neutral law. To leave that as the standard of protection for religious belief/acts 
eviscerates the free exercise guarantee of the First Amendment. 
Jurisprudential puzzles 
Religion clause jurisprudence has reached “a state of incoherence that leaves many 
uncomfortable, both on and off the bench” (French 90). Following the Smith decision, Congress 
signaled its discontent by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which the 
Supreme Court struck down in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). “After a 
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 “[T]he laws in question were enacted by officials who did not understand, failed to 
perceive, or chose to ignore the fact that their official actions violated the Nation’s essential 
commitment to religious freedom.” Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 
524 regarding Santeria practices. 
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majority relegated religious freedom to majoritarian political process in Smith, the Court in 
Boerne invalidated one of the clear products of that practice – RFRA, passed by a nearly 
unanimous Congress” (Soifer, “Fullness of Time,” 263). In her lengthy dissent, Justice O’Connor 
cited many examples of exceptions given to members of religions in the early days of the country 
that parallel recent cases where accommodation has been denied. There seems to be no 
principled approach to evaluating religious exercise claims. 
To the “each conscience is a law unto itself” of Reynolds, Smith added the concern that 
“judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.” 
Granted, the approach of Yoder is worrisome, in that the value of religion to society seems 
important. But are judges really not able to tell the difference between “the practice of throwing 
rice at church weddings … and the practice of getting married in church?”28 Those kinds of 
decisions seem to be at the heart of most judicial determinations. And if it is not to be judges, are 
legislatures more qualified to assess how much a law burdens a specific religion? Would they not 
look to the same sort of evidence? Our first new worry is: who decides how to accommodate 
religious practices. 
The second new worry is what exactly counts as a religious act. This concern was 
removed by Yoder, but Smith reintroduced the belief/action distinction. The majority opinion 
noted that religious belief includes some acts: assembling for worship, sacramental use of bread 
and wine, proselytizing, abstaining from certain foods or modes of transportation. It provides no 
guidance for assessing whether a religious act comes within the protection of the First 
                                                 
28
 Majority opinion footnote 4. 
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Amendment, except to say that the sacramental use of peyote during religious services does not 
because that act violates a law that is not specifically directed at the religious nature of the 
practice. The character of the act is not at issue. It seems that religious belief is protected and an 
act motivated by religious belief is protected if a law targets the belief, but the same act is not 
protected if a law targets the practice regardless of belief. The underlying religious belief is the 
same in either case, and the religious act is the same in both.  The only thing that has changed is 
the intent of the law. This changes the standard for assessing infringement from whether 
religious free exercise was burdened to whether the government intended to burden religious free 
exercise. Thus the Reynolds belief-practice division remains with the caveat that practices 
specifically targeted by laws directed at religious belief move to the protected side of the line. 
On this analysis, the Morrill Act targeting polygamy because it was a practice of the LDS 
Church specifically fails. Certainly the set of laws passed in the effort to exterminate polygamy 
is legally similar to the group of municipal ordinances targeting Santeria animal sacrifice 
invalidated by the post-Smith court.  
But the ordinances when considered together disclose an object remote from these 
legitimate concerns [suffering or mistreatment of animals]. The design of these 
laws accomplishes instead a ‘religious gerrymander,” … an impermissible attempt 
to target petitioners and their religious practices. It is a necessary conclusion that 
almost the only conduct subject to [the ordinances] is the religious exercise of 
Santeria church members. The texts show that they were drafted in tandem to 
achieve this result. (Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., et al v. City of 
Hialeah at 535).  
Smith purports to return to the Reynolds analysis without revisiting the underlying core conflict. 
Perhaps the Court was so distracted by the parade of horribles Yoder would seem to permit that it 
sought improvident refuge. 
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Back to polygamy 
Although the LDS church renounced the practice of polygamy (at first reluctantly and 
later enthusiastically), other religions sharing the same prophetic roots have retained the belief 
that plural marriage is essential for salvation. Some left the United States for Canada or Mexico, 
others moved to remote locations in the U.S. southwest. Members of these groups have 
continued to lodge futile legal protests to both the civil and criminal bans on polygamy. Until 
2015, no case was able to successfully challenge polygamy in Utah state or federal district 
courts. That changed, due (at least in part) to two television programs. 
 A sympathetic account of fictional polygamist families in HBO’s Big Love (2006-2011) 
spawned a reality show called Sister Wives (2011-2015) on TLC network.
29
 That program 
featured Kody Brown and his four wives, who lived in a religious polygamist relationship in 
Utah. The public exposure forced the hand of Utah law enforcement officials. The state had 
adopted a policy of not prosecuting polygamy unless another criminal charge, such as spousal or 
child abuse, was alleged. Embarrassed by the open flouting of the law by the Brown family, the 
county attorney launched an investigation into their legal status. The Browns moved out of Utah, 
and filed a lawsuit challenging the state statute that bans marriage, purported marriage, and/or 
cohabitation of more than one man and one woman. 
While some prior plaintiffs had sought multiple marriage licenses (Bronson v. Swenson), 
the Brown family claimed only that they should not be subject to arrest for their personal 
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 Another reality program called My Five Wives aired on TLC for two seasons, from 2013-
2015. The Williams family remained polygamist after leaving their church. 
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relationships. They held one marriage license, between Kody and his first wife.
30
 The subsequent 
wives did not request legal status as spouses. The legal battle over polygamy had earlier attracted 
the attention of legal scholar and Constitutional law professor Jonathan Turley. He volunteered 
to represent the Brown family free of charge. Their legal challenge detailed seven constitutional 
claims: due process, equal protection, free speech, free association, free exercise, the 
Establishment Clause, and 42 U.S.D. § 1983 (Brown v. Buhman). 
The Brown family’s Establishment Clause challenge was to the 1973 Utah Statute 
banning polygamy and cohabitation. It argued that the statute was the result of a “sectarian 
dispute” over the practice of polygamy between the LDS Church and members of fundamentalist 
religions with Mormon roots. Turley’s brief included statistics showing that 62% of the Utah 
population belonged to the LDS Church, including 90% of the 75 Utah House members and 27 
of 29 senators. The Brown family argued this makes the LDS Church the de facto established 
religion in the state, especially on issues on which it takes an official stand.  Federal District 
Court Judge Clark Waddoups noted that “it is perhaps a bitter irony of the history at issue here 
that it is possible to view the LDS Church as playing the role of both victim and violator in the 
saga of religious polygamy in Utah (and America)” (Brown at 14). 
As defined in the Utah statute (passed by the LDS-dominated legislature long after the 
church disavowed polygamy), cohabitation can include people in adulterous relations. Since the 
law seems to be neutral on its face, the Judge Waddoups examined whether it was neutral in 
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 That changed in 2014 when they obtained a civil divorce and Kody performed a civil 
marriage ceremony with his fourth wife. All four remained spiritual wives. 
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operation, observing, “[T]he court notes the commonplace occurrence of cohabitation in 
contemporary society” (Brown at 54).  
During oral argument, he posed a series of scenarios to the assistant attorney general 
representing the state. 
1. Court: a man has intimate relationships with three different women, who live in 
different residences and he has children with all of them. There is no marriage license 
or recognized public document that he is married to any. State: that would not be 
called polygamy because there is no marriage. (Although, the judge noted that in a 
prior case, the State applied to have one of the relationships declared to be a legal 
marriage so that the husband could then be charged with bigamy under the 
cohabitation statute (State of Utah v. Green) The defendant in that case had also 
appeared on national television.) 
2. Court: a man is legally married to one woman but has intimate sexual relationships 
continuing with two other women, with no commitment. State: this situation is no 
different from someone having an affair, the cohabitation statute does not apply. 
3. Court: a man is legally married to one woman and has intimate relationships with two 
other women but to one of the women he says “I’m committed to this woman, I’m 
going to take care of her for the rest of her life.” State: this may not change the 
analysis because there has to be a second marriage of some sort. 
4. Court: the man from scenario 3 makes the same profession before a Jewish rabbi. 
State: it is not the fact of recognition by the religion, but when they hold themselves 
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out as husband and wife, that the statute applies. If the couple says they are not 
married but just living together, the statute does not apply. 
The exchange continued for some time, with the assistant attorney general finally linking the 
statute directly to religious polygamy: 
But let’s look at how this really works in practice. In practice, there is the 
marriage, it may not be recognized by the state, but it is a marriage, it’s 
performed, there is a wedding ceremony performed, there are vows exchanged. 
The problem is proving it. The federal government had that problem in the 1880s. 
That’s why they added cohabitation to the Edmunds Statute. The same thing with 
the Utah statute. The problem was proving that they were married, so they added 
cohabitate, but the person has to cohabitate knowing that the other person is 
married … 
Court: so tell me what’s different between adultery and what you’ve just 
described. State: the one is that they claim to be married. But just because the 
state can’t prove it doesn’t mean it hasn’t happened. That’s what’s happening in 
the [religious] polygamist communities. Court: so it’s the expression of the fact 
that the person is a wife that makes it illegal. State: yes. (Brown at 59-62) 
The summary of facts compiled by the judge includes: prosecutions under the statute have been 
rare and published cases in the last three decades only involve religious families; Utah 
government officials are aware of thousands of polygamist families in the state, but investigation 
of the Brown family began only after the first episode of Sister Wives aired. 
The 91-page opinion contained multiple references to the lack of effort made by the State 
of Utah, which clearly felt that mentioning Reynolds was all that was necessary to prevail. “It 
would be an easy enough matter for the court to do as Defendant urges … defaulting simply to 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) without seriously addressing the much developed 
constitutional jurisprudence that now protects individuals from the criminal consequences 
intended by legislatures to apply to certain personal choices” (Brown at 10). Waldoupps 
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evaluated each of the claims, and found for the Brown family on the issue of cohabitation – a 
ruling that was hailed as a landmark at the time (Bryson, n.p.). However, he felt bound by 
Reynolds on the issue of marriage, even after criticizing its many legal and philosophical failings. 
The court notes that 113 years after Reynolds, non-Mormon counsel for Plaintiffs 
have vigorously advanced arguments in favor of the right of religious polygamists 
to practice polygamy (through private “spiritual” marriages not licensed or 
otherwise sanctioned by the state, a relationship to which the court will refer as 
“religious cohabitation”) that would have perhaps delighted Mormon Apostles 
and polygamy apologists throughout the period from 1852 to approximately 1904. 
To state the obvious, the intervening years have witnessed a significant 
strengthening of numerous provisions of the Bill of Rights, and a practical and 
morally defensible identification of “penumbral”31 rights “of privacy and repose” 
emanating from those key provisions of the Bill of Rights, as the Supreme Court 
has over decades assumed a general posture that is less inclined to allow 
majoritarian coercion of unpopular or disliked minority groups, especially when 
blatant racism (as expressed through Orientalism/imperialism), religious 
prejudice, or some other constitutionally suspect motivation, can be discovered 
behind such legislation (internal citations omitted) (Brown at 11). 
Pointing to a change in legal precedent is one facet of determining how claims of 
religious exercise should be evaluated. However, as the Supreme Court noted in its opinion 
legalizing same-sex marriage, “The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our 
own times” (Obergefell v. Hodges, 11). It is easier to identify past wrongs than to predict future 
inequity, and most difficult still to decide in the midst of a current controversy.   
Chapter Two begins that task by considering a functional definition of religion that 
includes the power relationship identified by Reynolds, but extends it to the lives of individuals 
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 A penumbra is a space of partial illumination between shadow on all sides and full light. 
Henley (81-100) traces the legal development of the term from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in 
1873 to its more recent usage by Justice William O. Douglas in recognizing a right to privacy in 
Griswold v. Connecticut: “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by 
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance” (Griswold at 484).   
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who seek to express religion freely. These individuals will differ in beliefs about what has been 
called “the metaphysics of ultimate reality” that include differences in personal identity. This 
approach will be guided by the philosophy of José Ortega y Gasset on the nature of the self and 
how to reconcile conflicting points of view. It also considers the interaction of toleration and 
religion, and explores how misidentification of the appropriate target of toleration harms 
religious believers.  
Chapter Three will make use of philosophy to consider what has changed between the 
marriages (and court cases) of George Reynolds and Kody Brown, guided by the philosophy of 
Ibn Khaldun. His concept of social/cultural identity will be defined and applied to the context 
within which religious free exercise claims arise, and how to address changes in that context over 
time. I will apply the functional definitions of religion and personal identity from Chapter Two in 
an Islamic perspective by looking at how Morocco handles polygamy.  
Finally, Chapter Four grounds and then rejects the approach of considering religious 
exercise as requests for exemptions from neutral laws. It uses the example of Islamic veils to 
illustrate the difference between creating exceptions and accommodating identity. I set two 
constraints on accommodation of belief/acts that conflict with social/cultural identity. The 
chapter then returns to the social and political context of the original Reynolds opinion to ask 
what the court could have done differently at the time to accommodate Reynolds and engender a 
more coherent approach to the family of Kody Brown. 
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CHAPTER TWO: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The precise point of the inquiry is, what is the religious 
freedom which has been guaranteed. 
-- Reynolds v. United States at 162 
The Supreme Court is not alone in struggling to identify or define religion. After 
surveying several attempts at definition, the editor of a textbook on philosophy of religion 
concludes that “a considerable degree of consensus has emerged amongst scholars of religion 
that it is not possible – or perhaps even desirable – to define religion so as to completely remove 
any and all ambiguity about whether a particular thing is a religion or not” (Eshleman, 4). 
Comparative religion scholar Wilfred Cantwell Smith devoted a chapter in his book The 
Meaning and End of Religion to a discussion of whether the concept of “religion” serves any 
useful purpose. He noted that a historian of religion asks different questions than a philosopher 
of religion or man of faith, saying “The rich panorama of man’s religious life over the centuries 
presents the observer with a bewildering variety of phenomena” (Smith, 4). 
The approach of this chapter is to build upon Chapter One’s description of how law has 
treated religion to consider how law should treat religion. For, as Cantwell Smith also observed 
“Yet religion itself continues, and in many parts of the world appears perhaps to be resurgent. 
For a time some thought that the onslaught of science, comparative religion, uncertainty, and the 
rest – in a word, the onslaught of modernity – meant or would mean the gradual decline and 
disappearance of the religious tradition. This no longer seems obvious” (Smith, 3). There would 
be no pressing need to inquire into the religious freedom that is guaranteed by the First 
Amendment if contested issues no longer made their way to court. 
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Limiting the inquiry to the interaction of religion with law may reduce the scope without 
increasing the focus, however. Rebecca Redwood French chronicled the Supreme Court’s 
struggle to either define or characterize the term “religion,” saying that it has stumped the Court 
and its commentators.  
By the 1990s, a significant section of the academy has given up on the endeavor 
entirely, others have declared that looking for a single definition … is not useful, 
and a third group has turned to a wealth of interdisciplinary sources. The 
appearance of deep incoherence in the religion-related decisions by the Court in 
the past decade is often cited as the reason for the continuing move to definition 
in the legal academy (French, 49). 
In her delightfully-entitled article “From Yoder to Yoda: Models of Traditional, Modern, 
and Postmodern Religion in U.S. Constitutional Law,” French looked at how members of the 
Court regard any particular religion. She abstracted and analyzed all the First Amendment cases 
to extract hundreds of “contextualized quotes characterizing religion” (French, 55). From these, 
the language was grouped into categories, and then into clusters of types of religion. She found, 
and wrote descriptions for, the three basic types of religion listed in the title of her article. French 
found that each type occurred both positively and negatively in Court opinions. The traditional 
model “has a positive normative weight when it represents an American Quaker in the founding 
period … but it has a negative weight when it is used to typify the former Hindu practice of 
suttee [in Reynolds]. …   Both images are derived from the central prototype of a devout 
population with a strong religious cosmology” (French, 57). The conclusion and predictive value 
that French proposes for her study are philosophically disturbing: “The opinions of the Court are 
determined, to a large degree, by the stereotypical images that the Justices have of the particular 
religion involved in the case” (French, 91). 
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Philosopher Brian Leiter has argued that the problem is not definition, but rather 
justification. He attempted to make the case that there is no reason for giving religion qua 
religion special treatment in law. In his book Why Tolerate Religion?, Leiter began with the 
example of a boy who enters a new middle-school classroom wearing a dagger on his belt. The 
teacher alerts the principal, who calls police, who confiscate the dagger because weapons are not 
allowed in school. Leiter wondered why the boy would be allowed to wear the dagger if he is a 
member of the Sikh religion but not if the dagger were a family heirloom, passed on through the 
generations as a signifier of “manhood.” In both cases, carrying the dagger is central to the boy’s 
identity. He argued that both boys should be out of luck. He maintained that there has been no 
principled argument for why religious practices should receive special legal and moral treatment. 
While I disagree with Leiter on his conclusion, I agree with this goal: 
Any examination of religion ought to do some justice to our pretheoretical 
intuitions about what counts as religion. An analysis according to which 
Catholicism is not a religion, but devotion to one’s favorite football team in the 
World Cup is a religion is prima facie (and probably irredeemably) deficient. But 
pretheoretical intuitions about what counts as religion are not the only relevant 
considerations. Most important, we want to identify religion in such a way that we 
can see why it has some moral and possibly legal claim on special treatment 
(Leiter, 30). 
Leiter offered four characteristics of religion: 
1. Religions issue demands on action that believers take to be categorical – demands 
that must be satisfied no matter what the consequences are in terms of worldly 
incentives or disincentives. 
2. Religious doctrines are insulated from ordinary standards of evidence and rational 
justification. 
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3. Religious beliefs involve a metaphysics of ultimate reality. He uses “ultimate” to 
mean most important for “valuable/worthwhile/desirable human lives …  that is, the 
reality that makes their lives worthwhile and meaningful” (Leiter, 48). 
4. Religions offer existential consolation, they render intelligible and tolerable the basic 
existential facts about human life, such as suffering and death. 
Leiter used the third factor to rule out groups like Maoist personality cults from the 
definition of religion. However, he quickly decided that it is unnecessary because number two 
already captures what is significant about religion (the metaphysical character of religious beliefs 
about ultimate reality) and many non-religious belief systems are also concerned about human 
welfare. The remainder of his analysis relied only upon factors one, two and four. He considered 
whether religion so defined is worthy of either toleration or respect on Kantian or Utilitarian 
grounds, concluding that there should be no exemptions from neutral laws for religious conduct. 
Leiter’s treatment of the metaphysics of religious belief, however, keeps a focus on 
actions arising out of religious commitment without addressing the most basic metaphysical 
question: what exists? Leiter’s “ultimate reality” (what makes life worthwhile) is only 
answerable by reference to that more basic question. Rather than serving no practical purpose, 
the metaphysics of ultimate reality is the heart of religion. The schoolboy who wears a dagger 
given to him by his father when he reached manhood does not believe that it will be a 
consideration in what happens to him after death. The Sikh schoolboy’s dagger wearing is a 
belief/act that impacts his eternal existence. 
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I propose that the concept of religion contains three interrelated aspects that are often 
conflated. Teasing them apart illustrates why the question of religious belief and behavior is so 
vexatious. It also allows us to consider law’s appropriate response to each aspect.  
Refocusing religion 
Mormon polygamy in the United States fused this religious practice with political 
significance. It was not difficult for the Reynolds court to identify religion as a competing 
normative authority. Government limited marriage to one man and one woman of the same race 
(if they were white); the LDS church required polygamy of those who were selected. A second 
concern was less certain. If there is a divine mandate for plural marriage, what can civil 
government rely upon as authority to forbid the practice? It is a question that arises because the 
civil government is committed to allowing religious diversity, and religions make competing 
claims about what actually exists – the metaphysics of reality. Rather than a detailed doctrinal 
survey, this aspect is captured by asking: what happens when human beings die?  The answer 
leads to the third relevant aspect of religion that Reynolds mentioned but did not explore: religion 
includes an account of embodiment. These three aspects of religion must be addressed in any 
satisfactory framework for evaluating religious free exercise – and a philosophical analysis of 
each points to a possible resolution. 
Competing normative authorities 
The interaction between civil government and religion varies by country. The First 
Amendment to the Constitution defines that relationship in the United States: all religions are 
permitted but none may be favored. The Reynolds court, then, made a sort of category error 
when it looked to English common law for precedent in handling polygamy as a religious 
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practice. The Church of England is established as the official religion, so its beliefs may be 
favored when regulating practices of citizens in that country. Indeed, the opinion notes that the 
prohibition on polygamy originated in ecclesiastical courts. But an established church was one of 
the very things rejected by the framers of the U.S. Constitution. The identification of the proper 
relationship between civil laws and religious practices, then, is only the beginning of the inquiry, 
rather than the conclusion. It sets the terms of engagement.  
The relationship of church and state as competing normative authorities in the United 
States may be described as one of mutual toleration.
32
 The government “puts up with” the 
different demands of religion upon its citizens. Churches recognize that they may not seek 
governmental preference, and that some limits on their authority may be imposed. In a country 
with varying religious beliefs and no state religion, conflict is inevitable. Reynolds correctly 
determined that the right to religious exercise cannot be unlimited if civil government is to 
survive. The challenge is to determine when and how the government may intrude upon religious 
exercise, rather than pretending that regulating religious actions is no imposition upon belief. 
Metaphysics of reality 
Religions make conflicting claims about what exists – the metaphysics of reality. One 
way to categorize these claims is by asking what happens at death. One option is that the death of 
the material body is the end of life, simpliciter. A second option is that some sort of non-physical 
life continues, as a spiritual or energy force, or through reincarnation. The common theme for 
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 “The word toleration had its origins in the Latin term tolerantia, meaning to endure or 
bear ... In the 16
th
 century, the noun form of the word appeared, meaning the permission or 
concession allowing another religion to exist” (Creppell 8-9). 
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this option is that the entity after death is not aware of the memories or activities of the entity 
before death. A third option is that some sort of individuated life continues, which retains 
memories of, and perhaps responsibility for, the experiences of the entity before death. This may 
include resurrection of the physical body, as in both Christianity and Islam. 
This functional definition of religion helps to illustrate why religious actions are both 
important and problematic. They impact eternity, yet are impervious to verification when law 
matters - before death. The lack of epistemic access creates another baseline for interactions 
between church and state, or civil authority and citizens. It requires that government adopt a 
stance of ontological agnosticism. There is a fact of the matter about what happens at death but it 
cannot be accessed to determine which, if any, of the three options in my functional definition of 
religion is correct. From a religious point of view, the existence of an afterlife is taken as a fact. 
It is this perspective that generally creates Court cases concerning belief/acts, so is the focus of 
analysis going forward. 
 Underlying the campaign against polygamy conducted by the U.S. government was the 
attitude that Mormons were wrong about the importance of polygamy to eternal salvation (of the 
option three, Protestant Christian type), so prohibiting it did no metaphysical insult. Whether or 
not that was acceptable as a governmental attitude in the 1800s, it is no longer an adequate 
foundation for either legislation or jurisdiction in the U.S. as a multicultural, multi-religious 
society. 
  60 
Embodied eternal identity 
The religious options outlined above do more than describe what happens at death, they 
define how we live. Rather, they define who we are as we live. On option one, I am an embodied 
intelligence that will cease when my body dies. Option two defines me as an intelligence with a 
spirit or essence that will continue after the death of my physical body. This spirit may, or may 
not, be impacted by the actions of my physical body during life. Option three makes significant 
demands upon my embodied existence. As I live each day, I am a body with an intelligence and 
an eternal essence, or soul. This invisible identity is the most important, because it continues for 
eternity. On the LDS view, it also pre-dates my physical existence: my currently-invisible self 
exists as an individuated essence both before and after embodiment. 
The Supreme Court acknowledged that George Reynolds believed practicing polygamy 
was essential to his salvation. At the time, it was a threshold consideration, in that his marriage 
was based upon a belief that was taken to be religious and sincere. No other components of 
personal identity that now receive Constitutional protection would have been relevant at the 
time.
33
 Although they had recently been freed from slavery, black men were far from equal 
citizens. Women not only lacked the right to vote, they also lost rights to person, property and 
progeny upon marriage. The idea that a man and woman of different races might marry was 
almost 90 years away (Loving v. Virginia). Protections for sexual orientation or same-sex 
marriage were even more distant. 
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 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment now protects such fundamental 
liberties. 
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Interacting Identity 
Two concepts that will refocus religious exercise are found in the work of Spanish 
philosopher José Ortega y Gasset. Ortega wrote extensively about political issues, as Spain 
worked through civil war and several forms of government during his lifetime. He was educated 
in Jesuit schools but was not a religious man. If presented with problems about the interaction of 
government and religion, his first concern would have been to eliminate any influence of religion 
upon civil life; his second would have been to increase the rigor of religious rhetoric and logic. 
In this spirit, he is a most appropriate philosophical patron saint for this dissertation. 
Ortega was born in 1883 into a family of Spanish newspaper publishers.
34
 When young, 
his family spent each fall and winter in Córdoba or Málaga. Ortega studied under the Jesuits in 
Málaga and went on to pursue philosophy, letters and law at the University of Salamanca, where 
Miguel de Unamuno was one of his examiners. He received a licenciatura in philosophy and 
letters from the Central University of Madrid in 1902. Ortega studied philosophy in Germany on 
two occasions as a young adult, including neo-Kantianism at Marburg under Hermann Cohen 
and Paul Natorp. He also became acquainted with phenomenology. Upon his return to Spain, he 
took up a post as professor of Metaphysics at Central University of Madrid, which he held for 24 
years.  
Spain was beset with political turmoil throughout his life. When military dictator Miguel 
Primo de Rivera closed the University for a time, Ortega delivered a series of lectures on “What 
is Philosophy” in student residence halls, the auditorium of a private school, and a theatre. He 
                                                 
34
 A detailed biography with discussion of Ortega’s many lectures, publications and travels 
is in Holmes, 3-21. 
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was re-appointed to his position as chair by King Alphonso XIII, who later fled the county when 
the second Republic was proclaimed. During the Spanish Civil War, Ortega left for France and 
then Argentina. He returned to Spain at the end of World War II, dying in Madrid in 1955. 
Ortega’s philosophical approach is a variation of perspectivism.35 Perspectivism was 
developed in the 1700s and by 1882 the term was used to describe the theory that the world 
consists of different, equally valid, points of view, each offering a unique perspective that is 
indispensable to the whole. Some aspects of perspectivism appear in many philosophical 
approaches, including phenomenology, existentialism, pragmatism, analytic, and process 
philosophy. What these approaches have in common is a move away from an external standard 
of reality and truth, such as God or a realm of eternal truths or universal concepts. They also 
include the idea that our interaction with the physical world adds an important dimension – for 
some, the only dimension – to truth and reality. Philosophers engaged in perspectivism still 
provide slightly different responses to charges of relativism and how we interact with the world 
and other humans. 
Ortega’s metaphysical innovations provide a different way of looking at how civil 
government may interact with citizens of varying faiths. In each of the concepts, I will describe 
Ortega’s position, and then a modified version of the concept that is catholic, in the sense of 
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 This paragraph and other parts of this section appear in: “Perspectivism” in Multicultural 
America: A Multimedia Encyclopedia, Carlos Eliseo Cortés, J. Geoffrey Bolson, editors, 
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publishing, 2013.DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781452276274.n686 
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universal or all-embracing. But first, it is important to address issues of translation for the names 
of these concepts, and another to be considered in the next chapter. 
About translation 
The terms Ortega used to describe his philosophy of life are problematic when translated 
into English. The English phrases have been too superficial, and yet difficult to dislodge. 
Andrew Dobson defended his translation of razón vital as ‘reason from life’s point of view’ 
against the common rendering of ‘vital reason.’ He noted a previous translator felt compelled to 
use the standard translation but it no longer makes sense in modern English. “Although the word 
for ‘vital’ in English can still mean ‘full of life and force’ or ‘necessary for life’, its primary 
meaning is that of ‘very necessary’ or ‘of the greatest importance’ “ which is inadequate to 
convey the “immediate sense” of the term as Ortega intended it (Dobson 171). 
And yet, he lodged no complaint against the translation of a phrase I find equally 
troublesome: yo soy yo y mi circunstancia as ‘I am I and my circumstances.’ I will avoid the 
common English translation for the same reason: circumstance in English is understood 
differently than Ortega intended it, no matter how closely the words seem to appear. Instead, I 
translated the phrase in context as “enculturing self” to capture both the dynamic and relational 
aspects of human life as described by Ortega. 
Ortega wrote an insightful essay on translation in which he discussed difficulties in 
approach and execution. He concluded that the best translation captures the spirit of the original 
language in the second. 
What is appreciated is … carrying the possibilities of their language to the 
extreme of the intelligible so that the ways of speaking appropriate to the 
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translated author seem to cross into theirs. The German versions of my books are 
a good example of this. In just a few years, there have been more than fifteen 
editions. This would be inconceivable if one did not attribute four-fifths of the 
credit to the success of the translation. And it is successful because my translator 
has forced the grammatical tolerance of the German language to its limits in order 
to carry over precisely what is not German in my way of speaking. In this way, 
the reader effortlessly makes mental turns that are Spanish (Schulte 110). 
Translating “circumstance” as umstande in German, then invokes the sense of lebensumstände 
understood as “life circumstances.” This seems to indicate a closer connection to personal 
identity than the word’s English connotation of external events or actions.  
The majority of contemporary philosophical engagement with Ortega’s thought is done in 
the Spanish language, in Spain and Central/South America. Many articles, lecture notes, and his 
completed works remain untranslated. Popular books have been translated by journalists and 
historians (and one who remained anonymous). Critical engagement with Ortega in English 
reveals current translations to be superficially correct but philosophically under-nuanced. With 
his permission, I translate Ortega to retain some of his rhetorical flair in philosophical terms. The 
original Spanish is quoted in the footnotes. I follow this approach in the next chapter, as well, 
when considering a term used by Ibn Khaldun. 
Enculturing self 
Ortega introduced the concept of a socially-situated self in his first book as a philosophy 
professor, Meditaciones del Quijote, a work he calls amor intellectualis (saying he is 
resuscitating Spinoza’s term). A man, Ortega said, achieves the most of his capacity when he 
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obtains the full awareness of his surroundings.
36
 Through them, he communicates with the 
universe (MQ 9).
37
 To describe what he meant by surroundings, Ortega added the Latin ¡Circum-
stantia! (circum: around, near, among; stantia: stand, remain).
 38
 
The voiceless things that surround us! Very close, so close to us they raise their 
silent features with a gesture of humility and yearning as though desirous that we 
accept their offer yet embarrassed at the obvious planeness of their contribution. 
And we walk among them, blind to them, focusing on remote ventures, planning 
the conquest of far-away hypothetical cities (MQ 9).
39
 
For Ortega, each self is this reciprocal relationship between the body and its surroundings 
(Holmes 85). Huéscar retains the hyphenation when explaining “the locution ‘circum-stance’ … 
refers to the bodily or ‘physical’ world (including my own body and its particularities) and the 
mental ‘world’ (including my own ‘soul’ and its individual characteristics)” (Huéscar 126). 
Dobson adds the dynamism of the relationship “’Things’ in their radical reality are what they are 
in terms of their action on me and in this sense must be conceived of in a transitive rather than a 
static fashion” (Dobson 146). Ortega was never really happy with the term cosas (“things”), 
explaining later “my human life … puts me in direct relation with everything about me -- 
minerals, plants, animals, other men …” (Man and People 59). 
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 El hombre rinde el máximum de su capacidad cuando adquiere la plena consciencia de sus 
circunstancias. Por ellas communica con el universo (9). 
37
 MQ is used to denote Meditactions del Quijote, which was published separately as well as 
in Ortega’s later Obras Completas. 
38
¡La circunstancia! ¡Circum-stantia! 
39
 ¡Las cosas mudas que están en nuestro próximo derredor! Muy cerca, muy cerca de 
nosotros levantan sus tácitas fisonomías con un gesto de humildad y de adhelo, como 
menesterosas de que aceptemos su ofrenda y a la par avergonzadas por la simplicidad aparente 
de su donativo. Y marchamos entre ellas ciegos para ellas, fija la mirada en remotas empresas, 
proyectados hacia la conquista de lejanas ciudades esquemáticas (9). 
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Dobson followed the translation of “realidad radical” as “radical reality” by Willard 
Trask in Man and People,
40
 even though Ortega took pains to explain: “We must go back to an 
order of ultimate reality, to an order or area of reality which because it is radical (that is, of the 
root) ...” (M&P 38). Not radical in the sense of extreme or exhaustive, this root is the reality of 
our individual lives. Ortega roots his perspectivism in the reality of human existence, in the way 
in which embodied individual humans encounter and impact the external world. 
Far from solipsistic, however, on Ortega’s view our individual lives include, and are 
included in, the lives of others. “What we call ‘other people’s lives’ – the life of one’s friend, of 
one’s sweetheart – is something that appears in the scenario that is my life, the life of each, and 
hence supposes that life” (M&P 39). Unlike philosophers who have imagined man as essentially 
isolated, Ortega’s philosophy accounts for the biological fact that humans are born into pre-
existing relationships of family and community. “The part of my world that first appears to me is 
the group of men among whom I am born and begin to live, the family and the society to which 
my family belongs – that is, a human world through which and influenced by which the rest of 
the world appears to me” (OC 7, 151-152). Society, then, is not an institution but a condition in 
which man finds himself “irremediably and without any hope of true escape” (Concord and 
Liberty 33).
41
 
Ortega’s explanation of how we understand others contrasts with the phenomenological 
approach of his contemporary, Edmund Husserl. Husserl used Einfühlung or “empathy” as a 
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 Man and People is abbreviated as M&P hereafter. 
41
 Concord and Liberty is abbreviated as C&L hereafter. 
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theory of how we experience others.
42
 Ortega read this as presenting the “Other” as analogous to 
my “I”. 
‘It is assumed, for him, that it is a double of my “I” and still does not serve the 
function of explaining the most difficult question – namely, how is it possible that 
this “double” of myself continues to appear to me as constituting the other?’ … 
For Ortega, this manifestation of “[my life as] radical reality” constitutes the 
fundamental feature of being-for-and-with-others and consequently cannot be 
explained as an isolated “I” that somehow discovers a way of confronting another 
equally isolated “I”. … The “I” and the other, then, are constituted by their 
appearance before each other, in the common world of society, and as each 
engages in reciprocal interaction (Holmes, n.p.). 
Ortega’s view of how we interact with others opens the possibility for us to experience in our 
lives people with whom we are not empathetic, or sympathetic. We need not understand their 
motivations to realize their impact upon our immediate reality. 
Language is also part of our interaction with our surroundings. The real meaning of a 
word is in the way that it functions in human relationships. “Hence, we must know who says it to 
whom, when and where. Which indicates that meaning, like all things human, depends on 
circumstance” (C&L 12). Verbalization is only part of the meaning that is created in the living 
interaction.
43
 As an example, the word “black” can mean either a color or a mood. But when a 
customer says “black” to the waitress, they both know that it means “no cream in the coffee.” 
                                                 
42
 I have explored the concept of empathy in Desiato, C. & Scheopner, C. “Empathy by 
Design: Enhancing Diversity in Online Participation,” in Practical Wisdom in the Age of 
Technology: Insights, Issues and Questions for a New Millennium, N. Dalal, A. Intezari, M. 
Heitz (Eds.). Gower Publishing (2016). 
43
 Translator Helene Weyl used the English word “vital” for the Spanish “vital,” when 
Ortega’s meaning was “living” rather than “essential.” 
  68 
“What the word fails to say, circumstance mutely adds. … The real meaning of a word is not in 
the dictionary, it is in the instant” (C&L 13). 
Ortega changed the definition of “I” from static to relational – bringing concentric levels 
of experience into what it is to be me. We relate to the world in a dynamic process of becoming, 
rather than being. This means that we have no fixed “nature” but rather a history – social/cultural 
milieu into which we are born and within which we create ourselves. My situation includes the 
physical world – my body, the mental world – my mind/soul, my family, the social and cultural 
world, “opinions, beliefs, ideas, institutions, artifacts, instruments … everything in which I am 
immersed” (Huéscar 126). We exist in the interaction, whether or not we realize it. If we become 
attuned to our surroundings, we become fully human. 
Ortega’s strong reading of this relationship is that there is no “I” to abstract away from 
my surroundings. No “self’ exists outside this ongoing, enculturing relationship. However, a 
weaker reading of the concept is useful in situations with varying views of the self, such as 
religious difference. On that reading, the “I” may be any reading of the self previously described 
(embodied eternal identity). However, it is always influenced by the surrounding culture. 
Individuals who believe that they are adopting a neutral or objective stance are merely unaware 
of their influences and incorrectly perceive themselves as unaffected by them. 
Situated selves 
Ortega introduced his doctrine of the point of view in El tema de nuestro tiempo (TNT). 
Building upon the idea that we are enculturing selves, he added the concept that we each see 
things from our own perspectives.  
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The body in which I live infused, shut up, inexorably makes me a spatial person. 
It puts me in a place and excludes me from other places. It does not permit me to 
be ubiquitous. At each moment, it fastens me to the one place like a nail and 
exiles me from everything else. Everything else, that is, the other things in the 
world, are in other places, and I can only see them, hear them, and sometimes 
touch them, from where I am. … I can change my place, but whatever place it 
may be, it will be my “here.” Apparently here and I, I and here are inseparable for 
life. And since the world, with all the things in it, must be for me from here, it 
automatically changes into a perspective” (Holmes 85). 
It does not make sense to say that one person’s view of their surroundings is false.  Ortega 
rejected the relativistic approach that would say difference is because we don’t know which of 
two conflicting perspectives is really true. That assumes that there is some position that is more 
true than either of theirs – an absolute, or “God’s eye view” to which they defer.  
While Ortega’s perspectivism reflects similarities with Leibniz, in this matter they 
diverge.
44
 Leibniz connected the multiple perspectives to God in two ways: first, God could see 
from any of the perspectives, so the created substances each provide a unique point of view of 
the world; and second, because he is omniscient, God is able to see from each perspective 
simultaneously. For Ortega, “This model landscape does not exist, nor could it exist. Cosmic 
reality is such that it is only possible to see from a certain perspective. Perspective is one of the 
components of reality. Far from being a deformity, it is the organization. The idea that there is 
one reality that will always be the same when seen from any point is an absurd concept” (TNT 
149).
45
 
                                                 
44
 Ortega conducted a detailed analysis of the concept of principle in Leibniz and his 
contributions to mathematics in La Idea de Principio en Leibniz y la Evolución de la Teoría 
Deductiva. 
45
 Ahora bien, ese paisaje arquetipo no existe ni puede existir. La realidad cósmica es tal, 
que sólo puede ser vista bajo una determinada perspectiva. La perspectiva es uno de los 
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If two people arrive at different truths, the difference between their worlds does not mean 
that one is false. “On the contrary, precisely because what they both see is real, each perspective 
produces an aspect of reality. The perspectives are not contradictory, but complementary” (TNT 
150-151).
46
 Each life provides an irreplaceable perspective of the universe.
47
 Truth, or total 
reality, is the accumulation of all points of view from all humans who ever live.  
Ortega’s strong position denied that there is any truth over and above the collection of 
perspectives. A weaker version of the position allows that no abstract perspective is possible in 
this earthly existence, and that we get closer to truth by accumulating perspectives. It is an 
approach that resonates with the legal process. 
Situated, enculturing selves 
The way we see things is influenced not only by our physical connection with what we 
are looking at but also by our experiences of reality. People who have different cultural 
influences have different views of the world. An example of this is a small triangular island in 
Hawai‘i. The Native Hawaiians thought it looked like the fluke at the end of a lizard’s tail and 
called it Mokoli‘i (little lizard). Westerners named the island “Chinaman’s Hat.” The idea of a 
                                                                                                                                                             
componentes de la realidad. Lejos de ser su deformación es su organización. Una realidad que 
vista desde cualquier punto resultase siempre idéntica, es un concepto absurdo (149). 
46
 Dos sujetos diferentes –se pensaba – llegarán a verdades divergentes. Ahora vemos que la 
divergencia entre los mundos de dos sujectos no implica la fasledad de uno de ellos. Al contrario, 
precisamente porque lo que cada cual ve es una realidad y no una ficción, tiene que ser un 
aspecto distinto del que otro percibe. Esa divergencia no es contradicción, sino complemento 
(150-151). 
47
 Cada vida es un punto de vista sobre el universe. En rigor, lo que ella ve no lo puede ver 
oitra. Cada individuo – persona, pueblo, época – es un órgano insustituible para la conquista de 
la verdad (151). 
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triangle-shaped island was common to Hawaiians and westerners so they could each understand 
why the other chose its name, even though they saw something different when they looked 
offshore. I have a clearer understanding of the island when I am both physically near to it and 
when I know why it has two names.
48
  
In this approach, Ortega aligns with Friedrich Nietzsche, who used a comparison with 
perception. The way we see things is influenced by our perspectives – not only our physical 
connection with what we are looking at but also the internal concepts that we use to organize our 
experience of reality. But there is a way that perception and perspective are unrelated. With 
perception, I can point to a physical object that exists apart from my view of it, and I can consult 
laws of optics to determine the accuracy of my perception. If I am colorblind or using binoculars, 
the way that I see the island is affected in predictable ways and I can determine which perception 
is more accurate. However, there is no way for me to experience the world without internal 
concepts. My beliefs influence the way that I see things, and my belief that something is true 
only captures how it appears from my perspective. With no objective reality and no neutral 
standard of truth, each perspective is relative. 
Nietzsche suggested that, while perspectives are unique to the individual, they overlap 
sufficiently that we can communicate, as with the triangle-shaped island. One way that we can 
broaden our own perspective is to try to see things from other points of view. There may still be 
times when perspectives are incommensurable and have views of truth that are incompatible. In 
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 The example of Mokoli‘i is taken from my article: “Perspectivism” in Multicultural 
America: A Multimedia Encyclopedia, Carlos Eliseo Cortés, J. Geoffrey Bolson, editors, 
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publishing (2013). 
  72 
these cases, there is no way to automatically  select one over the other. Because there is no 
privileged perspective, the best we can do is to compare different perspectives to one another to 
expose limitations or evaluate strengths. If many perspectives hold the same view, it is “truer”. 
Nietzsche was comfortable with the idea that there is no such thing as objective Truth.  
By contrast with Nietzsche’s program, a Hegelian might insist that these various 
perspectives are all ultimately compatible by complete historical self-
understanding of the Spirit in the moment of Absolute Knowing. Nietzsche, of 
course, denies that any such a priori guarantee of total success in our cognitive 
enterprise is available. For him, it is an empirical question whether any two 
perspectives useful for knowledge can be reconciled in a single, broader 
perspective; we can only try it and see (Anderson, 20). 
Ortega added social and historical dimensions to the idea of individual perspective. 
Humans relate to the world in a dynamic process of becoming, rather than being. Ortega gave an 
example of how the enculturing and situated selves interact in La deshumanización del arte (OC 
3, 361). He described a man on his deathbed, attended by his wife and a doctor, while a journalist 
reported on the scene and an artist painted them all.  Each person related to the event from a 
different point of view and each had a different story about reality. Certainly the scenario would 
not exist for discussion were there not a man on his deathbed, but the wife’s experience of 
torment or helplessness (or relief) is a perspective which alters the event itself with its presence.  
So, too, with the journalist and the painter.  It may be that the journalist saw something that the 
wife overlooked in her grief – his perspective makes the reality of the event more complete.  
The painter’s detachment may be what was needed for modern art, an approach that 
comes as a result of earlier ones (realism, surrealism) in the sort of historical grounding of 
surpassed perspectives Ortega described for philosophy of history.  In this sense, the painter is an 
intersection of the tools he chooses to use to record the event, his own personal history, the 
  73 
history of art, and the presence of an ill man on his deathbed.  Each of those strands contains 
many contingencies – it is not necessary that he produce this particular painting.  Each 
participant is living the event in Ortega’s point of view of life.  Without any one of them, it 
would be a different event; reality would be different. 
Ortega’s perspectivism is especially apt for this discussion of personal identity. He 
includes history as part of our present because it shapes who we have become, it is “something 
active in us now” (OC V: 40, 55). Holmes describes Ortega’s concept as “the reality of human 
life is the ‘vital’, living action of the present, and one with the past and the future. History 
characterizes what we are, instead of something that we possess” (emphasis added, n.p.). Our 
belief in our future after death is part of our present, of our current personal identity. 
Examining exercise 
The philosophical concepts now join to refocus the interaction between civil authority 
and citizens in the context of religious exercise. From the first section of this refocused approach, 
we take that governments define their relationship with religion as competing normative 
authorities. This relationship may be one of establishment, or varying levels of toleration. In the 
United States, the First Amendment operates to say that all religions will be equally tolerated, 
none will be favored, nor will any be persecuted. It is a relationship between institutions, of 
which citizens are simultaneous members. This is a goal toward which the government (courts, 
legislatures, presidents) has made imperfect progress. But it is possible to ask that toleration be 
the starting point for considering any controversy involving religion. It is also important for the 
governmental entities to recognize their perspective is not neutral, but rather historically and 
culturally situated. 
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The second section is the recognition that religion makes claims about the metaphysics of 
reality that are not susceptible of verification. Because they are beyond current epistemic access, 
the government must treat each as equally true, adopting an attitude of ontological agnosticism. 
Any limitation on the practice of religion must not be based on the content of religious beliefs (or 
judicial biases). Again, this is not a neutral position, but rather a consideration of perspectives as 
equally valid. 
The third section is that the metaphysical commitments entail a belief about my present 
personal identity. The province of courts is my period of embodiment, but a condition of that 
embodiment is my eternal self. I live in this world as an individual with a race, sex, and religious 
eternal identity. None of us is able to adopt completely another point of view, but in making the 
attempt, we exercise empathy toward fellow citizens of differing identities and expand our own 
perspectives. When considering claims of religious exercise, courts should employ epistemic 
perspectivism – considering the issue from the point of view of the impacted party. 
About toleration 
An attitude of toleration may exist between the state and religion, however it becomes 
problematic when it is between a state and its citizens. We have demanded a more robust 
acceptance of racial difference, gender and sexual orientation. Toleration would mean that the 
state puts up with the religious identity of its citizens in a manner inconsistent with other 
elements of personal identity. To illustrate how this sort of toleration operates, consider the 
parallel with a policy called “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT) regarding military service and 
sexual orientation.  
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The U.S. military banned gays and lesbians from service from the earliest days of the 
nation. The first documented military dismissal for homosexuality was under a 1778 order from 
General George Washington during the colonies’ quest for independence. The official charge 
was “attempting to commit sodomy” with a fellow soldier (Fitzpatrick, 1931-44). That language 
was later incorporated into the Articles of War of 1916. A 1920 modification created a new 
crime of sodomy but kept “assault with intent to commit sodomy” as a separate offense (USNI).  
The focus of these regulations seemed to address conduct, but by World War II, the status 
of being, or appearing to be, homosexual was sufficient for dismissal. A 1941 directive of the 
Selective Service System banned anyone with “homosexual proclivities” from the draft. A 
system set up in 1947 created two classifications: a general discharge for servicemen or women 
who were found to be gay, and an undesirable discharge for anyone found guilty of engaging in 
homosexual conduct (Berube, 139). An executive order by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 
1953 listed “sexual perversion” as grounds for dismissal or denial of employment with the 
federal government or any of its contractors.
49
 A 1981 Department of Defense directive declared 
“homosexuality is incompatible with military service.” (USNI). It was no longer necessary to 
consider specific conduct, although that was still prohibited. Merely being identified as gay 
ended any military career. 
By the time of Bill Clinton’s presidential election, public attitudes were changing. 
However, his campaign promise to remove the military ban on gay servicemen and women was 
opposed by military leaders and blocked by Congress, which seemed ready to convert what had 
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 The order used “sexual perversion” as a code word for homosexuality, making it the first 
time that sexual orientation was considered behavior threatening to national security (Brube, 19). 
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been only military policy into federal law. The result was a compromise called “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell” (DADT). From 1993 to 2010, gays and lesbians could serve in the military as long as 
they did not disclose their sexual orientation. A question regarding sexual orientation was 
removed from the application, and commanders were forbidden to ask about the sexual 
orientation of their troops (Don’t Ask). However, servicemen and women could not openly 
identify as gay or lesbian and remain in the military (Don’t Tell). DADT was repealed in 2010 
and the military ban on consensual sodomy was repealed in 2013. 
Conduct vs. status 
The history of the military treatment of gay servicemen and women indicates that both 
status and conduct were at issue. The initial offense of sodomy was expanded to include 
appearance, proclivities, and finally just being identified as gay was sufficient for a general 
discharge. Further, after the ban on status (DADT) was lifted, it was still necessary to remove the 
specific charge of sodomy.  
However, during debate on DADT, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin L. Powell, who 
is black, rejected comparisons with race, saying sexual orientation was not a civil rights issue 
(Berman). Powell called sexual orientation a “behavioral characteristic” that could undermine 
military order and discipline. But he described race the “benign, non-behavioral characteristic of 
skin color” (De Young, n.p.).  
Those affected by the ban felt differently. An example was this comment to the news 
media by a man who considered joining the military but decided not to due to DADT and the 
guilt that he would face from hiding his sexuality. “It was too hard to think about going into the 
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service,” Bob Kavanagh said, “having to hide a part of who I am” (Hornick, n.p.). Sexual 
orientation was a component of his personal identity, rather than or in addition to, behavior.  
By the time of the repeal, sexual orientation was considered to be something more than 
conduct or behavior (Lee, n.p.). President Barack Obama, who is also black, told the story of a 
man saved in World War II by a fellow soldier who he learned was gay only when they were 
both elderly. “[H]e knew that valor and sacrifice are no more limited by sexual orientation than 
they are by race or by gender or religion or by creed …” (Lee, n.p.). Sexual orientation was 
specifically equated to race as a status. 
Individual vs. societal impact 
Another important aspect of DADT was the perceived impact on other members of the 
military if they were to serve with openly-gay servicemen and women. When a repeal of DADT 
was being considered, Marine Corps Commandant General James Amos told reporters that he 
was very concerned about a possible loss of “unit cohesion” and combat readiness if the ban 
were overturned. When gatherings of Marines serving in Afghanistan had been asked, they 
agreed, almost unanimously, that repealing DADT would negatively impact morale (Perry, n.p.).  
By the time of the repeal, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike 
Mullen, (the same position that Colin Powell held when it was enacted) said all servicemen and 
women “sacrifice a lot for their country, including their lives. None of them should have to 
sacrifice their integrity as well” (Lee, n.p.). The perspective of the individual gay serviceman or 
woman was acknowledged and given at least as much weight as concerns about “unit cohesion.” 
Once sexual orientation was equated to race, it was harder to privilege the comfort of the unit 
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over the integrity of the individual, especially in light of the forced integration of the armed 
forces under President Harry S. Truman. 
Philosophical principles 
The working premises of DADT were: 
 Sexual orientation is something you DO not someone you ARE 
 IF KNOWN, threatens military order, discipline and unit cohesion 
 The perspective of the majority prevails 
 The perspective of gay/lesbian troops is less (un)important 
When governments enact bans on visible religious symbols, or political philosophers bar 
religious points of view from the public square, they mischaracterize the nature of religious 
commitment as experienced by people of faith. In addition to private conviction, religion directly 
impacts the manner in which citizens participate in government. Personal or individual religious 
conviction is more than mere belief or opinion on par with being a fan of a particular sports 
team. The parallel with DADT is, for opponents of openly-religious conduct: 
 religious identity is something you BELIEVE, not someone you ARE 
 IF KNOWN, threatens social order, discipline, cohesion 
 Perspective of the majority prevails 
 Perspective of religious individuals is less (un)important 
Religious personal identity is similar to race or sexual orientation (which I take to include 
elements of sex and gender). Each component contributes to our enculturing self, on Ortega’s 
view, the my (mi) in yo soy yo y mi circunstancia. Shifting the concept of religious exercise to 
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identity makes it possible to change the language from toleration to accommodation. It also 
illustrates another problem with Leiter’s demand for neutrality with no exceptions – that is no 
longer the way we treat other components of personal identity.  
In the 1950s, many police and fire departments in the United States had height and 
requirements that automatically screened out all women and many men, including entire 
ethnicities. These were “neutral” laws, in that they applied to everyone, but hardly equitable in 
impact. Since then, any physical requirements for employment must be linked to job 
performance. But suppose we offer a thought experiment along these lines: NASA requires that 
all astronauts be under 5’5” and 150 pounds. This is neutral and has legitimate job performance 
characteristics: more room in the cockpit, less fuel required, and so on. There would certainly be 
a large enough pool of qualified applicants so as not to jeopardize future missions. It would 
screen out most white men, but there are no exceptions to a neutral rule on Leiter’s formulation. 
Is there a problem? If so, it is along the lines of not wanting to exclude a category of individuals 
for something they cannot change, an essential component of their identity – in this case, body 
size. What principled argument could be made that white men should not be excluded from space 
travel that would not apply with even greater force to accommodation for eternal identity? 
Refocus Recap 
To recap the argument thus far: (1) church and state are competing normative authorities. 
Between them, toleration is one of several possible relationships, and is the one described in the 
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. (2) Religions make competing claims regarding the 
metaphysics of ultimate reality that are not possible of verification. When evaluating claims 
involving religion, courts adopt an attitude of ontological agnosticism, treating the (often 
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incompatible) claims of various religions as equally valid. (3) Courts and Congress are made up 
of individuals who are situated in specific cultural and historical contexts. Therefore, neutrality is 
as impossible as objectivity, so they adopt an attitude of epistemic perspectivism, adopting the 
point of view of the religious individuals seeking relief. These are the requirements for any 
successful approach to the free exercise of religion. (4) The approach I propose is to treat 
religion as a component of personal identity, similar to sexual orientation. This changes the 
approach to one of governmental accommodation of situated, encultured individuals with eternal 
identities. 
With this framework, is there any limit to belief/acts? The Reynolds Court’s question 
remains – what role can courts have in civil law if every claim to religious exercise is 
automatically allowed? The next chapter examines the parameters of acceptability and how they 
are determined. To do so, it adopts an Islamic perspective and considers the Constitution of 
Morocco, which has Islam as an official religion. A philosophical concept from Ibn Khaldun 
provides guidance.  
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CHAPTER THREE: ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE 
[T]here cannot be a doubt that, unless restricted by some 
form of constitution, it is within the legitimate scope of the power 
of every civil government to determine whether polygamy or 
monogamy shall be the law of social life under its dominion. 
-- Reynolds v. United States at 166 
 
Islam presents a direct challenge to the Supreme Court’s division of belief from action. It 
is a faith rooted in praxis, providing general guidelines and specific practices for the conduct of 
daily activities. Religion is expressed through belief/acts, with no tidy division into belief vs. 
action, personal vs. communal, or public vs. private. Religion is integrated into the various 
aspects of identity. An attempt to resolve contested religious practices by permitting belief but 
restricting actions would be meaningless. However, an approach that successfully engages with 
Islam also applies to other religions where integration also occurs but is less obvious. 
Three sources of authority provide guidance for almost every aspect of human life: the 
Qur’an,50 the word of God/Allah as revealed to the prophet Muhammad; the Sunna, the words 
and deeds of Muhammad; and the Sharica, the duties and requirements for human interactions. 
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 See discussion of when non-English words are italicized in the Introduction. 
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As a set of norms and values, Sharica includes what would fall under criminal, civil and 
commercial law in other contexts.
 51
 
With more recent global developments, Muslims find themselves living under non-
Muslim rule, which was rare in the early days of the religion. Addressing Muslims living in 
Western countries, contemporary political philosopher Tariq Ramadan has identified conditions 
that protect the public welfare
52
 for Muslims: freedom to manifest faith and spirituality; freedom 
to worship individually and collectively; physical security; freedom to educate others about 
Islam; and freedom to participate in the social, political and economic life of the community. 
Within his definition of the right to the practice of Islam are included the traditional “pillars,” 
detailed below. Ramadan defines a “space of testimony” (dar al-shahada) where Muslims are 
“free from government intrusion on their religious beliefs and practices and free to teach others 
about Islam and act on Islamic principles.” (Tampio, 618-19). This space includes interaction in 
political communities, rejecting the idea that belief and practice be severed or confined to the 
private sphere. “Islam is not just an abstract belief but an ethics that infuses a Muslim’s whole 
life” (Tampio, 620). 
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 I have written in greater detail on these requirements and how duties arising out of them 
impact U.S. society in “Islamic Ethics” in The SAGE Encyclopedia of Business, Ethics and 
Society, 2
nd
 edition, Robert Kolb, editor, Sage Publishing, 2017. 
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 Public welfare (maslaha) is a principle of Islamic jurisprudence in Sunni discourse. It 
prohibits or permits actions based on whether or not they serve the public interest. The concept 
allows consideration of equity in cases not clearly regulated by the Qur’an or Sunnah. It is 
described in the first collection of jurisprudence by Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi’i (767-820), 
founder of the Shafi’i school and a student of Malik ibn Anas al-Asbahi (714-796), founder of 
the Maliki school. 
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This chapter extends the description of how U.S. law has treated religion in Chapter One 
and Chapter Two’s philosophical consideration of how law should treat religion to ask how the 
law can treat religion. It is a pragmatic concern about the limits and legitimacy of civil law as a 
normative authority over citizens with embodied eternal identities. Adopting an Islamic 
perspective is useful not only because Islam challenges the belief/action dichotomy, but also 
because it confronts the latent Protestant Christian influence on U.S. jurisprudence. Before 
returning to the central question of this work, I first situate this section of the discussion with 
regard to Muslims in contemporary society, their religious roots, and the impact that has on 
philosophy as it is practiced within Islam.  
Implications of Islam
53
 
Muslims live on all continents, but are concentrated in Asia (60%), the Middle East and 
North Africa (20%). Islam is the fastest rising religious group, as a share of the world’s 
population, 23.2% of the global population is Muslim (Pew). If current trends continue over the 
next four decades, the number of Muslims will nearly equal the number of Christians worldwide. 
In Europe, Muslims will make up 10% of the overall population.
54
 Of the global Muslim 
population, almost 90% are Sunni. Most Shica Muslims live in four countries: Iran, Pakistan, 
India, and Iraq. 
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 This phrase is used by Oliver Leaman (1999, ix), as mentioned in the Introduction. Text of 
section is taken from my “Islamic Ethics” in The SAGE Encyclopedia of Business, Ethics and 
Society, 2
nd
 edition, Robert Kolb, editor, Sage Publishing (2017). 
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 All of the population figures and projections in this section are from the Pew report “The 
Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010 – 2050,” which is online and 
has no page numbers. The data was updated 8/9/17. 
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Pew estimates about 3.3 million Muslims of all ages were living in the United States in 
2015, about 1% of the total U.S. population. However, this share is projected to double by 2050. 
Christians will decline from more than three-quarters of the population to two-thirds, while 
Muslims will outnumber those who identify as Jewish. U.S. Muslims are predominately Sunni, 
55% to 16% Shica. No racial or ethnic group is the majority of Muslim American adults. Forty-
one percent report their race as white, 20% black, 28% Asian, 8% Hispanic and 3% other or 
mixed race. Although Sunni and Shica are historically the primary doctrinal divisions in Islam, 
they are less significant to black Muslims in the U.S.  Of native-born African-American 
Muslims, most say they are Sunni (45%). The next largest number (43%) either said they do not 
identify with any particular denomination or did not answer the question. Although the Nation 
Islam was once high-profile, with members such as Malcolm X and Muhammad Ali, only 3% of 
US-born black Muslims identify with it.
55
 
Religion and philosophy
56
 
While the approach of this dissertation is not to seek answers from within Islamic 
religious law, it is important to have a general understanding of Islam to engage with its thought. 
The difference between theology and philosophy is one of mutual influence, rather than a sharp 
divide. “[F]or an appropriate understanding of Islamic philosophy it is important to have some 
grasp of the main issues in Islamic theology. Philosophy often emerges out of what were 
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 Pew’s Demographic portrait of Muslim Americans uses the Census Bureau definition of 
white “origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, the Middle East or North Africa.” 
http://www.pewforum.org/2017/07/26/demographic-portrait-of-muslim-americans/ 
56
 The summary in this section is compiled from several sources, including Hourani, Fakhry, 
Pew, and Ramadan. 
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originally theological disputes, and we shall see that many theological debates are highly 
philosophical in nature” (Leaman, 16). 
Islam has a primary division over leadership and authority. The split came in the 
designation of a successor after the death of Muhammad. Shicites supported Muhammad’s cousin 
cAli, believing that religious and political leadership should remain in the family lineage. Sunnis 
believed that the community should choose a political leader from among the male members of 
Muhammad’s tribe (the Quraysh), with religious authority residing only in the scriptures. Shica 
follow an imam who must be a descendant of Muhammad. Sufi orders may be either Sunni or 
Shica; to either authority, they add the importance of learning from a spiritual master.  
Five specific acts of worship, often called the “Five Pillars” (arkan), are universally 
recognized as applying to all Muslims. These rituals are not similar to Catholic sacraments, in 
which God is believed to be present. They are formalized ways of expressing belief. One of the 
earliest descriptions of these acts of worship (cibadat) is in the Risala of Muhammad ibn Idris al-
Shafici. Although he mentions them as important practices, he does not present them as a 
defining element of Islam. “To frame this conundrum somewhat differently, even though these 
five pillars seem to have played a role in the development of Muslim identity from a fairly early 
period, it is hard to know at what point they became the primary ritual markers of this identity” 
(Khadduri, 210). The interpretation of the five pillars has remained “neither theoretically nor 
practically constant” (Hughes, 208). The meanings vary by time and place, and also by the 
individual who performs them. Other than the profession of faith, “Some Muslims do not 
perform any of the actions associated with pillars yet still regard themselves quite contentedly as 
Muslims” (Hughes, 204).  
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A practicing Muslim is one who abides by the five pillars of Islam (testament of 
faith, prayer five times daily, fasting during the month of Ramadan, annual 
charity and pilgrimage once in a lifetime). Many Muslims no longer practice their 
faith, just as many Christians no longer go to church and many Jews no longer 
attend the synagogue or observe kosher. Nonpractice does not imply nonbelief 
(Bullock, xvii). 
However, Muslims would consider it an infringement on religious exercise if they are prohibited 
from being able to perform any of the pillars.
57
 
The first pillar is the profession of faith (Shahada), which includes two declarations: 
there is no god but God and Muhammad is the messenger of God (Allah is the Arabic word for 
God). The second is the five daily prayers (Salat), although there are differences between Sunnis 
and Shicites in the form, method, and time of the prayers. Sunnis pray just before dawn, at noon, 
in mid-afternoon, just after sunset, and in the evening. Shicites may combine prayers into three 
distinct times, rather than five. The prayers are made in the direction of Mecca, and include both 
recitation and ritual movements. Friday is the main day of public prayer. The third pillar is the 
annual alms tax (Zakat), generally set at 2½% of the assets of the believer. These alms are used 
to feed the poor or otherwise support the faith. Fourth is fasting during the daylight hours of the 
month of Ramadan (Sawm) each year. The believer abstains from food, drink, and sexual activity 
(many also forbid smoking). Fifth is the pilgrimage (Hajj) to Mecca during the first ten days of 
the month of Dhu al-Hijjah. The pilgrimage is an obligation only for believers who are 
financially able to make the trip and physically able to perform the rites. Muslims are encouraged 
to make the pilgrimage at least once in their lives. 
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 In the United States, this commonly arises in work situations that do not allow breaks or 
spaces for prayer. 
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Islam is practiced in countries around the world, which gives rise to some cultural and 
linguistic variations in specific interpretations. Before he was a prophet, Muhammad was a 
merchant. His first wife, Khadija, was a wealthy and successful trader who hired him as her 
business agent before they married. After the migration of Muslims from Mecca to Medina, 
Muhammad added the role of civil authority to religious prophet. He is credited with the 
Constitution of Medina, a detailed description of the relationships among the various tribes that 
inhabited the city and region. Accounts of Muhammad’s words and deeds, then, include practical 
concerns grounded in a transcendent perspective. 
Islamic philosophy has varied by century and civilization, as have other religious and 
secular approaches. The defining characteristic of Islamic theory is that it must be compatible 
with both revelation and religious practice. Schools of jurisprudence
58
 have developed norms 
according to a hierarchy of acts: compulsory/duty (fard), recommended/desirable (mustahabb), 
neutral/permissible (mubah), disliked/undesireable (makruh) and sinful/prohibited (haram). The 
five daily prayers and ritual fasting fall into the category of fard. This category of divine decree 
is distinguished from wajib, which is a duty imposed by law (Albertini, 462). 
These norms are generally applied by Muslims deciding by themselves, although they are 
heavily influenced by family and society. Most individual ethical decision-making occurs in the 
intermediate categories between duty and prohibition (Albertini, 464). When the application is 
unclear, individuals may seek an official legal determination (fatwa). This is often the case when 
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 Four schools, or madhhabs (habits of thought and practice) are accepted in contemporary 
Sunni jurisprudence: Hanafi, Shafi’i, Hanbali and Maliki. Each is named after the founder, 
scholars of the ninth to eleventh centuries, and are predominant within geographic regions. See 
Albertini, 459-461. 
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Muslim society addresses new issues, such as cloning or other technological innovations. A 
fatwa can only be issued by an expert in Islamic jurisprudence (mufti); any issued by unqualified 
individuals are considered void. Even valid fatwas are guidance that the individual may accept or 
decide not to respect. 
U.S. history 
In discussions of religious freedom during the drafting of the Constitution, Bill of Rights 
and other foundational documents, Islam was frequently mentioned along with other non-
Christian faiths as a demonstration of the breadth of religious tolerance envisioned for the new 
nation. Thomas Jefferson owned and read an English translation of the Qu’ran. Although he 
developed negative perceptions of Islam (as anti-science and reason), he consistently included 
Muslims in his vision of religious liberty, such as this comment on the adoption of the Virginia 
Statute for Religious Freedom. 
Where the preamble declares, that coercion is a departure from the plan of the 
holy author of our religion, an amendment was proposed, by inserting the word 
"Jesus Christ," so that it should read, "a departure from the plan of Jesus Christ, 
the holy author of our religion;" the insertion was rejected by a great majority, in 
proof that they meant to comprehend, within the mantle of its protection, the Jew 
and the Gentile, the Christian and Mahometan, the Hindoo, and Infidel of every 
denomination” (Ford, Document 45). 
Indeed, there were many references to “Mahometans” (with various spellings) in political 
exchanges of the times, including writings of Baptists and Presbyterians, who had been 
persecuted as dissenters from the established Anglican church in various colonies (Izadi, n.p.). 
One from the Hanover Presbytery used the specter of Islam to oppose any national establishment 
of religion:  
  89 
Certain it is that every argument for civil liberty gains additional strength when 
applied to liberty in the concerns of religion, and there is no argument in favor of 
establishing the Christian religion but what may be pleaded with equal propriety 
for establishing the tenets of Mohammed by those who believe the Al Koran 
(Smylie, 355). 
Non-Christian religions were often linked in expressions, such as “Jews, Turks and Infidels” 
(Borden). However, Catholics and Jews suffered civic harms from the religious tests used to 
exclude them from voting or holding office in many colonies and then states. Muslim citizens or 
office holders were considered to be hypothetical (Izadi n.p.). Far from the political debates, 
however, thousands of Muslims were living in the colonies at the time of the Constitutional 
Convention. Perhaps the first to arrive was a Moroccan slave called Estevanico in 1528. While 
he escaped to explore much of the Southwest, most other Muslims in early America remained in 
servitude. It is estimated that twenty percent of enslaved Africans were Muslims. Some 
attempted to retain the faith, others accommodated by adopting Christian terms (Manseau n.p.).
59
   
“Turks” was a reference to the Ottoman Empire, the most consistent Islamic political 
power to engage with Christian Europe over centuries. It was still a viable threat in the early days 
of the United States, led by Sultan Selim III from 1789 to 1807. The U.S. also had first-hand 
experience with other Islamic nations from its earliest days. Morocco was one of the first states 
to recognize the independence of the United States, with a declaration on December 20, 1777 
allowing U.S. ships to pass freely into Moroccan ports, along with the ships of other nations who 
had treaties with Sultan Sidi Muhammad Ben Abdullah. Preoccupied by the war and 
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 A Christian missionary to slave plantations in the South observed, “Mohammedan 
Africans” ... had found ways to “accommodate” Islam to the new beliefs imposed upon them. 
“God, say they, is Allah, and Jesus Christ is Mohammed. The religion is the same, but different 
countries have different names” (Manseau, n.p.). 
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governmental organization, the U.S. failed to respond to the Sultan’s declaration (or subsequent 
restatements) until he seized a U.S. ship in 1784, offering to free it in exchange for a treaty. The 
Treaty of Marrakech was finally signed in 1786 and ratified by Congress in 1787, marking the 
beginning of diplomatic relations. It was the first treaty between any Arab, Muslim or African 
State and the U.S. (Embassy, n.p.).  
After he became president, Jefferson hosted the first Muslim ambassador to the United 
States, an envoy from Tunisia, on December 8, 1805. Sidi Soliman Mellimelli arrived during 
Ramadan. When Jefferson invited him to dinner, he changed the customary 3:30 pm starting time 
to “precisely at sunset,” making it the first known iftar at the White House (IIP, n.p.). 60  
Mellimelli remained for six months during a dispute over attacks on U.S. merchant ships by 
pirates from the Barbary states, and the American blockade of Tripoli which resulted in the 
seizure of Tunisian vessels.  
Philosophical perspective 
Islamic philosophy has developed in conversation with western philosophy, but retains 
significant differences – one of the most important for this work is the relationship between 
reason and revelation. Seyyed Nasr introduced his study of Islamic philosophy by describing 
connections between philosophy and prophecy in early Greek thought, then described how the 
Christian and Islamic philosophical traditions parted ways. 
In the West philosophy became more and more distanced from theology after the 
eighth/fourteenth and ninth/fifteenth centuries onward … gradually the main 
schools of philosophy… ceased to be Christian philosophy, and in fact philosophy 
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 The Ramadan fast is broken at sunset with a meal called iftar. 
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in many of its schools turned against religion in general and Christianity in 
particular, pitting philosophy as the main rival to religion. In contrast, in the 
Islamic world philosophy continued to function within a universe dominated by 
the reality of prophecy (Nassr, 5). 
Nasssr said some of the western scholars have been interested only in the role Islamic 
philosophy played in Latin scholasticism. Others tried to make sense of Islamic philosophy in 
terms of Western schools of thought, or considered it as a historical artifact. But in the second 
half of the twentieth century, some began to study Islamic philosophy “as a living school of 
thought … treating Islamic metaphysical and philosophical ideas as something of innate 
philosophical value rather than being of only archaeological interest.” (17). 
In applying an Islamic perspective to the question of how the free exercise of religion is 
accomplished in a pluralistic society, it is this aspect of Islamic philosophy as a lived experience 
that is most helpful. I also wish to consider Ibn Khaldun in context, within the fabric of Islamic 
thought.
61
 Rather than a solitary figure, he was well versed in the philosophers before him. He 
developed the key concept that I wish to borrow from personal experience in Islamic politics and 
observation of other civilizations. 
Early ethical discussions in the seventh and eighth centuries explored the priority of 
God’s commands and the power of the caliph (the successor of Muhammad as the leader of the 
Muslim community) to determine right and wrong. Theologians differed with one another about 
the definition of terms in the Qur’an or Sunna and the role of human rationality with regard to 
revelation. Unlike developments in the history of philosophy in the west, there was no inherent 
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 This section is drawn from Jackson, Leaman, Nasr and Fakhry. 
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conflict between science and religion. Where philosophy contradicted Islam or neglected 
science, Muslim philosophers adopted varying approaches.  
From the eighth to eleventh centuries, a prominent schools of thought was that of the 
rationalist Muctaliza. They held that dogmas of faith may be known through reason prior to 
revelation, although they may not contradict it. Principal tenets included: the oneness and justice 
of God, human freedom of action, and the creation of the Qur’an. Muctazilites have been called 
the “first organised theologians of Islam” (Campanini, 43) and influences are seen in later Shica 
and Sunni thought. Under Caliph al-Ma’mun, it became the official theology in 827 when he 
launched an inquisition (mihna) to enforce the dogma of the created Qu’ran, designed to allow a 
continuous interpretation of scripture. The mihna was reversed around 850 in the reign of al-
Mutawakkil and the Muctazilite influence waned.
62
 
Although centered in Iraq (Baghdad and Basra), Muctazilite thought did not coalesce 
around a single founder or leader. George Hourani explored possible origins of Muctazilite 
ethical rationalism, leaving open the possibility that they were influenced by non-Islamic 
religions, such as Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, or Christianity. He ruled out influences from 
Arab pagans or Judaism and concluded that Muctazilite theologians “either knew something of 
Greek philosophy or had it available if they wished to study it” so their decision not to make use 
of it must have been a deliberate choice (Hourani, 92). 
The philosophical conversation expanded in the early ninth century with the massive 
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 Martin et al detail a contemporary revival of interest in Islamic rationalism and Campanini 
describes a Neo-Mu’tazilism that seeks to emphasize the role of reason in Islamic ideology. 
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translation project of the Bayt al-Hikmah (House of Wisdom).
63
 Beginning with al-Kindi,
64
 
philosophical ethics explored problems that were common across cultures. Aristotle, Socrates, 
and Plato were engaged as authorities, in addition to the Qur’an and Sunna. Al-Kindi found no 
contradiction between philosophy and religion, rather that the tools of science advance 
knowledge of both. In a treatise that would resonate with contemporary analytic philosophers, al-
Kindi argued mathematics is required to learn philosophy. He engaged with Aristotle on the 
nature of the soul and intellect, and whether the world is eternal. 
Al-Farabi
65
 excelled at Aristotelian logic sufficiently to be called the “Second Master.” 
He wrote many commentaries on Aristotelian logic and on his Nicomachean Ethics. He saw 
philosophy and religion as two different ways of expressing truth, aimed at different audiences. 
Ibn Sina’s66 philosophy and medical knowledge heavily influenced medieval and 
Renaissance thinkers. His book on medicine remained a principal reference in European 
medicine into the eighteenth century. Ibn Sina found al-Farabi to be the key to understanding 
Aristotle. Later Islamic philosophers engaged with Ibn Sina as a primary authority, along with 
Greek philosophers. He became the target of al-Ghazali but inspired Ibn Tufail’s masterpiece.67 
                                                 
63
 Founded by Abbasid Caliph al-Mansur, the Bayt al-Hikma flourished under al-Ma’mun 
and his successors but began to decline under al-Mutawakkil, who deemphasized Greek 
philosophy in favor of orthodox Islam. The collection was destroyed in the Mongol invasion of 
Baghdad in 1258. 
64
 Abu Yusuf Yacqub bin Ishaq al-Kindi (805-873) known as al-Kindus in the west, many 
works translated into Latin by Gerard of Cremona. 
65
 Abu Nasr Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Tarkhan al-Farabi (872-950), known in the 
west as Alpharabius. Albertus Magnus and his student Thomas Aquinas were scholars of his 
work. His Classification of the sciences was translated as De scientiis. 
66
 Abu cAli al-Husain Ibn Sina (980-1037), known to the west as Avicenna. 
67
 The treatise of Hayy Ibn Yaqdhan. Ibn Tufail’s version was known to John Locke. 
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One of the best-known classical philosophical ethicists was Ibn Miskawayh,
68
 who drew 
upon Platonic psychology for his concept of virtue, which requires submission to Shariaca as the 
holy law emanating from God. His treatise The Refinement of Character, influenced by 
Aristotle’s concept of the mean, later inspired Nasir al-Din Tusi’s69 ethics. This blend of 
philosophical and religious ethics is perfected in al-Ghazali,
70
 who identified three fundamental 
doctrines that must not be violated: monotheism, Muhammad’s prophecy, and the descriptions in 
the Qur’an regarding life after death. In all other matters, philosophers may use reason and 
Aristotelian demonstration to reach truth. Al-Ghazali merged the ethical traditions of Greek 
philosophy and Sufism, concluding that God’s revelation of Sharica is to benefit humans in this 
world and the next. 
Al-Ghazali is often seen as the final contributor in Islamic philosophy’s golden age. 
There is still a general assumption that philosophy and science came to an end with the 
destruction of Baghdad. However, centers of Islamic learning merely shifted west, where the 
Iberian peninsula soon became a major world center of learning and another major translation 
project. Under the patronage of the Bishop of Granada, works of philosophy, medicine, and 
science were translated from Arabic to Latin and Hebrew (Hasse, n.p.). Although beyond the 
scope of this work, Peter Adamson explores the mutual influences of Christian, Jewish and 
Islamic philosophers during this time (Adamson, 148-294). 
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 Abu cAli Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Yacqub ibn Miskawayh (930-1030).  
69
 Nasir al-Din Tusi (1201-1274) was a contemporary of Aquinas and Roger Bacon. 
70
 Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058-1111).  
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Ibn Bajja
71
 lived in Seville, Granada, and Fez. Unlike al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, his 
knowledge of Aristotle was not filtered through Neoplatonism. Like al-Farabi, he considered the 
interaction of an individual and the virtuous city. Overlapping with Ibn Bajja, Ibn Tufail
72
 served 
as court physician to the Almohad sultan of Morocco and Andalusia for two decades. His only 
extant work in philosophy is Hayy Ibn Yaqdhan,
73
 which was translated into many languages 
from 1671-1900 (Al-Allah, 277). Ibn Tufail’s introduction made reference to the thought of al-
Farabi, al-Ghazali, and Ibn Bajja. 
The same duties as court physician that may have limited Ibn Tufail’s philosophical 
output prompted him to engage Ibn Rushd to write commentaries on Aristotle for the caliph.
74
 In 
addition to his original philosophical works, Ibn Rushd spent three decades writing the 
commentaries of varying lengths on Aristotle’s available works (which did not include Politics) 
and Plato’s Republic. When Greek philosophy was re-introduced to the west, it was through 
these commentaries. In medieval philosophy, he was referred to as Averroes, and called “The 
Commentator.” However, Ibn Rushd’s renown in the West must not eclipse his contribution to 
Islamic philosophy. 
No one would wish to understate Ibn Rushd’s contribution to the interpretation of 
Aristotle. For in this lay his unquestioned right to stand in the foremost ranks of 
that international continent of scholars who, from Theophrastus to al-Farabi and 
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 Abu Bakr Muhammad bin Yahya (1106-1138), known as Avempace. His most famous 
works were translated into Hebrew and Latin. 
72
 Abu Bakr Muhammad Ibn Tufail (1116-1185), known as Abubacer. 
73
 The title is the same as an earlier work of Ibn Sina. The story of an infant who grows to 
adulthood on an island with only the company of nature is thought to have inspired Robinson 
Crusoe (Adamson, 177) 
74
 Abu al-Walid Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Rushd (1126-1198), known as Averroes. 
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St. Thomas Aquinas, have illustrated through their dedication to the same cause 
the philosophical unity of mankind. But if, in the process, his vital intellectual 
interests and his place in the historic context of Islamic thought are ignored, a 
grave injustice would be done to him  … For a correct understanding of the 
philosophical and theological ideas of the Muslim Ibn Rushd, the most important 
source is, without question, his Tahafut al-Tahafut (Incoherence of the 
Incoherence), one of the greatest philosophico-theological works (Fakhry, 284-5). 
In this work, Ibn Rushd responded to al-Ghazali’s attack on the two foremost Muslim 
interpreters of Aristotle, al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, in his Tahafut al-Falasifah (Incoherence of the 
Philosophers) (Fakry, 229). 
Islam engaged with the conflicts between philosophical and theological thought within 
the context of a revealed religion long before religious authorities in Europe were presented with 
the challenge. However, their philosophical concerns were different from those of medieval 
Christian interlocutors, such as Thomas Aquinas, because their cosmological commitments were 
rooted in Islam. Majid Fakhry traced the interaction of philosophical, theological, and 
jurisprudential themes in Islamic thought from Arab conquest of Alexandria (641) to 
contemporary thinkers such as Moroccan Muhammad cAbid al-Jabiri (1935-2010). While many 
names are familiar to European philosophical audiences, Fakhry situates them in conversation 
with fellow Islamic philosophers. 
Cultural identity 
Ibn Khaldun
75
 identified a concept that will illuminate the contours of toleration in 
society. Born in Tunis in 1332 (732 AH),
76
 his family was of the Kinda tribe of Hadhramaut, 
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 Wali al-Din cAbd al-Raḥman Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Khaldun al-Tunisi al-Ḥadrami 
76
 The Islamic calendar dates from the Hijrah, the term for the migration of Muhammad 
from Mecca to Medina in September 622 C.E. It is composed of twelve lunar months, which 
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Yemen. (Alatas 2006, 783). During the Muslim conquest of the Iberian peninsula (now Spain 
and Portugal), his ancestors settled in Seville and became prominent in politics. One established 
a quasi-independent state near Seville (Rosenthal, xxxiii-xxxiv).
77
 They left al-Andalus in the 
Reconquista, settling in what is now Tunis.
78
  
The battle between Christians and Muslims over control of the Iberian peninsula 
continued throughout Ibn Khaldun’s lifetime. The Caliphate of Cordoba had collapsed in 1031, 
dividing into 23 Taifas. These principalities battled each other and the combined Christian 
armies of the north. However, final Christian domination did not come until 1492. 
Through his family history of political service, Ibn Khaldun was acquainted with three 
dynasties of Morocco: the Almoravids (1040-1147), Almohads (1147-1248), and Marinids 
(1248-1465). Each of the dynasties was associated with an indigenous Amazigh
79
 tribe: Ṣanhaja 
for the Almoravids, Masmuda for Almohads and Zanata for Marinids. The Amazigh were the 
                                                                                                                                                             
begin with the sighting of the crescent moon. Dates are commonly abbreviated A.H. for Anno 
Hegirae (Muhanna, n.p.). 
77
 Pedro the Cruel, the Christian king of Castille, offered to return the legacy of Banu 
Khaldun to entice him to stay in 1363 (Alatas 2012, 6). 
78
 Muslims first took control of the Iberian peninsula from the Visigoths in 711-718. At its 
peak, the area under Muslim control (called al-Andalus) reached into southern France. The 
Christian reconquest proceeded by region, turning what had been Muslim jurisdictional areas 
into individual kingdoms, which were not united into the nation of Spain until after Ibn 
Khaldun’s death. Spanish history is drawn from O’Callaghan, unless otherwise noted. 
79
 The Amazigh are descendants of the pre-Arab inhabitants of North Africa. Arabs used the 
term “Berber,” derived from barbarian (speakers of languages other than Latin or Greek) to 
combine the many indigenous tribes into a single group. Ibn Khaldun adopted this term and 
worldview. 
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population of the Maghrib
80
 before the Arab migration in the eighth to eleventh centuries (Alatas 
2012, 14). The Sunni Marinid/Zanata dynasty ruled throughout Ibn Khaldun’s life. 
Ibn Khaldun’s early education included customary topics in jurisprudence, theology, and 
linguistics. He was later exposed to philosophers such as al-Kindi,
81
 Ibn Sina,
82
 and Ibn Rushd 
(with whom he took issue).
83
 His familiarity with Muctazilite arguments was demonstrated in 
later writing.
84
 His political life was punctuated with terms in prison for backing the wrong side 
in court intrigues. Over the first twenty years of his professional life, he bounced back and forth 
between al-Andalus and the Maghrib, serving a series of sultans. When hostilities between Fez 
and Granada broke out, Ibn Khaldun went to Granada but the Fez court would not let his family 
join him. “Ibn Khaldun had to return to North Africa where he was out of favour with practically 
all the rulers” (Alatas 2012, 8). He retreated to a fort to begin his history of the Arabs and 
Berbers.
 85
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 Maghrib is “west” in Arabic. It refers generally to North Africa, the area that is now 
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. During Ibn Khaldun’s life, the Merinids controlled the Maghrib 
from a capitol in Fez (although rule was split in 1374 to add a capital in Marrakesh). Morocco is 
referred to as Maghrib al-Aqsa (farthest west).  
81
 Quoted in a discussion on racial characteristics (I ,175). Ibn Khaldun critiqued historian  
al-Mas’udi (893?-956) for relying upon the authority of Galen and al-Kindi without adding an 
original contribution. 
82
 Ibn Khaldun quotes a passage from Ibn Sinna when discussing skin color (I ,171). 
83
 See p. 96 below. 
84
 He made several references to Muctazila and “speculative theologians” I ,189). 
85
 After this four-year interlude, Ibn Khaldun returned to Tunis for access to libraries and 
historical sources for his history. The sultan pressed him into service in battle, which he avoided 
by seeking permission to perform the hajj. Instead, he went to Cairo where he was appointed a 
Maliki judge. His wife and children were detained in Tunis. When they were allowed to join 
him, their ship sank on the way to Egypt. His wife and daughters died, while two sons may have 
survived. Ibn Khaldun accompanied the sultan to Damascus in response to an invasion by Timur 
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While in seclusion, he completed the Muqaddimah, the prologue to a larger historical 
survey, the Kitāb al-‘Ibar (Alatas 2008, 784). In this introduction, Ibn Khaldun detailed his 
method, such as how to determine if stories are accurate and factors that produce untruth. He also 
described his overall approach as creating an original science, one concerned with human 
civilization and social organization. (Muqaddimah I, 77) Rather than theorizing an ideal polis, 
Ibn Khaldun’s new science recorded history as it tried to understand it. He sought the inner 
meaning of history, the causes and origins of things that exist and of events. “History, therefore, 
is firmly rooted in philosophy. It deserves to be accounted a branch of it” (I, 6).  He also revealed 
a motivation for undertaking such a monumental project. 
The Great Plague in 1348 was a formative experience for Ibn Khaldun.
86
 It took both of 
his parents and most of his circle of scholars (Alatas 2012, 4). It also transformed civilization. 
 [C]ivilization both in the East and the West was visited by a destructive plague 
which devastated nations and caused populations to vanish. It swallowed up many 
of the good things of civilization and wiped them out. … Civilization decreased 
with the decrease of mankind. Cities and buildings were laid waste, roads and 
way signs were obliterated, settlements and mansions became empty, dynasties 
and tribes grew weak. The entire inhabited world changed. … It was as if the 
voice of existence in the world had called out for oblivion and restriction, and the 
world had responded to its call (I, 64). 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Tammerlane). After the sultan returned to Cairo due to a plot to overthrow him, Ibn Khaldun 
met with Timur in an unsuccessful effort to save Damascus. Back in Cairo, Ibn Khaldun was 
again appointed judge, relieved of his post, and reappointed (six times in all). He died on March 
16, 1406 (Alatas 2012, 11-13). 
86
 Plague in early Islamic history followed commercial routes, attesting to the importance of 
trade throughout the Mediterranean. Dols also credits plague with prompting interest in pre-
Islamic medical works, such as the writings of Hippocrates and Galen. “In this manner, the 
massive translation of classical medical works into Arabic in early Islam should be considered as 
part of the endeavor to understand the nature of recurrent disease and not as a purely academic 
exercise” (Dols, 381-2). 
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This drastic change in conditions, as if the world were “brought into existence anew,” prompted 
Ibn Khaldun to “systematically set down the situation of the world among all regions and races, 
as well as the customs and sectarian beliefs that have changed” (I, 65). 
 Translation again 
As with Ortega’s self and circumstance of the previous chapter, a central concept in Ibn 
Khaldun’s philosophy of history resists facile translation. The concept of caṣabiyya was first 
translated into Western terms by William MacGuckin de Slane in Prolégoménes d’Ebn-
Khaldoun, published in three volumes released in1862, 1865, and 1868.
87
 In producing a French 
translation of the Muqaddimah, de Slane relied upon a full Arabic edition by Étienne Marc 
Quatremère (1858), the Arabic manuscripts that Quatremère used, and a 1859 Turkish 
translation.
88
 In his translation of the Muqaddimah, de Slane generally used esprit de corps for 
casabiyya, although not consistently.
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 A 1636 Latin translation of Ibn ‘Arabshāh’s book on Timur includes a mention of the 
historic meeting between Ibn Khaldun and the Mongol warrior. A biography of Ibn Khaldun was 
included in d’Herbelot’s Bibliothèque Orientale in the latter part of the seventeenth century. But 
it was more than 100 years before translations of his work appeared in Europe. Extracts of Ibn 
Khaldun’s work were published in French by Silvestre de Sacy in 1810 and in German by Joseph 
von Hammer-Purgstall in 1818, 1822 (Alatas 106). 
88
 Ottoman Turks began a sustained study of Ibn Khaldun as early as 1550 and “scholars and 
statesmen vied with each other in their interest in Ibn Khaldun’s work and ideas” (Rosenthal, 
lxvii). The first complete translation of the Muqaddimah was into Turkish in 1730, published in 
1859 (Rosenthal, cvii). 
89
 Other words substituted for caṣabiyya include: family, kinsmen, group of friends, devoted 
group, community, a people animated by a sense of its own dignity, sympathy, fellow feeling, 
zeal and ardor, feeling and interest, patriotism, tribal spirit, national spirit, national feeling, party, 
strength, power, support, army (Lacoste, 103). 
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In his “Translator’s Introduction” to the Muqaddimah, Rosenthal defended de Slane’s 
version from critiques that it was too “free” (I, cviii). He agreed there were occasional mistakes 
of translation, few explanatory footnotes, and rare attributions to sources. However, the stylistic 
choice was intentional and “perfectly legitimate” for a work such as the Muqaddimah.  
The greater issue was that scholars relied upon de Slane “almost to a man” for their 
quotations from the Muqaddimah until Rosenthal’s edition in 1958 (I, cviii). In addition to 
diffusing the concept of caṣabiyya, de Slane read Ibn Khaldun through a Western lens of social 
progress that was alien to his original work.
90
 Western sociologists, historians, and philosophers 
also presented Ibn Khaldun as a sort of solitary genius, springing from the soil of Islamic North 
Africa, rather than linked to centuries of Islamic philosophy, theology, and legal theory. 
Included among them was José Ortega y Gasset, who published an essay in 1934 titled 
Abenjaldún nos revela el secreto: pensamientos sobe Africa Menor (Ibn Khaldun reveals to us 
the secret: thoughts on North Africa). Ortega’s focus was the Spanish enclave of Melilla, which 
has remained under Spanish rule since 1497 even though it is on the coast of North Africa, now 
within the boarders of Morocco. Although writing from an Orientalist perspective, Ortega 
attempted to apply Ibn Khaldun’s theory to the current situation, “Ortega regarded the 
Muqaddimah as the first ever philosophy of history … [and] insisted that Spaniards would not be 
able to understand their past, present and future if they did not understand North Africa. The 
same cultural influences that affected the northern part of Africa also passed through Spain” 
                                                 
90
 Lacoste rendered caṣabiyya as a sort of Hegelian dialectic of state formation, when the 
contemporary concept of nation-state was far from Ibn Khaldun’s imagination, not to mention 
observation. 
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(Alatas 107). However, Ortega did not generalize Ibn Khaldun’s thought beyond areas directly 
impacted by Arabic civilizations. 
 The rendering of casabiyya as esprit de corps “is in itself not a terrible translation, but 
when that translation was transplanted to (Toynbee’s) A Study of History, it acquired misleading 
Bergsonian overtones of élan vital” (Irwin, 471). Arnold Toynbee’s 1934 depiction of casabiyya 
as ‘the basic protoplasm out of which all bodies politic and bodies social are built up’ (Volume 
Three, 474) was the only treatment of Ibn Khaldun’s theories in English until Franz Rosenthal’s 
translation of the Muqaddimah in 1958 (Irwin, 466). 
Rosenthal used “group feeling,” which is both ubiquitous and reviled in contemporary 
scholarship. He realized it was a “rather artificial loan rendering” (I, cx), but wished to preserve 
Ibn Khaldun’s use of casabiyya as term of art. Rather than translating casabiyya according to the 
particular context, as de Slane had done, Rosenthal used “group feeling” throughout. “[A]ny 
other procedure would irrevocably have destroyed the essential unity of Ibn Khaldun’s work, 
which is one of its main claims to greatness” (I, bcx). 
Yves Lacoste criticized both esprit de corps and “group feeling” as too broad or general. 
He surveyed proposed translations of casabiyya over four pages, noting that “Virtually everyone 
who has written on Ibn Khaldun has his own interpretation of casabiyya” (100). His discussion 
then used the untranslated casabiyya. In the introduction to the 2005 abridged edition of 
Rosenthal’s Muqaddimah, Bruce Lawrence agreed with criticism of “group feeling” as too static 
for “what remains for Ibn Khaldun a variable pinned between the state (dawla) and religion 
(din)”  but also did not suggest an alternative term (Rosenthal, xv). 
  103 
Many contemporary writers use the untranslated Arabic because they are so dissatisfied 
with English equivalencies. Rabi insisted upon replacing “group feeling” with casabiyya even in 
direct quotes from Rosenthal. Alatas introduced casabiyya as “tribal social solidarity or group 
feeling” (785). By 2012, he described casabiyya as “a type of group feeling or social cohesion” 
(56).  Aranson and Stauth called casabiyya one of Ibn Khaldun’s “most untranslatable terms” 
(33).  
Irwin undertook an etymology of the term, saying the concept may derive from the root 
verb casaba for “he twisted” to “summon up the image of men twisted together by blood ties or 
physical proximity.” Another possibility is from the noun cisaba as “something wound around 
the head” to serve as a sign of tribal allegiance, or “band or league” (472). Regardless of the 
original derivation, the word had a commonly-understood meaning with negative connotations 
by the time that Ibn Khaldun wrote.  
cAsabiyya had a pre-Islamic meaning of “making common cause with one’s agnates” 
(Rabi, 48). Arabic tribes were founded upon this kinship through male ancestors. However, 
Muhammad criticized it as an unquestioning allegiance. With the advent of Islam, tribal ties were 
to be sublimated to religion (Rabi, 48). “Religion does supersede casabiyya, but it does so by 
redefining it rather than denying it” (Lawrence, xv). This provides one way to reconcile the pre- 
and post Islamic manifestations of casabiyya: as an indicator of the primary (but not exclusive) 
allegiance. 
The Khaldunian dilemma is thus: using untranslated casabiyya pushes the definition back 
a step, but does not obviate it. Even philosophers fluent in Arabic must agree on what work the 
concept is doing in analysis. Absent that agreement, casabiyya is useless as an analytic concept. 
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My greater concern is that not translating casabiyya renders the concept mute in non-Islamic 
philosophical discourse. My contention is that Ibn Khaldun has something interesting to say 
about how societies tolerate difference, which requires an explication of casabiyya. An adequate 
translation would allow this concept to participate in contemporary philosophical discussions on 
identity and community. Ibn Khaldun used casabiyya as a technical term, describing it in terms of 
sources and functions (Kaypinar, 166). Following Ibn Khaldun, then, let us consider how 
casabiyya functions in his theory.  
Community contours 
Ibn Khaldun introduced casabiyya as a component of civilization in the opening lines of 
Book One of the Kitāb al-‘Ibar. “[History] deals with such conditions affecting the nature of 
civilization as, for instance, savagery and sociability, group feeling/ casabiyya and the different 
ways by which one group of human beings achieves superiority over another” (I, 71).91 He 
applied the term to individuals when discussing human beings who are chosen by God. Ibn 
Khaldun listed signs of inspired human beings, which included the prestige they have among 
their people: 
That means that (such a man) has group feeling/ casabiyya and influence which 
protect him from harm at the hands of unbelievers, until he has delivered the 
messages of his Lord and achieved the degree of complete perfection with respect 
to his religion and religious organization that God intended for him (I, 188).  
                                                 
91
 Quotations in this section are from Rosenthal’s translation of The Muqaddimah. I will use 
both his original “group feeling” and casabiyya to highlight the concept. Page numbers are to the 
three-volume work/abridged version. 
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The implication seems to be that an individual may be imbued with group feeling/ casabiyya, 
rather than being protected because the community has it. 
Ibn Khaldun related group feeling/ casabiyya to the blood relationship “or something 
corresponding to it (I, 264).” When connection through common descent is clear, it evokes a 
natural affection (I, 265). When extended to neighbors, clients and allies, it produces a sense of 
shame when any of them is humiliated (I, 264). However, if the fact of common descent is 
known only from genealogy, it becomes a matter of scientific knowledge and no longer moves 
the imagination. “It has become useless” (1, 265).  Although group feeling/ casabiyya may be 
extended to clients and allies, Ibn Khaldun did not believe that those individuals will feel the 
same close connection to the group as those born into it. They would never be able to lead the 
group, because leadership is “transmitted in one particular branch that has been marked for 
superiority through group feeling/ casabiyya” (I, 270).  
Ibn Khaldun distinguished group feeling/ casabiyya from pedigree, prestige, or nobility. 
Pedigree is the result of common descent. However, nobility and prestige are personal qualities. 
Prestige means that one has forefathers “who had good (personal) qualities and who mingled 
with good people and (that, in addition, they) try to be as decent as possible” (I, 274).  Nobility 
may come either from birth or from service to the ruling dynasty. Each of these qualities is 
powerful when combined with group feeling/ casabiyya. 
According to Ibn Khaldun, this interaction of prestige with descent and nobility was 
mischaracterized in Ibn Rushd’s commentary on Aristotle’s Rhetoric.  
“Prestige,” he states, “belongs to people who are ancient settlers in a town. … I 
should like to know how long residence in a town can help (anyone to gain 
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prestige), if he does not belong to a group that makes him feared and causes 
others to obey him. (Averroes,) in a way, considers prestige as depending 
exclusively on the number of forefathers. Yet, rhetoric means to sway the 
opinions of those whose opinions count, that is, the men in command. It takes no 
notice of those who have no power. They cannot sway anyone’s opinions, and 
their own opinions are not sought. … It is true that Averroes grew up in a 
generation (group) and a place where people had no experience of group feeling 
and were not familiar with the conditions governing it. Therefore, (Averroes) … 
did not refer to the reality of group feeling and its influence among men. (I, 275-
276). 
When discussing succession in leadership of the community, Ibn Khaldun connected 
group feelings/ casabiyya with the restraining influence of government and religion. During the 
time of the first four caliphs, “royal authority as such did not yet exist, and the restraining 
influence was religious” (I, 433). Group feeling/ casabiyya “which determines unity and disunity 
in the customary course of affairs” was not as important then as it was to be later because 
religious unity was very strong (I, 433). 
During the time of the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties, the group feeling/ casabiyya of 
the Arabs approached the final goal of royal authority. However, the restraining influence of 
religion had weakened, so the influence of government and group was needed. 
If, under those circumstances, someone not acceptable to the group had been 
appointed as successor, such an appointment would have been rejected by it. The 
(chances of the appointee) would have been quickly demolished, and the 
community would have been split and torn by dissention” (I, 433). 
Differences in the relationship among government, group, and religion vary by civilization. 
“Times differ according to differences in affairs, tribes, and group feeling/ casabiyya, which come 
into being during those times” (I, 434). 
In addition to being a restraining influence on groups, group feeling/ casabiyya is a 
unifying and inspiring factor. When discussing tactics in war, Ibn Khaldun addressed external 
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factors, such as: the number of soldiers, the number and quality of weapons, and proper tactics. 
Then, he discussed hidden factors resulting from human trickery, such as spreading alarming 
news to cause defections, attacking from high points, or hiding in thickets or rocky terrain. These 
hidden causes produce fear and confusion, which can result in routs. He credited Muhammad’s 
victory over more numerous polytheists to “terror in the hearts of their enemies,” concluding that 
the most effective tactics are hidden from men’s eyes (I, 229).  
Ibn Khaldun disagreed with a proposal that victory may result from one side having more 
famous heroes than the other, which is an external factor.  
What is the fact proven to make for superiority is the situation with regard to 
group feeling/ casabiyya. If one side has a group feeling comprising all, while the 
other side is made up of numerous different groups, and if both sides are 
approximately the same in numbers, then the side with a united group feeling/ 
casabiyya is stronger than, and superior to, the side that is made up of several 
different groups (II, 87). 
So, group feeling/ casabiyya may be held by individuals within groups, by groups within groups, 
and by the overall group. 
Dynamic difference 
Ibn Khaldun used the concept of casabiyya to describe a cyclical process through which 
civilizations become stronger or weaker. His observations focused on the interplay between 
Bedouins and sedentary people, both natural groups that exist “by necessity” (I, 250). Bedouins 
are prior to sedentary people, because they have only the bare necessities of life.
92
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 He lists as Bedouins: “In the West, the nomadic Berbers and the Zanatah … in the East, 
the Kurds, the Turkomans, and the Turks” (I, 252). 
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Bare necessities, in a way, are basic, and luxuries secondary. Bedouins, thus, are 
the basis of, and prior to, cities and sedentary people. Man seeks first the bare 
necessities. Only after he has obtained the bare necessities does he get to comforts 
and luxuries. The toughness of desert life precedes the softness of sedentary life 
(I, 252). 
Bedouins are more courageous than sedentary people, because they must defend themselves. 
They have no walls or gates or militias, but must always carry weapons and pay attention to any 
noise. “Fortitude has become a character quality of theirs, and courage their nature” (I, 258).  
To survive in the desert requires strong group feeling/ casabiyya. The conditions are 
harsh, which requires mutual cooperation. Anyone without a group affiliation would perish from 
the elements, lack of food and other resources, or attack. Human beings have inclinations to both 
good and evil. Evil qualities are injustice and mutual aggression. In cities, mutual aggression is 
controlled by governmental authority. Aggression from outside is averted by walls and 
government troops. Within Bedouin tribes, mutual aggression is restrained by the tribal leaders, 
on the basis of the veneration of members. Aggression from outside is repelled by strong group 
feeling/casabiyya, which both “makes for mutual support and aid, and increases the fear felt by 
the enemy” (I, 263). 
While sedentary people do not wish to live in the desert, Bedouins work to achieve the 
luxuries of urbanization. “When he has obtained enough to be ready for the conditions and 
customs of luxury, he enters upon a life of ease and submits himself to the yoke of the city” (I, 
253). The goal of group feeling/casabiyya is royal authority, but once it is reached, the leader no 
longer relies upon members of the group. This inevitably causes a dissipation of group 
feeling/casabiyya and decline of civilization. To be restored, the Bedouins must return to the 
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desert “the basis and reservoir of civilization and cities” (I, 252).  The strength of the Bedouin 
group feeling/casabiyya as nourished by the desert is the animating force of civilization. 
Ibn Khaldun’s cyclical theory of decline and renewal in civilizations is supported by a 
theory of generations. Upon a return to the desert, it takes time to shed the meekness acquired in 
urban living, and to allow a new group feeling/ casabiyya to arise. He sets forty years as the 
shortest period for generational change. Ortega also made use of a theory of generations in his 
political philosophy. However, I propose to abstract the concept of casabiyya from its original 
role in civilizational or generational cycles and examine its cohesive and motivational nature. Ibn 
Khaldun’s identification of this societal force may then be applied in a much broader context 
than al-Andalus and the Maghreb. 
Situated selves in society 
One paragraph of Ibn Khaldun’s discussion on leadership demonstrates the complete 
inadequacy of the term “group feeling” to capture the individual and communal aspects of 
casabiyya. This is the paragraph in Rosenthal’s translation: 
 Leadership over people who share in a given group feeling cannot be vested in 
those not of the same descent. 
This is because leadership exists only through superiority, and superiority only 
through group feeling. Leadership over people, therefore, must, of necessity, 
derive from a group feeling that is superior to each individual group feeling. Each 
individual group feeling that becomes aware of the superiority of the group 
feeling of the leader is ready to obey and follow him (I, 269). 
The repeated use of “group feeling” obscures the meaning of concentric interactions among 
individual leadership qualities, lineage, and community. However, since group feeling/casabiyya 
has no commonly-agreed-upon English definition, we may as well use X instead to focus the 
analysis. 
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Leadership over people who share in a given X cannot be vested in those not of 
the same descent. 
This is because leadership exists only through superiority, and superiority only 
through X. Leadership over people, therefore, must, of necessity, derive from a X 
that is superior to each individual X. Each individual X that becomes aware of the 
superiority of the X of the leader is ready to obey and follow him. 
Where X contains these characteristics: 
 component of civilization 
 influence that protects one from harm 
 natural affection 
 produces sense of shame when allies are injured 
 moves the imagination 
 restraint upon actions similar to religion or government but separate from them 
 unifies and inspires groups  
 motivation to provide mutual support and aid 
 instills fear in enemies 
 determines unity/disunity in ordinary course of affairs 
 restrains mutual aggression 
 repels aggression from outside 
 change is inherent in the process 
These characteristics share a dynamic quality that motivates action without analysis – an 
instinctive response to recognition of affiliation. Mohammad Talbi defines casabiyya as: the 
cohesive force of the group, the group’s conscience of itself and ambitions, and the group’s 
drive to seek power through conquest. Jon Anderson considers casabiyya to be a relation of 
sameness that sets itself apart from both state and religion. 
A careful reading of Ibn Khaldun, of the ‘Ibar and the Ta’rif (the ‘Ibar’s 
autobiographical tailpiece) as well as the Muqadimmah, shows that Ibn Khaldun 
did not think of casabiyya as being a monopoly of the nomad, nor did he think that 
blood relationship was the only form of casabiyya bonding. Clients of tribal 
groups may acquire casabiyya. Urban groups, such as the Mamluks of fourteenth-
century Cairo, could constitute an effective and cohesive group (isaba). … [A] 
Mamluk corps infused with an artificial casabiyya could provide a ruler with 
renewed strength (internal citations omitted)(Irwin, 472). 
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These readings support the project of abstracting casabiyya as technical term to apply more 
broadly in philosophical analysis. They attempt to capture what it is as how it works in groups. 
However, they do not address the manifestation of casabiyya in individuals and its interaction 
within multiple levels of associations. 
A return to the original use of casabiyya helps to focus the concept, which may then be 
used to flesh out an aspect of identity that is under-theorized in Ortega’s situated selves 
discussed in the previous chapter. The Arabian concept of tribe identified those linked by 
paternal descent. In addition to familial relations, what else does this idea capture? It includes: 
geographic location, language, religion, race/ethnicity, sex/gender, common customs, and 
traditions. We are born into this milieu, which forms our perspective of the world.  
Ortega takes note of our embeddedness in culture, of our necessity to choose among the 
mute things seeking our attention. However, he does not fully address the aspects of our selves 
that are not chosen, but through which we encounter the world – such as sex/gender and 
race/ethnicity. Many of the most impactful aspects of our identity are not self-selected, they are 
imposed by the bodies and cultures into which we are born. Women, at nearly all points of 
history, had fewer things available than men from which to select in the task of building their 
lives. The same is true for non-white individuals in the United States, and minority populations 
worldwide. To return to Talbi’s definition of casabiyya, it may be possible for members of the 
dominant culture to have an casabiyya of which they are not conscious. However, it is not 
possible for a members of a minority group to be unaware of their social/cultural identity, of 
their casabiyya. Indeed, the shared self-identity may differ from that imposed by culture or 
presumed by majority populations. 
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The relevant aspect of my identity, my situated self, depends upon the context. When in a 
gathering of Muslim women, I am a member of the group of women, but not of the Islamic 
population. We women would all be denied entry to the men’s section of any mosque. It is less 
likely that I would be denied entry to the United States in an airport. If we take casabiyya to be 
the primary source of social or cultural identity in a given situation, it can capture the dynamic 
and concentric nature of the concept. This is not to say that the group itself has an identity, but 
rather it is a collection of individuals who share an identity. 
Contemporary philosopher Ridha Chennoufi takes note of concentric community 
identity: 
What first permits to establish a given space, are the standards of individual and 
collective action – at family, corporatist, local, and national level – that are 
accepted and complied with by those who live in that space. Those standards are 
in turn based on the values that structure all the economic, juridical, moral, 
cultural, and political spheres of social life. However, each space is always inside 
another larger space to which it must constantly cooperate with and adapt (3). 
Speaking of political changes in Tunisia, Chennoufi says the significance of the revolution is 
“the way that those who experience it look upon their own existence and the image they formed 
over time of their collective identity”(4). Change had to be cast as Islamic, but in the Maghreb, 
Islam alone could not define casabiyya. “[A]ny political movement, including one that claims to 
be a universal religion, does not have a chance of enlisting the support of a people unless it takes 
account of the specific character of their space” (4). Chennoufi reads Ibn Khaldun’s theory of 
casabiyya as a general principal that is always grounded in specific events: “Indeed, in order to 
make sense, a thought must express the spirit of its times, but as spiritual expression, it must 
cross all times” (4). 
  113 
Political parameters 
The founders of the United States described their shared identity in both defined and 
unspecified terms. The Declaration of Independence identified them as residents of the colonies 
of Great Britain in the Americas.  
We, therefore, the Representatives of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, in 
General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the World for 
the Rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good 
People of these Colonies, solemnly Publish and Declare, That these United 
Colonies are, and of Right ought to be, Free and Independent States; that they are 
absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political 
Connection between them and the State of Great-Britain, is and ought to be totally 
absolved; … (Declaration, n.p.) 
What was not explicitly stated is that the “good People” did not include the original inhabitants 
of the Americas, nor those brought here involuntarily as slaves. That was made more evident in 
the Constitution, which apportioned representatives and taxes according to the population of the 
States “which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including 
those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all 
other Persons” (Article I, Section 2, U.S. Constitution).  
The reference to “the Supreme Judge of the World” came after the claim in the first 
paragraph of the Declaration to “the separate and equal Station to which the Laws of Nature and 
of Nature’s God entitle them.” The appeal to a single Supreme Judge, and the presumption that 
Man can know the laws of Nature’s God, are rooted in a Christian/Deist view of the world. 
Rather than identify the nature of the cosmology, however, the foundational documents are silent 
as to the religious identity of the colonists. The idea that no citizen should have to declare 
religious affiliation tracks with the Constitutional prohibition of a religious test for holding 
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public office (and with the historical memory of the colonists). However, the silence obscures the 
perspective of the authors.  
The colonial (white, male) founders signed on to the idea that the new nation would 
permit all religions, even though implementation has been predictably problematic. While their 
expressed intent was to found a nation open to all believers, their sense of what was permissible -
- their social/cultural identity (casabiyya) -- was Christian/Deist. The goal was easier to articulate 
with imaginary Muslims than confraternal cousins. The LDS Church, through the Reynolds test 
case, presented a challenge to this powerful, but unstated, shared identity. White men claiming to 
follow Christ demanded protection for their practice of polygamy under the First Amendment. 
The intensity of the opposition demonstrated both the motivational and cohesive nature of 
casabiyya. It was not necessary to consult with the community or arrive at a consensus of leaders 
– the opposition to Mormons was spontaneous and negative in every state they entered, as well 
as in the Supreme Court, and Congress. 
Toleration again 
Morocco provides a contrasting way of dealing with the interaction among religion, state, 
and shared identity. As a result of its social/cultural identity, the country takes a different 
approach to polygamy that begins with the Constitution and continues through the Family Code. 
Although it is able to deal with Islamic polygamy, the polygamist marriages practiced by 
members of the early LDS Church would present a challenge. Nonetheless, the different 
approach suggests a possible path forward for religious expression in the United States. 
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Constitutional community 
Morocco adopted a new Constitution in 2011. In contrast with the U.S., the document 
was completely re-written by a commission empaneled by the King, rather than being subjected 
to periodic amendments. It is also far more detailed, running to 180 articles. In keeping with an 
Islamic approach, the focus is on justice rather than rights.  
The preamble to the constitution set as its goal to develop “a society of solidarity,” and 
for the first time described the national identity. 
A sovereign Muslim State, attached to its national unity and to its territorial 
integrity, the Kingdom of Morocco intends to preserve, in its plentitude and its 
diversity, its one and indivisible national identity. Its unity is forged by the 
convergence of its Arab-Islamist, Amazigh (Berber) and Saharan-Hassanic 
components, nourished and enriched by its African, Andalusian, Hebraic and 
Mediterranean influences. The preeminence accorded to the Muslim religion in 
the national reference is consistent with the attachment of the Moroccan people to 
the values of openness, of moderation, of tolerance and of dialogue for mutual 
understanding between all the cultures and civilizations of the world (Ruchti, 3). 
This articulation of national identity addressed two of the most controversial issues in the debate 
over the adoption of the constitution: the place of Islam in the Moroccan state, and whether to 
recognize Tamazight (spoken by Amazigh) as an official language (Ottaway, n.p.).  
Article Three set Islam as the religion of the State, “which guarantees to all the free 
exercise of religious practices” (Ruchti, 5). This contains two concepts of note: first, the religion 
of Islam itself is the guarantor of free exercise of religion (rather than the State) and second, 
Islam is the religion of the State, rather than the State religion. This differs from constitutions of 
other Islamic countries, which make Islam the sole source of legislation, or a foundational source 
of legislation (Egypt and Iraq). It may reflect that Morocco is a Muslim state “in the sense that 
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the vast majority of its nationals are Muslim: … the contours of the Moroccan people overlap 
with those of the Muslim community established on the territory” (Madani, et al, 19).  
Equating the citizens of Morocco with a shared Muslim identity sets the parameters of 
what is acceptable behavior. Examples were presented in the discussion of how to accommodate 
non-Muslim religions. Some argued for recognition of a freedom of conscience, as 
acknowledged in many European nations, rather than a guarantee that people of other religions 
are able to perform religious practices. This was “vehemently denounced by the general secretary 
of the PJD
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 as opening the way to unacceptable and provocative behavior such as public display 
of homosexuality and violating in public the Ramadan fasting” (Ottaway, n.p.). Although not 
requiring that non-Muslims must fast or refrain from same-sex relationships, the public 
demonstration of either is offensive to the national social/cultural identity. 
The King guarantees the free exercise of beliefs as the Commander of the Faithful, 
detailed in Article 41 (Ruchti, 13). The 2011 Constitution separates this power from his position 
as head of state, now in Article 42. Religious issues are decided in consultation with the Superior 
Council of the Ulemas, while civil matters are referred to the judiciary. Even though Islam is the 
religion of the state, and most citizens are Muslim, civil laws are neither made nor enforced by 
religious leaders.  
The Constitutional Reform Advisory Committee never considered removing Islam as the 
religion of the country, or the King as the Commander of the Faithful. Rajae Naji Mekkaoui, law 
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 The Justice and Development Party (PJD) has been the leading Islamist party in Morocco 
since 1998. It is considered to be politically moderate but socially conservative (Maghraoui, 
n.p.). 
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professor and member of the committee, said they were aware of threats to boycott the 
referendum if the text did not clearly state the pre-eminence of Islam. Despite the explicit role of 
Islam, the law also guarantees freedom of religion. “The Jewish community has always played a 
part in Moroccan society,” Mekkaoui said, and was represented on the constitutional committee. 
“A moderate and tolerant form of Islam prevails in Morocco, which is why Moroccans do not 
tolerate certain forms of extremism or fanaticism” (Ali, n.p.) 
Polygamy in practice  
The distinction between religious and civil regulations is demonstrated in how Morocco’s 
Family Code deals with polygamy. The Moudawana was revised February 5, 2004. Although 
there were protests, including a march against it in 2002, the reform effort was led by the King, 
who guaranteed its Islamic credentials. “It was he who intervened to ensure that the Family Code 
was adopted, by setting up a committee made up of ulemas and experts in various fields,” said 
Reda Hnaui, a professor of Islamic education (Ali, n.p.). 
The reform raised the legal age for girls in all marriages from 15 to 18 (although judges 
may make exceptions). Women were also given the right to choose their spouse and an equal 
right to property in divorce. The preamble set the contemporary attitude toward polygamy in 
Morocco. 
Concerning polygamy, we took into consideration the commitment to the tolerant 
principles of Islam in establishing justice, which the Almighty requires for 
polygamy to take place, as it is plainly stated in the Holy Koran: He said ‘…and if 
you fear that you cannot do justice (to so many) then one (only).’ And since the 
Almighty ruled out the possibility for men to do justice in this particular case, He 
said: ‘You will not be able to deal equally between (your) wives, however much 
you wish (to do so),’ and he thus made polygamy quasi impossible under Sharia 
(religious law). 
  118 
We further adhered to the distinguished wisdom of Islam in allowing men to 
legitimately take a second wife, but only under compelling circumstances and 
stringent restrictions, with the judge’s authorisation, instead of illegitimate 
polygamy occurring if we prohibit it entirely (Moroccan Family Code, n.p.) 
Two concerns are addressed: as an Islamic country, Morocco cannot ban polygamy and 
attempting to do so would drive it underground (as has happened in the United States).  
However, this does not mean that the state must keep hands off. As with other marriages, 
the Moudawana addresses specific harms. Article 40 prohibits polygamy when there is a “risk of 
inequity” between the wives, or when the marriage contract with the first wife stipulates that the 
husband may not marry again. Article 41 states that the court will not authorize polygamy unless 
a “exceptional and objective justification” is proven and the husband demonstrates the ability to 
provide for two families equally. Articles 42 – 46 outline the procedure to be followed. The 
husband must petition the court describing the justification, attaching a financial statement. The 
court summons the first wife and a hearing is conducted with both parties present. The court may 
approve polygamy if it accepts the justification and “puts into place conditions benefiting the 
first wife and her children.” If the first wife does not approve, she may receive a divorce and 
financial settlement that must be paid within seven days. If the court approves the polygamy 
petition, the second marriage may not take place until the judge has informed the future wife that 
the husband is already married and she consents (Moroccan Family Code, n.p.). 
While polygamy is permitted in Islam, and Morocco is an Islamic country, the practice is 
rare. Only one percent of marriages is now polygamous (Rubin, n.p.). On the range of 
permitted/prohibited practices in Islam, it could be seen as permitted but discouraged (makruh). 
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The approach in Morocco draws a distinction between what is legal and what is required or 
admired.  
Polygamy is a practice that is permitted, but not required, by Islam. There is no 
metaphysical implication either way, unlike the polygamy of the early LDS Church or current 
practitioners with Mormon roots. Islam also traditionally limits additional wives to four, which 
the language of the Moudwana seems to reduce further with provisos that legal criteria are met to 
take a second wife. Mormon polygamy does not limit the number of wives.  
Philosophical principles 
In the section of the Reynolds opinion cited at the beginning of this chapter, the Court 
created a false binary: “unless restricted by some form of constitution, it is within the legitimate 
scope of the power of every civil government to determine whether polygamy or monogamy 
shall be the law of social life under its dominion” (Reynolds at 166). It is possible to encourage 
monogamy and discourage polygamy without outlawing either, as demonstrated in Morocco. 
Legality does not necessarily equate to endorsement. 
Further, the limitations of a constitution are not the most powerful restriction on 
governmental action. Outrage over public violation of the Ramadan fast in Morocco is an 
expression of social/cultural identity, regardless of whether it is enforced by law. It is similar to 
Ibn Khaldun’s comment about a leader who does not have the same casabiyya as the group: “the 
community would have been split and torn by dissention” (Mukaddimah, 168). It aligns with 
Thomas Jefferson’s concern “that it is time enough for the rightful purpose of civil government 
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for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good 
order” (quoted in Reynolds at 165).  
The enactment and enforcement of laws illuminate the boundaries of casabiyya but do not 
create or sustain it. At the time of Reynolds, the social/cultural identity of the United States did 
not include members of the LDS Church, even though the Church was founded in the U.S., and 
its followers were white and of Western European heritage. Many were recent immigrants from 
England, as the founding colonists had been. Their open challenge to the nature of Christ, God, 
humans, and eternity was theologically unacceptable and the practice of polygamy solidified 
aversion. Yet in 2017, one of the impediments to judicial recourse for Kody Brown is that laws 
against bigamy are no longer enforced and he is unable to demonstrate a credible threat of harm. 
The social/cultural identity of the United States is no longer offended by personal relationships 
that involve multiple partners, even though laws restricting them remain on the books. 
Social/cultural aversion rooted in religious identity was the basis of the ban on polygamy. But 
current adherents are unable to demonstrate in court that this aversion no longer exists, which 
means there is no longer any jurisprudential justification for the ban. 
Refocus recap 
To recap the argument of this chapter: (1) social/cultural groups contain a dynamic that 
both identifies and motivates members (casabiyya). (2) Political nations contain many 
social/cultural identities, such as race/ethnicity, sexual orientation, and religion. (3) All 
individuals hold simultaneously many social/cultural identities, some selected while others are 
imposed (sex/gender, race/ethnicity). The momentary importance is determined by the identity at 
risk. That is why it is possible for white Christian males to be relatively unaware of their societal 
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relationship in the United States but more conscious of that status in Morocco. (4) Social/cultural 
identity changes over time, in relationship with neighbors and itself. On Ibn Khaldun’s strong 
view: each casabiyya contains within it the inevitability of destruction and the need for renewal. 
On a weak view: societal standards are not static, but rather relational. It is inevitable that change 
will occur in community mores over time, especially as the definition of political community is 
expanded to include additional members (such as non-white men, and women of every 
ethnicity). 
The framework for evaluating religious free expression then is: situated, encultured 
individuals with differing eternal identities have a First Amendment protection for religious 
practices in the United States. When the free exercise of those practices seems to violate current 
social/cultural identity, the government adopts an attitude of ontological agnosticism that is 
content-neutral as to the underlying religious belief. Laws adopt epistemic perspectivism to 
accommodate the fullest possible exercise from the perspective of the impacted believer. 
Contained within any restriction religious exercise is the necessity for review as conditions 
change. If the reason for restricting religious practice is social/cultural identity (casabiyya), then 
the law loses its justification when those conditions/attitudes change. 
The next chapter considers these questions: does the framework I propose better resolve 
free expression challenges that arise from Islamic practices? What limits may social/cultural 
identity impose and how can change in social/cultural identity be recognized in the legal analysis 
of the free expression of religion? Finally, what could the Reynolds Court have done differently?  
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CHAPTER FOUR: REYNOLDS REFOCUSED 
[T]he question is raised whether religious belief  
can be accepted as a justification of an overt act  
made criminal by the law of the land. 
-- Reynolds v. United States at 162  
 
One of the most visible symbols of contemporary religious identity is the head covering 
worn by some Islamic women. The headscarf, or veil, has sparked controversy in secular nations 
such as France, in Islamic countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia, and in Turkey, where a secular 
civic commitment remains at odds with the religious identity of much of its citizenry.
94
 The 
resolution in each depends upon the relationship between government and religion as competing 
normative authorities. In this work, I argue that this relationship in the United States is one of 
tolerance between church and government. However, government is to accommodate its citizens 
and their religious eternal identities. Nevertheless, the Islamic veil has served as a barrier to 
women in employment, education, and having their day in U.S courts. 
This chapter applies the framework developed in Chapter Three to issues that arise with 
religious head coverings in the United States as an example of how religious identity is to be 
accommodated. My analysis rejects the approach in this chapter’s opening quotation of 
considering these belief/acts as exceptions to laws of the land. It considers a possible negative 
impact of using social/cultural identity (casabiyya) as the outer limit of toleration for belief/acts. 
                                                 
94
 See discussion of which term to use for religious head coverings in the Introduction. 
  123 
To determine how to accommodate social/cultural change, it reconsiders how the law could have 
answered the question of polygamy as a religious practice by Mormons in the United States in 
the late 1800s. It first situates the question in the jurisprudential, religious, and social/cultural 
context of the time. It then applies the framework outlined in the previous chapter, and finally 
considers what approaches would have been viable and their implications for current 
jurisprudence. 
Veil as belief/act 
An Islamic woman sued Enterprise Rent-A-Car in Michigan small claims court in 2006. 
When called to give testimony, the judge asked Ginnah Muhammad to remove her veil, which 
covered her face except for an opening for her eyes. Judge Paul J. Paruk told her that was 
necessary so that he could evaluate her credibility: “unless you take that off, I can’t see your face 
and I can’t tell whether you’re telling me the truth or not …” (Schwartzbaum 1534).95 
Muhammad said she could remove the veil before a female judge, but otherwise could not 
comply with his order. Judge Paruk said he was the only judge available, and that he understood 
from conversations with other Muslim women that wearing the veil was a custom, but not a 
religious obligation. Muhammad insisted that she wore the veil out of respect for her religion, 
saying “I will not take off my clothes … [T]his is part of my clothes so I can’t remove them 
when I’m in court.” The judge dismissed her case.  
A few years earlier, a Muslim woman wearing a similar face-covering veil sued the state 
of Florida for revoking her driver’s license because she would not provide a photo revealing her 
                                                 
95
 Transcript of Record Muhammad v. Enter. Rent-A-Car, No. 06-41896 (Dist. Ct. Mich. 
Oct. 11, 2006), quoted in Schwartzbaum. 
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face. Sultana Freeman had been given a license with a photo in her veil, but the state reviewed its 
database following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and suspended her license until she appeared for a 
photo without the veil. In the 2003 trial and appeal, expert witnesses on Islamic law were called 
by both sides to determine whether wearing the veil is an optional, cultural practice or religious 
obligation.
96
 
In both cases, judges considered as relevant both the centrality of the belief/act to 
religious theology, and whether there was divergence of practice within the community. 
However, the Supreme Court has eschewed both inquiries. “It is not within the judicial ken to 
question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular 
litigants’ interpretations of those creeds” (Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 US. at 699). 
The Indiana court also appears to have given significant weight to the fact that 
another Jehovah's Witness had no scruples about working on tank turrets; for that 
other Witness, at least, such work was "scripturally" acceptable. Intrafaith 
differences of that kind are not uncommon among followers of a particular creed, 
and the judicial process is singularly ill-equipped to resolve such differences in 
relation to the Religion Clauses. One can, of course, imagine an asserted claim so 
bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection 
under the Free Exercise Clause; but that is not the case here, and the guarantee of 
free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a 
religious sect. Particularly in this sensitive area, it is not within the judicial 
function and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his 
fellow worker more correctly perceived the commands of their common 
faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation (Thomas v. Review 
Board, 450 U. S. at 7165-6, emphasis added). 
In neither case was there a suggestion that the women were feigning belief. Focusing on the 
validity of the belief that veiling is a religious obligation merely confuses the question. It is not 
uncommon for religious practices to hold great significance to believers regardless of their 
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centrality to theology in any religion. Such an inquiry is especially fraught in a religion with as 
many different schools of law and cultural influences as Islam.  
Following Ginnah Muhammad’s rental car case, the Michigan Supreme Court changed 
the state’s rules of evidence in 2009 to require that the judge or jury be able to observe the 
demeanor of parties and witnesses (Clerget, 1035).
97
  Sean Clerget argued that this rule of 
evidence fails as a neutral law in that it has the effect of targeting only the religious exercise of 
Muslim women who wear a veil (Clerget, 1037). Further, it was enacted shortly after 
Muhammad’s case gained media attention. Nothing had been done to regulate the behavior in 
question before her case. In fact, the trial judge in an earlier criminal case had allowed a witness 
to testify while wearing a full mask. The court of appeals reversed the mask case on 
Confrontation Clause grounds.
98
 However, no change in the rules of evidence was discussed 
following that case. 
 In Georgia, a woman attempting to enter a courtroom as an observer was jailed for 
wearing a veil in 2006. Lisa Valentine was accompanying her nephew to a traffic citation hearing 
when officials stopped her at the metal detector and told her she would not be allowed in the 
courtroom with the veil. She was ordered to serve ten days in jail for contempt of court but was 
released when the Washington-based Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) urged 
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federal review of her case and another in Georgia where a veiled woman was denied entry to a 
courtroom (U.S. Judge Jails Muslim Woman over Headscarf, n.p.). In neither of these cases was 
the woman a participant as either plaintiff, defendant, or witness so credibility was not an issue.  
Roots of exemption 
The construction of religious practices as exceptions to “neutral” laws automatically 
favors citizens who are members of majority groups and religions, as discussed in Chapter One. 
It also places the burden on those seeking to perform belief/acts to justify an exception. In ruling 
against Freeman’s appeal of her driver’s license suspension, the court said, “we recognize the 
tension created as a result of choosing between following the dictates of one’s religion and the 
mandates of secular law … as long as the laws are neutral and generally applicable to the 
citizenry, they must be obeyed” (Moore, 247). This construction echoes the Reynolds quotation 
from the opening of this chapter, but was not created by that court. 
Sixty-seven years before the Reynolds court was presented with its Constitutional 
challenge, a court in New York City considered the first recorded free exercise case in U.S. 
history (DeLise 120).
99
 During confession, a man revealed to his parish priest that he had 
received stolen property.
100
 It is a practice of the Catholic Church that anything revealed in 
confession must not be disclosed by the priest. The priest instructed the man to perform penance, 
including returning the stolen property. Parishioner Daniel Phillips gave the property to his 
confessor, Father Anthony Kohlmann, who returned the items to their owner, who reported the 
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 People v. Philips, N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. (1813), cited in McConnell (2006). 
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 Now called the Sacrament of Reconciliation, the ritual provides that sins confessed to a 
priest are forgiven if the individual truly repents and performs the prescribed penance. 
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theft to the police. The New York Court of General Sessions subpoenaed Father Kohlmann to 
testify under oath about the theft. He appeared in court but refused to divulge details of the 
confession. 
In Phillips, the central question under examination was whether a government 
entity could enjoin a priest to divulge information obtained during the sacrament 
of Reconciliation (during confession), as forcing a priest to reveal such 
information would unequivocally violate the priest’s conscience, the principles of 
his church, and the requirements of his position. Furthermore, Father Kohlmann’s 
contravention of the church tenets under examination would have most assuredly 
resulted in his dismissal from the priesthood and, possibly, his excommunication 
from the church. Father Kohlmann had to decide between observing his religious 
scruples—his identity as a Catholic—and serving jail time for refusing to testify 
(DeLiss, 120, emphasis added). 
The unanimous opinion of the court was delivered by Judge De Witt Clinton. The court 
identified the law of general applicability to be: a person must relate all that he (or she) knows 
when compelled to testify in a court of law. It then considered exemptions that already existed, 
such as spouses could not be compelled to testify against one another. The court then applied the 
New York State Constitution’s provision that the “free exercise and enjoyment of religious 
profession and worship” is to be allowed except where the profession and worship interfere with 
the peace or safety of the state or result in the sanctioning of licentious acts. The court found that 
exempting Father Kohlmann from the general requirement of full and truthful testimony would 
not endanger the public peace or safety, or result in licentiousness. 
This framing of the question has pre-Constitutional roots, according to James DeLise. As 
an example, he cited the Charter of Carolina, revised in 1665, which expressly authorized 
authorities to grant “indulgences” or “dispensations”  as they saw “fit and reasonable.”  
Conflict between general laws and religious conviction commonly arose in three 
areas: military conscription, oath requirements, and religious assessments. When 
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conflict arose in these areas, “the colonies and states wrote special exemptions 
into their laws.” (DeLise 121, citing McConnell 1990 at 1472). 
DeLise relied heavily upon Mitch McConnell’s reading of historic religious exercise to argue 
that the underlying theory also supports race-based disparate impact policies. I consider this 
approach misguided in both applications, preferring accommodation of all personal identity 
components, including race, gender, and eternal identity. I point to his historical review to give 
context to the judicial environment in which Reynolds arose.  
When Chief Justice Waits framed the question before the court as seeking a religious 
exemption from a general law, he was reflecting the common construction of the time. US 
Supreme Court cases since then have followed the same approach. The focus of inquiry has been 
upon whether a law that appears to be neutral either has a disparate impact upon some religion or 
is a veiled attack upon it; how much a religious exercise is burdened by the general law; and the 
strength of the government’s interest in refusing the requested exemption.  
The analytic framework that I propose rejects this construction of the issue. On my 
framework, the personal identity of citizens is accommodated to the fullest extent possible, 
bounded only by social/cultural identity. Both the “religious exemption to a neutral law of 
general application” and the belief/action dichotomy are rejected as inappropriate to resolving 
performance of belief/acts. 
Evaluating veils 
On the evaluative framework that I propose, women who are wearing the veil as a 
belief/act should be accommodated as a default. If their wearing of the veil seems to violate 
social/cultural identity, the government adopts an attitude of ontological agnosticism that is 
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content-neutral as to the underlying religious belief, and adopts the epistemic perspective of the 
impacted believer. However, the two situations with veils that cover the face present different 
concerns for the social/cultural context. From a philosophical perspective, the cases demonstrate 
that (1) centrality to dogma/theology should not matter, but (2) community tolerance may. 
In Muhammad’s small-claims case, the concern was evaluating her credibility as a 
witness. A simple accommodation would be to provide a female judge. No larger community 
concern was presented.
101
 Similar accommodations are now made where identification is 
important, such as female officers to screen prison visitors or travelers in airports. The state had 
offered to provide a female photographer for Freeman’s driver’s license photo. 
However, the review that flagged Freeman’s license was specifically linked to terrorism, 
not her ability to drive. The state of Florida cited security concerns with the driver’s license as a 
primary means of identification. The judge agreed, ruling that while Freeman “most likely poses 
no threat to national security, there likely are people who would be willing to use a ruling 
permitting the wearing of full face cloaks in driver’s license photos by pretending to ascribe to 
religious beliefs in order to carry out activities that would threaten lives” (Moore, 247). The 
ruling has been criticized for linking a woman who was not suspected of any crime with the 
threat of terrorism solely on the basis of her appearance.  
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 Schwartzbaum questioned whether the judge’s desire to assess credibility would offset a 
religious claim, citing much evidence on the unreliability of credibility assessments based on 
facial expressions. An appeal of the small claims court ruling was filed but then dropped, so 
there was no judicial review of the issues. 
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Contours of accommodation 
The linkage of Freeman’s driver’s license with terrorism arises out of a generalized fear 
of Muslims in the post 9/11 United States, which was and is a social/cultural concern. When 
surveying regulation of Islam in American law in 2007, Kathleen Moore noted that the Islamic 
veil accentuated the increasing visibility of Muslims in the United States. “Especially after 9/11, 
the heightened daily concern over an “Islamic threat” to the United States has made objects 
associated with Muslim-ness, such as the hijab, the displaced locus of debates over the social 
reality of contemporary America and the global war on terrorism” (Moore, 240). Sixteen years 
after the attack on the twin towers, anti-Muslim hostility frequently includes not only concern 
over terrorist attacks, but also denial that the faith and American identity are compatible. 
At another [military] base, the wife of a combat-decorated Muslim U.S. Naval 
officer, who was wearing a Muslim headscarf, was surrounded in the commissary 
and spat upon and cursed as not being a “true American and being a spy and a 
terrorist.” She was with her children at the time (Burleigh, n.p.). 
The phenomenon of “Islamophobia” in post 9/11 United States illustrates a concern with using 
social/cultural identity as an outer boundary for tolerating belief/acts. Does this approach leave 
open the possibility of reading mob rule into religious accommodation?  
CAIR issues a quarterly report on anti-Muslim incidents. 
“The presidential election campaign and the Trump administration have tapped 
into a seam of bigotry and hate that has resulted in the targeting of American 
Muslims and other minority groups,” said Zainab Arain, coordinator in CAIR’s 
Department to Monitor and Combat Islamophobia. “If acts of bias impacting the 
American Muslim community continue as they have been, 2017 could be one of 
the worst years ever for such incidents.” 
The third most common trigger (15%) was a Muslim woman’s veil. As noted throughout, the 
religions who must seek protection from the courts are generally minority, and frequently 
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disliked, faiths. Rather than facing judges who normalize their biases as neutral, must citizens 
now face the court of hostile public opinion? 
Limits of social/cultural identity 
The first consideration is the strength of the opposition that is needed to limit 
accommodation. Ibn Khaldun described a challenge to casabiyya as something that would tear 
apart the community – not merely break out into violence, but such that community members 
might not follow the tribal leader. In U.S. history, a parallel is the long struggle to remove the 
remnants of slavery. As with Jim Crow laws restricting the lives of African-Americans, the 
relevant community is the entire nation.
102
 An example is the removal of “separate but equal” 
segregation of the nation’s schools. Rulings of the Supreme Court on forced school bussing to 
achieve racial integration were challenged by a Governor on the steps of his State Capitol and 
mobs in the streets. But they were supported by the other two branches of government, and much 
of the broader community. 
Ability to enforce 
The limit of community toleration of belief/acts I propose is the point that a Supreme 
Court ruling would neither be supported by the overall community nor enforced by Congress and 
the President. The Supreme Court got a glimpse of that boundary early on. It had claimed the 
right to rule upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and executive branches in 
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Marbury v. Madison. (1803). However, the Court had (and has) no independent police force nor 
standing army. President Andrew Jackson is said to have observed, "John Marshall has made his 
decision, now let him enforce it," in ignoring a ruling on seizure of lands held by American 
Indians a few decades before Reynolds.
103
 While the comment may be more legend than fact, it 
arose from a potential Constitutional crisis.  
In 1832, Chief Justice John Marshall announced the decision of the Supreme Court that 
declared unconstitutional all laws of Georgia over the Cherokee Nation (Worchester v. Georgia 
(1832). The courtroom was packed with observers, but lacking attorneys for the state of Georgia, 
which had no intention of complying with an adverse ruling (Miles 527). Two days later, the 
high court sent its order to the Georgia Supreme Court. President Jackson is alleged to have 
made a number of comments indicating that he would not enforce any order that became final. 
Edwin Miles detailed the negotiations that then took place with the plaintiffs, two 
Congregationalist missionaries who had violated a Georgia law forbidding the “unauthorized 
residence of white men within the Cherokee Nation” (Miles 519). They were visited by 
prominent Georgians who feared civil war if an attempt was made to enforce the ruling. The 
missionaries were urged to accept a pardon to avoid a “possible bloody conflict between state 
and federal authorities.” The missionaries did not wish to accept a pardon, as that would imply 
an admission of guilt. They eventually decided to instruct their attorney not to pursue the case 
due to “considerations of public interest” (Miles 540). 
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Though Wirt thought that it “gives one but mournful presages of the strength and 
durability of the union, when it can only be kept together by means like these,” 
the settlement of the quarrel between Georgia and the Supreme Court 
undoubtedly helped make possible the preservation of the Union in 1833 (Miles 
543). 
The Union was preserved at the expense of the Cherokee Nation, soon removed from its lands by 
the force of public opinion. This result points to the second consideration in limiting 
accommodation of belief/acts. 
Necessity to reconsider 
Even when a Supreme Court ruling enjoys the support of the President, Congress, and 
community, it may produce an unjust result. As Ortega insists, every perspective is grounded in a 
specific place and time. If the justification for a limit on accommodation of belief/acts is 
social/cultural identity, then a change in that identity requires a review of the limitation. The fact 
that laws (such as bigamy) are no longer being enforced would then be relevant evidence of a 
change in social/cultural identity, rather than a barrier to consideration. This is discussed further 
in the context of contemporary polygamy below. 
Accommodating veils 
Whether veiling in Islam is considered to be a religious or cultural practice, it is one 
deeply connected to the personal identity of the women. Adam Schwartzbaum drew a parallel to 
cases on access to courts. One was brought by two paraplegics against the state of Tennessee for 
refusing to make courts handicap-accessible. Lane had to crawl up the stairs to reach the 
courtroom. The Supreme Court held that “a State must afford to all individuals a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard in its courts” (Tennessee v. Lane, 2004 citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 
1971). 
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For a religious Muslim woman like Muhammad, the ban on the niqab in Michigan 
courtrooms is the functional equivalent of a courthouse without a ramp or an 
elevator for a paraplegic. Though she can technically enter by removing her veil, 
this would be an affront to her dignity and integrity as a human being … For a 
woman like Muhammad, religious obligations are just as intrinsic to her 
personhood and as out of her control as Lane’s disability (Schwartzbaum, 1556). 
This argument points to religion as a component of personal identity, and to accommodation as 
the appropriate approach. It looks to precedent with physical handicaps, rather than relying upon 
the First Amendment. 
In some cases, women wearing veils have been successful if accommodation, rather than 
exception, is the goal. This legal strategy was successful in the case of a sixth-grade student who 
was twice suspended from school for wearing a veil. Nashala Hearn had been permitted to wear 
the veil and was given time to pray in the early afternoon. However, another teacher compared 
her veil to a bandana or handkerchief, which are both banned by the school system dress code. 
She was suspended and her parents brought suit in 2003. The U.S. Justice Department filed a 
motion in support, arguing that the school district violated the equal protection clause of the 14
th
 
Amendment by applying the dress code in a discriminatory manner (Moore, 244). The school 
agreed to change its dress code to accommodate clothing worn for religious reasons. 
When the legal mandate is framed as accommodating religious believers, the result is 
more accepting of difference than when it is framed as tolerating religion. Muslim women in the 
workplace have successfully forced accommodation for veils by appealing to Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which requires employers to accommodate religious needs of 
employees. Samantha Elauf’s suit against Abercrombie & Fitch went to the Supreme Court. The 
retail clothing store location in Tulsa, Oklahoma, refused to hire her, saying her scarf clashed 
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with the company’s “Look Policy” (Liptak, n.p.). The company argued that Ms. Elauf did not tell 
them she wore the scarf for religious reasons. “This is really easy,” Justice Antonin Scalia said in 
announcing the 8-1 vote in Elauf’s favor. Scalia said the decision not to hire her was motivated 
by a desire to avoid accommodating her religious practice. The lone vote in opposition, Justice 
Clarence Thomas, dissented because the company dress code was “a neutral policy that could not 
be the basis for a discrimination lawsuit” (Liptak, n.p.). 
The antipathy of some citizens and groups toward Muslims, generally, and the veil, 
specifically, fails to challenge community identity to the extent that accommodation could not be 
enforced. Further, the examples above show that the judicial and executive branches have 
supported women who wear the veil. To recap, the belief/act act of wearing a veil for religious 
reasons is assumed to be permissible as the free exercise of religion. If social/cultural identity is 
in opposition, courts adopt an attitude of ontological agnosticism – presuming that the religious 
belief is true – from the perspective of the believer (epistemic perspectivism). The belief/act is 
accommodated unless social/cultural identity is so opposed that rulings permitting the belief/act 
cannot be enforced, and only for so long as that condition persists. With this framework 
established, we return to consider whether it can provide a result for George Reynolds that does 
not have such a severe impact upon his religion. If not, can it at least provide a result that does 
not create a permanent bar to judicial relief for Kody Brown. 
Reynolds revisited 
The treatment of polygamy as a religious practice differs in several significant ways from 
Mormons in 1800 United States to Muslims in 21
st
 Century Morocco. Morocco’s approach in the 
revision of the Family Code was to shift the perspective on polygamy from tolerance by the 
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government for religion as a competing normative authority to its impact on participants as 
individual citizens. It also shifted the Constitutional concern from whether religion provides a 
husband with a right to defy a governmental limit on polygamy to the conditions of wives in 
polygamy as equal citizens. This shift in perspective is compatible with my revised framework 
for evaluating religious expression. It takes the perspective of the individual impacted by any 
limit on religious expression. It preserves the intent that religion is tolerated, while seeking to 
accommodate citizens with eternal identities. 
Could the United States Supreme Court have taken a similar approach to Mormon 
polygamy as practiced by George Reynolds? To determine the feasibility of this approach, it is 
necessary to return to the social/cultural context of the polygamy ban and the boundaries of 
tolerance that existed at the time. Social/cultural identity not only concerned attitudes toward 
Mormons, but also the way that marriage and interpersonal relationships were viewed, generally. 
Reynolds context 
The political situation of the LDS Church in 1800s U.S. was reviewed in Chapter One. 
However, an equally-important context is the status of marriage at the time. Marriage was 
between one man and one woman and sexual activity outside marriage was illegal. Adultery as 
well as bigamy could result in criminal charges, as could homosexual status or activity. The 
practice of polygamy by the LDS Church had become public by the time it was a territory, even 
though it was suspected much earlier. This is the social/cultural environment in which the 
Reynolds opinion would be received. 
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Marriages traditionally fell under colonial and then state laws that could have varying 
legal requirements (such as the age of consent)
 104
 and formalities (such as recognition of 
common law marriages).
105
 Upon marriage, women ceased to exist as a legal entity under the 
doctrine of coverture – the two became one, and that was the husband.  
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being 
or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is 
incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband; under whose wing, 
protection, and cover, she performs every thing; and is therefore called in our law-
french a feme-covert . . . under the protection and influence of her husband, her 
baron, or lord; and her condition during her marriage is called her coverture. . . . 
(English Jurist William Blackstone, cited in Zaher, 459).
106
 
The wife’s person and property belonged to her husband. Any income from property she 
brought into the marriage was controlled by her husband, and any wages she earned outside the 
home belonged to him. If he contracted debts, her property went to cover his expenses. Similarly, 
fathers had complete rights to the labor of children as head of household. Custody of children 
went to the father in the case of divorce; a woman could also lose her children in the event of 
widowhood, sexual impropriety, or illegitimacy.  
This legal fusion produced odd and unfortunate results. A husband and wife could not 
                                                 
104
 The age of consent in the colonies had not changed by 1880, it was generally from 10 to 
12 years of age. Delaware had a low of 7; no state had an age of consent higher than 12.By 1920, 
the age had risen to 16-18 in most states, although marriage with parental consent was still 
allowed at younger ages. 
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 This section drawn from Basch, Hartog, Murry and Zaher. 
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 William Blackstone delivered a series of lectures on English law that were published as 
four volumes of Commentaries between 1765 and 1769. They were read by most American 
colonial lawyers. Jefferson and other framers of the Declaration of Independence and 
Constitution broke with him in creating some U.S. laws but and his books were considered an 
authoritative collection of common law doctrines and English law (Alschuler, 4-7). 
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steal one another’s property, nor conspire together. Neither could sue the other for a civil wrong 
(tort). A husband could not rape his wife because of the legal fiction. This is also the source of 
the principle that wives could not testify against their husbands. “[I]n trials of any sort they are 
not allowed to be evidence for, or against, each other: partly because it is impossible their 
testimony should be different, but principally because of the union of person. . . .” (Blackstone in 
Zaher, 460). 
Divorces were possible, but rare and difficult to obtain, especially for women. For 
example, the Massachusetts Bay Colony legalized divorce in 1629 on grounds of adultery, 
desertion or husbandly cruelty, but wives had to prove they had not provoked the attack by 
nagging or otherwise failing their duties. To obtain a divorce, a woman generally needed 
multiple grounds, although a man could divorce on the claim of adultery alone. Until the late 
1800s, New York allowed divorce only on grounds of adultery, with the guilty party forbidden to 
ever remarry. 
The first Married Women’s Property Act was adopted in Mississippi in 1839, primarily to 
allow husbands to shield their property from creditors by placing it in the wife’s name. New 
York passed what became a model act nine years later, allowing women to retain ownership and 
control of real and personal property that they brought into the marriage. In 1855, Massachusetts 
gave married women the right to own real or personal property, sell, contract, sue or be sued, 
make a will, and have full control over their own earnings. However, other states followed 
slowly; as late as 1887, a third of states still did not allow women to control their own earnings.  
Eight states formed from areas originally controlled by France or Spain encoded 
community property customs, rather than coverture: California, Idaho, Texas, Washington, 
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Arizona, Louisiana, Nevada, and New Mexico.
107
 Although wives had property rights, husbands 
retained control over management and disposition. Women had no greater civil liberties in 
marriages in these states. Since divorce was similarly severely limited, the primary difference 
was in inheritance.  
When the U.S. Supreme Court finally ended the marriage relationship of a dominant male 
to a subordinate female, it was on a challenge from a community property state. In 1981, the 
court struck down Louisiana’s Head and Master Rule in Kirchberg v. Feenstra.  The wife had 
filed a criminal complaint against her husband for molesting their minor daughter. While in jail, 
the husband used the family home as collateral on a mortgage to pay his defense attorney. His 
wife was not informed of the mortgage because the law gave her husband exclusive control over 
their community property. She learned of the mortgage two years later, when his defense 
attorney threatened to foreclose because the husband had defaulted on the promissory note that 
had financed his defense. 
Sexual activity 
At the time of Reynolds, all sexual activity outside marriage was proscribed, although 
rarely enforced with the zeal directed toward Mormons. Laws against adultery and fornication 
had been enacted in the colonies by Puritan settlers, who used criminal sanctions to force 
conformity with their religious views. Massachusetts hanged a man and woman for their adultery 
in 1644. Other punishments commonly included branding, whipping, and public shaming, such 
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as being put in the stocks. Over time, many of these laws have been repealed, however about half 
of the states still have laws on the books against adultery.  
More common than criminal prosecutions for adultery are job terminations, 
sanctions or demotions. The military can discharge or prosecute soldiers for 
infidelity, and courts have permitted dismissals or discipline of police officers, 
librarians, fire department employees, and FBI trainees based on marital infidelity 
that had no demonstrable connection to their job performance. Adultery also 
figures as a factor in allocating property and custody in divorce cases, although it 
isn't necessarily relevant to parental fitness or financial need (Rhode, n.p.) 
Although largely unenforced, removing these laws can prove to be difficult. In 
Minnesota, it is still illegal for a married woman to commit adultery or for a single woman to 
engage in fornication, although there is no similar penalty for men. An attempt to remove the law 
failed in 2011, when the Minnesota Family Council campaigned to, instead, have it apply to both 
men and women. 
Race and relationships 
A few years after Reynolds, the same Court upheld a law that forbade couples to 
intermarry if they were “a white person and a negro” in Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883). 
The law imposed penalties on any man and woman who lived together in fornication or adultery: 
a minimum of one hundred dollar fine and not more than six months imprisonment or hard labor 
for a first offense, a second offense (with the same person) carried a minimum three hundred 
dollar fine and a year of imprisonment or hard labor, a third conviction (with the same person) 
resulted in a two year imprisonment or hard labor. However, for mixed-race couples (who could 
not marry), the penalties were increased to two to seven years of imprisonment or hard labor for 
the first offense. After citing the Civil Rights Act, Chief Justice Fields denied the claim that the 
Alabama statute caused any racial discrimination: 
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The two sections of the Code cited are entirely consistent. The one prescribes, 
generally, a punishment for an offense committed between persons of different 
sexes; the other prescribes a punishment for an offense which can only be 
committed where the two sexes are of different races. There is in neither section 
any discrimination against either race. Section 4184 equally includes the offense 
when the persons of the two sexes are both white and when they are both black. 
Section 4189 applies the same punishment to both offenders, the white and the 
black. Indeed, the offense against which this latter section is aimed cannot be 
committed without involving the persons of both races in the same punishment. 
Whatever discrimination is made in the punishment prescribed in the two sections 
is directed against the offense designated and not against the person of any 
particular color or race. The punishment of each offending person, whether white 
or black, is the same (106 U.S. at 585). 
It was not until 1964 that the reasoning of Pace was rejected in McLaughlin v. Florida. The 
Court struck down a Florida criminal statute that prohibited an unmarried interracial couple from 
living together. By that time, there was no law against the same conduct among members of the 
same race.  
Judicial inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause, therefore, does not end with a 
showing of equal application among the members of the class defined by the 
legislation. The courts must reach and determine the question whether the 
classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its purpose -- in this 
case, whether there is an arbitrary or invidious discrimination between those 
classes covered by Florida's cohabitation law and those excluded. That question is 
what Pace ignored, and what must be faced here (379 U.S. at 191). 
The Florida Supreme Court had relied upon Pace to find no legal discrimination. At the 
U.S. Supreme Court, the State argued that the legislative purpose of the statute was to prevent 
breaches of the basic concepts of sexual decency. The Supreme Court accepted that purpose, but 
wrote, “We find nothing in this suggested legislative purpose, however, which makes it essential 
to punish promiscuity of one racial group and not that of another” (379 U.S. at 193). The Court 
considered but left standing Florida’s law against interracial marriage. Marriage between white 
and non-white spouses was permitted nationwide in 1967 (Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1). 
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Rewriting Reynolds 
The Morrill Anti-bigamy Act was passed by Congress and signed into law by President 
Lincoln on July 2, 1862. On its face, it is neutral among religions as a rule of action for all those 
residing in the Territories. In a speech to the House of Representatives, however, Representative 
Justin Smith Morrill of Vermont attacked the idea that Utah could pass laws permitting 
polygamy under the protection of the First Amendment. 
Under the guise of religion, this people has established, and seek to maintain and 
perpetuate, a Mohammedan barbarism revolting to the civilized world … As well 
might religion be invoked to protect cannibalism or infanticide. … Could a man, 
charged with burglary or rape, find privilege and excuse before any of our courts 
on a plea that it was an act in accordance with the religion of the prophet Mercury 
or the prophet Priapus, and that our Constitution permits the free exercise of 
religion? (Vitale 267-8) 
Morrill’s comparison of (Muslim or Mormon) polygamy with cannibalism or infanticide 
sets it outside practices that the community was able to tolerate. As detailed in Chapter One, the 
unpopularity of Mormon polygamy had been manifested at every level. Citizens of the states 
where they moved attacked violently, while local authorities either turned a blind eye or openly 
supported the mobs.  
Another pragmatic consideration was the potential vulnerability of the body politic.  
Many debates on polygamy drew parallels to the threat to the nation from the south and that 
threat potentially posed by Brigham Young’s theocracy to the west. Legislation after Reynolds 
moved more directly against the LDS church itself, dissolving its legal corporation, seizing 
property and business interests. While polygamy was presented as a religious practice, it was 
also laden with political implications. 
When Mormons began to practice polygamy, they did not limit the number of possible 
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wives (unlike Islam). The LDS Church has acknowledged that Joseph Smith had as many as 40 
wives, in various forms of marriage – some sealed to him after he had died. Brigham Young had 
at least 55, including 30 who were sealed to him for eternity only, meaning that he would not 
share an earthly life with them. In cases such as these, women who were sealed in some forms of 
Mormon marriage did not live with their husbands.  
Plural marriages could take several forms, including: spiritual wifery, proxy 
relationships, spouses without conjugal relations or cohabitation. Even plural wives in familial 
arrangements were encouraged to be self-sufficient. Some pursued careers in medicine, enabled 
by having sister wives who shared child-care duties. Others worked as telegraph operators, 
teachers, or business managers (Gillett, 2000). By necessity, they had greater independence than 
women in monogamous marriages. Plural wives who were journalists and writers defended the 
practice, saying that polygamy “gives women the highest opportunities for self-development … 
more independent of thought and mind” (Harmer-Dionne, 1998). 
Although the LDS church discouraged divorce, women were able to initiate divorce 
proceedings and the church was liberal in granting them. There was no barrier or stigma to 
remarriage for women as either plural wives or in monogamous marriage. 
Morocco model 
As noted above, the approach that Morocco has taken to polygamy in the 2011 
Constitution and Family Code revision is compatible with the framework I propose in this work. 
It establishes religion and government as competing normative authorities (with the King as 
leader of each). It recognizes the religious identity of citizens and seeks to accommodate the 
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traditional practice of polygamy while adding safeguards for the safety and security of women as 
equal citizens.  
However, the religious and societal attitudes of the community for polygamy as practiced 
by Muslims in Morocco differs from the community tolerance for polygamy as practiced by 
some Mormons in the United States in the 1800s and by some non-LDS fundamentalists today. 
Even if a U.S. court adopted the epistemic perspectivism of George Reynolds, or Kody Brown, 
would be limited by a different social/cultural identity. The U.S. social/cultural identity of the 
time and the viability of the Morocco model to each case is discussed below. 
Opinion of the Court 
The refocused approach to the free expression of religion begins with the two baseline 
requirements for any successful evaluative framework. 
(1)  the Court adopts an attitude of ontological agnosticism, which removes all of the 
Reynolds court arguments regarding the superiority of monogamy to societal culture and the 
odiousness of the practice of polygamy; and 
(2) the Court adopts epistemic perspectivism, examining the belief/act from the 
perspective of the participants, George Reynolds and his two wives. 
The Reynolds court did recognize the importance of the practice to the participants, saying they 
believed that not practicing polygamy when approved by the LDS church “would be punished, 
and that the penalty for such failure and refusal would be damnation in the life to come" 
(Reynolds at 161). 
To apply the framework that I propose, we begin by saying that the belief/act of 
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polygamy is part of the eternal identity of the members of the LDS Church. At that time in 
history, citizens other than white men were just beginning to have a legally-recognized identity. 
There were no protections for women, for same-sex orientations, or any conduct of sex outside 
monogamous marriage. So, this is a thin claim.  
Next, we attempt to accommodate the belief/act as a default – saying that polygamy is 
permissible unless limited by social/cultural identity so opposed that it would rupture the fabric 
of society. Unlike contemporary Morocco, polygamy had no support in either cultural or non-
LDS religious tradition in 1800’s United States. Carving out a space for polygamy that protected 
women would not find popular support, either, as monogamous marriage did not recognize their 
legal existence. Laws forbade any sexual relationship outside monogamous marriage, so a ruling 
that polygamy was possible but discouraged would also have been infeasible. Similarly, there 
was no space to say that polygamous marriages are religious only, and not seek state protection. 
Opinion options 
This social/cultural boundary of toleration is precisely the situation faced by the Reynolds 
court. Utah had made polygamy the default marital relationship and society fought back at every 
level:, rioting citizens, Governors, Congress, and the President -- before it got to the Court. The 
options available to the Reynolds court seem to be these: 
(1) Permit the practice of religious polygamy by members of the LDS Church as an 
exception to the law anywhere in the United States and its territories. 
This would be necessary if Mormons were to travel outside Utah with their extended families, or 
attempt to reside in other states. It is undoubtedly the result that Brigham Young and church 
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elders expected in bringing their legal challenge to the Morrill Anti-bigamy law under the plain 
wording of the First Amendment. 
(2) Allow polygamy in Utah, in deference to territorial authority. 
Territorial laws had been established to deal with inheritance, divorce, property ownership: a 
complete network of regulations that supported plural marriage. The hazard was that other states 
would not recognize these marriages, so it would be a barrier to mobility and to eventual 
statehood. It could even be a barrier to remaining as a territory.  
This approach was suggested by Mormons who pointed out that the Democratic Party 
had passed a resolution before the Civil War that “Congress has no power under the Constitution 
to interfere with or control the domestic institutions of the several States, and that all such States 
are the sole and proper judges of everything appertaining to their own affairs not prohibited by 
the Constitution.” The target of that resolution was slavery. As the Mormons pointed out, if 
states could claim the right to permit slavery, then they could also claim the right to permit 
polygamy. 
Lincoln addressed this as a contradiction in the position of the Democratic Party and the 
public positions taken by its candidate, Senator Stephen A. Douglas. 
[I]it is very plain the Judge evades the question the Republicans have ever pressed 
… in regard to Utah. That question the Judge well knows to be this: ‘If the people 
of Utah shall peacefully form a State Constitution tolerating polygamy, will the 
[Democrats] admit them into the Union?’ there is nothing in the United States 
Constitution or law against polygamy; and why is it not part of the Judge’s 
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“sacred right of self-government” for that people to have it, or rather keep it, if 
they choose?
108
 (Vitale 267) 
Although Lincoln signed the Morrill Anti-bigamy Act into law, he was reluctant to enforce it. He 
needed Utah’s support for the war, and had authorized Brigham Young to raise his own army to 
protect telegraph and mail routes through the territory until Federal troops were available.
109
 
Other Presidents were less equanimous and Congress grew increasingly impatient. “The specter 
of Mormon polygamy was cast as an urgent political crisis, an imminent threat to the emergent 
nation’s system of political governance and racial destiny …” (Deinke, 853). The prospect  of 
the state sanctioning polygamy gave rise to 55 proposed constitutional amendments on marriage 
between 1879 and 1924. 
Any ruling short of full support for the anti-bigamy law would have been unpopular and 
unenforceable. It would have been strong enough to challenge the social/cultural identity of the 
nation.. The LDS Church presented a threat to the self-image of the United States as a white, 
Protestant-Christian nation. As a powerful theocracy, it posed a potential threat to the continued 
existence of the nation, still dealing with the ravages of war and reconstruction of the south. 
This meets the first criteria for proscribing/limiting a belief/act on my framework. That 
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 From a speech in response to Douglas, 26 July 1857 in Springfield, Illinois. 
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Lincoln is said to have provided this explanation for not enforcing the law against 
polygamy: 
“Occasionally [in clearing timber from a field] we would come to a log that had fallen down. 
It was too hard to split, too wet to burn, and too heavy to move, so we ploughed around it. That’s 
what I intend to do with the Mormons. Tell Brigham Young that if he will let me alone, I will let 
him alone.”  
Attributed to an interview with T.B.H. Stenhouse, who was editor of the Deseret Tribune in 
Salt Lake City (Vitale 269). 
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leaves us with how to prohibit polygamy for George Reynolds in a way that does not create a 
conundrum in 2017: a ban that does not outlast the outrage that justified it. 
(3) Prohibit polygamy as a religious practice that cannot be tolerated by current 
social/cultural norms.  
The question is not framed as an exemption to a law that applies to everyone, as the law clearly 
targeted Mormons. It does not claim that prohibiting religious practices does not infringe upon 
belief. In acknowledging the social/cultural identity – the casabiyya -- of the nation, it relies upon 
the Madison/Jefferson approach cited in the original Reynolds opinion:  
[‘I]t is time enough for the rightful purpose of civil government for its 
officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace 
and good order’ (Reynolds at 165). 
The ‘overt acts against peace and good order’ were committed against Mormons, as well as in 
conflict between Mormons and their neighbors. However, they were indicators of boundaries of 
tolerance. In chronicling the events leading up to the Utah War, David Roberts said “To look 
back at this episode now is to see the nation at the brink of civil war in 1857 and 1858—only to 
pull back” (Roberts, n.p.) 
Protected practices and cultural change 
 The century following Reynolds has seen profound societal changes.  A line of Supreme 
Court cases has established that the relationship between individuals is due the same 
Constitutional protection whether recognized as marriage or not.  It began when the Court 
protected the right of married couples to contraceptives (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965).
  
In a 
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decision extending the protection to unmarried couples, the Court held there was no reason to 
treat married and unmarried persons differently, saying they share a right to privacy. 
[W]hatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the 
rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike ... the married 
couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an 
association of two individuals each with separate intellectual and emotional 
makeup.  If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, 
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into 
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or 
beget a child (Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 454 (internal citations omitted). 
The interpersonal association itself was accorded status.  The Court recognized that relationship 
was eligible for the same sort of privacy accorded the marital status.   
The court found a similar protection for same-sex couples in Lawrence v. Texas, 2003).  
To reach its decision, the court distinguished its earlier ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986). In 
that case, a Georgia statute made sodomy illegal for both heterosexual and same-sex couples.  
The court observed that although the statute seemed just to prohibit a certain sexual act, the 
impact is more severe for same-sex couples.  It again accorded individuals the right to establish a 
protected interpersonal relationship. 
Their penalties and purpose, though, have more far-reaching consequences, 
touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most 
private or places, the home. The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship 
that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty 
of persons to choose without being punished as criminals (539 U.S. at 567).  
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In that same vein, the Virginia and Georgia have struck sodomy and fornication laws, relying 
upon Lawrence v. Texas.
110
  However, a handful of states still have such statutes, even though 
they are Constitutionally-suspect (Sweeny, 129).  
Brown context 
When Kody Brown brought his lawsuit in 2013, the cultural climate had changed such 
that the reality television program chronicling his marriage was a curiosity, not social scandal. 
The lead counsel on his law suit certainly saw it falling in the line of cases protecting private 
personal conduct among consenting adults. 
The case was never about the recognition of multiple marriages or the acceptance 
of the religious values underlying this plural family. It was about the right of 
consenting adults to make decisions for themselves and their families. Judge 
Clark Waddoups, a conservative George W. Bush appointee, ruled that the 
criminalization of cohabitation clearly violated the due process clause and the free 
exercise clause of the United States Constitution (Turley n.p.). 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. “We do not address the merits of the Browns’ 
claims. The district court should not have done so, either” (Brown v. Buhman, 17).  
The Court of Appeals would not evaluate whether or not religious polygamy should be 
permitted in the United States in 2016. It refused to consider the merits of the case because it did 
not believe the Brown family would be arrested for practicing polygamy. The court’s request to 
attorneys for both sides that they file supplemental briefs was a signal of the direction it would 
take. The court asked counsel to argue whether the Brown family had standing when the suit was 
filed, and if so, whether their claims were rendered moot when the Utah County Attorney’s 
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Office (UACO) adopted a policy of not prosecuting polygamy as a crime unless another crime 
was involved, such as fraud or abuse. 
The issues of standing and mootness are threshold considerations. They determine 
whether the federal court has the jurisdiction to consider the case. Standing concerns whether the 
person bringing the complaint has a “case or controversy” at the time that the suit is filed. 
Mootness concerns whether it is still a live concern at the time of judgment. “[T]he requisite 
personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue 
throughout its existence (mootness)” (Tenth Circuit opinion citing Arizonans for Official 
English, 520 U.S. at 68 n. 22). 
The Court assumed that the Browns had standing when they filed the case --  a credible 
threat of prosecution -- due to the investigation initiated by Utah County Attorney Jeffrey 
Buhman. But the case became moot when Buhman announced the UACO policy of not 
prosecuting polygamy as a separate offense in May, 2012. Brown’s attorney argued that the next 
county attorney could change the policy, which would make them again liable for arrest, and 
questioned whether the DA had adopted the policy as a tactical maneuver to moot the case. The 
appellate court was not convinced. Neither was the U.S. Supreme Court, which refused to hear 
the case. The Brown family was denied their day in court because the state promised not to 
enforce its law -  a law required by the state constitution, which state attorneys swear an oath to 
uphold.  
Polygamy as a religious practice was prohibited because of community outrage in 1879. 
A lack of community outrage made it impossible to mount a successful legal challenge to the 
prohibition in 2017. If Reynolds had been decided on the grounds suggested above, refusal to 
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prosecute polygamy would be evidence that the ban is no longer justified, rather than a barrier to 
entry. This is the final part of the new framework that I propose: change is relevant to any ruling 
based on social/cultural identity. The burden is on the ban to demonstrate its continued viability. 
Barriers to justice 
Just as the veil worn by Ginnah Muhammad prevented her from presenting her case in 
court, the bridal veils of Meri, Janelle, Christine, and Robyn Brown not only subject them to 
jeopardy but also deny them judicial relief. In 2017 United States, the Utah cohabitation statute 
is not thought to apply to a man with multiple intimate relationships, nor one legal marriage and 
additional sexual relationships. As demonstrated by Judge Waldroups in the series of scenarios 
quoted in Chapter One: “Court: so it’s the expression of the fact that the person is a wife that 
makes it illegal. State: yes” (Brown at 59-62).  
Each “case or controversy” is necessarily connected to a specific place and time. The 
refusal of the appellate and Supreme Courts to hear this case at this time perpetuated two harms, 
which are seen more clearly from the perspective of the impacted wives. The first is the 
characterization of the injury. As noted above, the framing of the question often determines its 
legal resolution. The second is a missed opportunity to address some of the social and cultural 
harms of plural marriage.  
Legal outcasts 
The court of appeals characterized the harm as threat of arrest. It was convinced the threat 
no longer existed when the Utah county attorney adopted an official policy of not prosecuting 
polygamy unless other violations of law were present (which did not apply to the Brown family). 
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However, in the case of same-sex marriage, the Court considered it to be a harm that citizens 
were denied the opportunity to marry – even though criminal penalties had been removed. “But 
while Lawrence confirmed a dimension of freedom that allows individuals to engage in intimate 
association without criminal liability, it does not follow that freedom stops there. Outlaw to 
outcast may be a step forward, but it does not achieve the full promise of liberty” (Obergfell 
at 14, emphasis added). 
The Court rejected applying liberty in a circumscribed manner rooted in historic 
practices: 
 [I]t is inconsistent with the approach this Court has used in discussing other 
fundamental rights, including marriage and intimacy. Loving did not ask about a 
“right to interracial marriage”; Turner did not ask about a “right of inmates to 
marry”; and Zablocki did not ask about a “right of fathers with unpaid child 
support duties to marry.” Rather, each case inquired about the right to marry in its 
comprehensive sense, asking if there was a sufficient justification for excluding 
the relevant class from the right (internal citations omitted). That principle applies 
here. If rights were defined by who exercised them in the past, then received 
practices could serve as their own continued justification and new groups 
could not invoke rights once denied (Obergfell at 18, emphasis added). 
Consider the contrast between asking for a religious exemption from the Utah 
cohabitation statute for polygamy, or claiming either (1) plural marriage as right to marriage 
among consenting adults (in the precedents cited by Obergfell), or (2) plural marriage as 
undistinguished from the other multiple intimate relationships condoned in contemporary society 
(in the precedents cited by Lawrence). In either sense, the underlying conduct is not legally 
proscribed and does not engender societal outrage. The conduct/practice of multiple, 
simultaneous, intimate partners is now only problematic when it is associated with religious 
belief.  
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Further, the Obergfell court specifically linked marriage with identity: “The Constitution 
promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow 
persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity. The petitioners in these 
cases seek to find that liberty by marrying …” (Obergfell at 2, emphasis added). On my 
framework, the belief/act of polygamy is assumed to be permissible as the free exercise of 
religion. If social/cultural identity is CURRENTLY in opposition, courts adopt an attitude of 
ontological agnosticism – presuming that the religious belief is true – from the perspective of the 
believer (epistemic perspectivism). The belief/act is accommodated as a component of personal 
identity unless social/cultural identity is so opposed that rulings permitting the belief/act cannot 
CURRENTLY be enforced, and only for so long as that condition persists. Religious eternal 
identity, as expressed through plural marriage, can be accommodated within the boundaries of 
social/cultural identity in the United States in 2017. 
Missed opportunity 
While Morocco’s legal and philosophical approach to polygamy may have been 
infeasible at the time of Reynolds, it would address several concerns raised by contemporary 
religious polygamy in the United States. To borrow the Islamic regulation of human actions, 
polygamy would no longer be forbidden. It could be considered disliked but legal, or permitted 
(but not recommended or obligatory). At this time in United States, many citizens feel that same-
sex marriage falls into this category. Their religious beliefs cause them to oppose marriage for 
same-sex couples, even though such marriages are now legal.  
Removing the criminal sanctions would go one step toward improving the lives of 
women in polygamist communities that now insulate themselves to avoid prosecution. The focus 
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of most concern with polygamy is not on families who have their own reality television shows. It 
is with those who live in remote compounds or isolated communities to avoid notice. Girls often 
marry young, have little education, and less opportunity to exit (Bennion 2012, 259). Given the 
history of legal prosecution, fundamentalist communities in Utah might be forgiven a lack of 
confidence in the county attorney’s promise not to prosecute. Not all such communities are in 
Utah, and families in states such as Texas do not even have that thin assurance.  
Other safeguards inspired by Morocco’s approach would go even farther to protect plural 
wives, such as: verification of age and consent, official notice to the wives of the additional 
marriage, availability of divorce, and financial provision for exiting wives. Even if most plural 
marriages remain unofficial – religious ceremonies with no state license or recognition – the 
availability of legal protections for wives would give them the ability to seek improved 
conditions without leaving their religion (Bennion & Joffe, 228). 
Refocus recap 
This chapter applies the new framework I have developed to evaluate permissibility of 
belief/acts in the United States. In previous chapters, I have shown how the division of belief 
from practice is impossible for religiously-motivated actions. This chapter also rejects the 
approach of considering belief/acts as exceptions to general laws that apply to everyone. While 
appearing to be neutral among religions, each of these criteria further privilege religions of 
majority groups that are already accommodated in law.  
This chapter further develops the idea that religion is a component of personal identity 
through consideration of veils worn by Muslim women. In it, I consider the potential hazard of 
using social/cultural identity as an outer boundary for community toleration. I suggest two 
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constraints: the threat to social/cultural identity must be unenforceable due to opposition by the 
community and government, and any ban based in that concern must be reviewed. When 
community aversion changes such that toleration is possible, any prohibition of belief/acts loses 
its justification.  
The court cases of Mormon polygamy involving George Reynolds and Kody Brown 
illustrate the boundaries of community toleration and how they have changed over time. I 
conclude that the approach to polygamy taken by Morocco would not have been an option for the 
Reynolds court, but would have produced a more just result if implemented in the case of the 
Brown family as exemplars of contemporary plural marriage. The refocus I have proposed would 
bring coherence to Supreme Court jurisprudence in the area of religious free exercise and better 
protect the religious identity of U.S. citizens. 
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CONCLUSION 
The only defence of the accused in this case is his belief 
that the law ought not to have been enacted.  
It matters not that his belief was a part of his professed religion: 
 it was still belief, and belief only. 
-- Reynolds at 167 
 
This dissertation provides a philosophical grounding for religious belief that can achieve 
legal recognition. It places religious eternal identity – which includes post and possibly pre-
embodiment selves – alongside components of personal identity such as sexual orientation. This 
move changes the approach from tolerance of doctrine to accommodation of individuals. 
Adopting this philosophical approach would bring coherence to Supreme Court opinions and 
some predictability to results. Both are desirable outcomes of legal theory. Equally importantly, 
it respects the lived experience of religion. Believers experience religion as part of their identity -
- often, the most important part. 
The fundamental insight that informs this refocusing of the interplay between religion 
and law comes from my functional definition of religion. Religions make conflicting claims 
about what exists – the metaphysics of reality. One way to categorize these claims is by asking 
what happens at death. One option is that the death of the material body is the end of life. A 
second option is that some sort of non-physical life continues, as a spiritual or energy force, or 
through reincarnation. A third option is that some sort of individuated life continues, which 
retains memories of, and perhaps responsibility for, the experiences of the entity before death.  
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These religious outcomes do more than describe what happens at death, they define who 
we are as we live. On option one, I am an embodied intelligence that will cease when my body 
dies. Option two defines me as an intelligence with a spirit or essence that will continue after the 
death of my physical body. This spirit may, or may not, be impacted by the actions of my 
physical body during life. Option three makes significant demands upon my embodied existence. 
As I live each day, I am a body with an intelligence and an eternal essence, or soul. This invisible 
identity is the most important, because it continues for eternity.  
This functional definition of religion grounds my approach of considering religious 
eternal identity to be a component of personal identity similar to sexual orientation. It also 
provides an answer to the Reynolds Court question “what is the religious freedom which has 
been guaranteed?” As I describe in Chapter Two, historians ask different questions than 
philosophers or faithful believers. This definition is legally-sufficient to evaluate court cases 
arising from free exercise claims. 
The need for a refocusing of religious expression is demonstrated by the conundrum 
created by the treatment of religiously-motivated polygamy by the Supreme Court. In 
considering the practice of polygamy by members of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day 
Saints, the Court attempted to draw a line between religious belief and practices motivated by 
that belief. It claimed the right to regulate practices, even though beliefs are protected by the 
First Amendment guarantee of free expression of religion. This would mean that Mormons could 
believe that having multiple spouses while embodied in this world is essential to eternal 
salvation, but they could not actually participate in plural marriages. However, this approach 
produced the opposite result in 2017. Changes in societal standards over 150 years created the 
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situation that such relationships are subject to prosecution only if they are practiced due to a 
religious belief. 
But let’s look at how this really works in practice. In practice, there is the 
marriage, it may not be recognized by the state, but it is a marriage, it’s 
performed, there is a wedding ceremony performed, there are vows exchanged. 
The problem is proving it. The federal government had that problem in the 1880s. 
That’s why they added cohabitation to the Edmunds Statute. The same thing with 
the Utah statute. The problem was proving that they were married, so they added 
cohabitate, but the person has to cohabitate knowing that the other person is 
married … 
Court: so tell me what’s different between adultery and what you’ve just 
described. State: the one is that they claim to be married. But just because the 
state can’t prove it doesn’t mean it hasn’t happened. That’s what’s happening in 
the [religious] polygamist communities. Court: so it’s the expression of the fact 
that the person is a wife that makes it illegal. State: yes. (Brown at 59-62, 
emphasis added ) 
Absent any religious connotation, multiple simultaneous, intimate relationships among 
consenting adults are now not prosecuted. Actions that are not illegal absent a religious belief 
should not be proscribed because of a religious connotation.  
The first goal of this project was to identify conditions for any philosophically-adequate 
approach to problems of religious exercise. To accomplish this, I first rejected both the Reynolds 
division of religious belief from practice, and its consideration of religious practices as 
exceptions to neutral laws. While appearing to be neutral among religions, both of these criteria 
further privilege religions of majority groups that are often already accommodated in law. I also 
examined the concept of toleration, determining that government and religion may tolerate one 
another as competing normative authorities. But it is an inappropriate attitude for the government 
to take toward its citizens. 
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I then established two baseline requirements. Because religious claims are beyond current 
epistemic access, the government must treat each as equally true, adopting an attitude I call 
ontological agnosticism. Any limitation on the practice of religion must not be based on the 
content of religious beliefs (or judicial biases). This is not a neutral position, but rather a 
consideration of perspectives as equally valid, inspired by the philosophy of José Ortega y 
Gasset. The second is that religious metaphysical commitments entail a belief about my present 
personal identity. The province of courts is my period of embodiment, but a condition of that 
embodiment is my eternal self. I live in this world as an individual with a race, sex, and religious 
eternal identity. When considering claims of religious exercise, courts should employ what I call 
epistemic perspectivism – considering the issue from the point of view of the impacted party. 
This is the space from which to consider any approaches to religious free expression. The 
Reynolds Court’s fear that every citizen will be a law unto himself is answered with 
perspectivism. No individual or court is objective or neutral, each comes from a point of view. 
Courts routinely examine witnesses to events to collect perspectives and then decide among 
them. The concern with relativism in this instance rests in the impossibility of proving which 
metaphysical reality actually exists. So, the approach is to consider each as true for the purposes 
of the claim, and to evaluate the permissibility/impact of the claim from the perspective of the 
impacted believer.  
The second goal of this work was to make a case for treating religious exercise as a 
component of personal identity. Other approaches may be suggested, if they meet the baseline 
concerns that I have established. However, considering religious eternal identity to be similar to 
sexual orientation produces advantages for both religious believers and courts attempting to 
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accommodate them. As I demonstrate with the series of cases on Islamic veils in contemporary 
United States, the change in perspective simplifies the analysis. There is a body of law on 
accommodation of race, sex/gender, and orientation that is compatible because those are also 
components of personal identity.  
This also answers two worries that Courts have identified, which I discussed in Chapter 
One: who decides how to accommodate religious practices and what exactly counts as a religious 
act. Just as with laws regarding sexual orientation, federal and state governments consider how to 
accommodate religious identity in creating laws or administrative rules. Courts review them 
when individuals bring suit. Religious practices are any acts motivated by religious eternal 
identity. Centrality to theology has already been rejected as an appropriate judicial determination 
by the Supreme Court. 
I applied my framework to the situation underlying the Reynolds case, and determined 
societal norms of the time would not permit a verdict favorable to the LDS Church. This 
prompted the philosophical concept of social/cultural identity from Ibn Khaldun. This concept 
works to provide a limit on accommodation, the answer to the Court’s concern that human 
sacrifice would have to be permitted, “Or if a wife religiously believed it was her duty to burn 
herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be beyond the power of the civil 
government to prevent her carrying her belief into practice?” (Reynolds at 166). Toleration is 
employed here between the social/cultural identity and individual eternal identity. Without 
judging the merits of the belief, it can restrict actions it prompts.  
However, as Ibn Khaldun demonstrates, this social condition changes over time, which is 
what has produced the contemporary conundrum. In response, I flesh out two characteristics of 
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social/cultural identity when used in legal analysis of free expression claims. First, the 
community outrage must be to the extent that a judicial opinion would not be supported or 
enforced and second, any restriction must be reviewed if social conditions change. The burden is 
upon any restriction to demonstrate that it is still grounded in sufficient social/cultural identity to 
support an imposition on accommodation. 
The fully-articulated framework that I propose would remove the ban on polygamy for 
the Sister Wives family. The fact that anti-bigamy laws are no longer enforced against polygamy 
would be evidence that the social/cultural identity has changed such that the imposition on their 
belief/act is no longer justified. I suggest that following the model of Morocco’s legalization of 
polygamy would better protect participants than the harms produced by the U.S. ban.
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APPENDIX 
REYNOLDS v. UNITED STATES 
98 U.S. 145 (1879) 
Supreme Court of United States 
*151 Mr. George W. Biddle and Mr. Ben Sheeks for the plaintiff in error. 
The Attorney-General and The Solicitor-General, contra. 
*153 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. 
 The assignments of error, when grouped, present the following questions:— 
1. Was the indictment bad because found by a grand jury of less than sixteen persons? 
2. Were the challenges of certain petit jurors by the accused improperly overruled? 
3. Were the challenges of certain other jurors by the government improperly sustained? 
4. Was the testimony of Amelia Jane Schofield, given at a former trial for the same offence, but 
under another indictment, improperly admitted in evidence? 
5. Should the accused have been acquitted if he married the second time, because he believed it 
to be his religious duty? 
6. Did the court err in that part of the charge which directed the attention of the jury to the 
consequences of polygamy? These questions will be considered in their order. 
1. As to the grand jury. 
The indictment was found in the District Court of the third judicial district of the Territory. The 
act of Congress "in relation to courts and judicial officers in the Territory of Utah," approved 
June 23, 1874 (18 Stat. 253), while regulating the qualifications of jurors in the Territory, and 
prescribing the mode of preparing the lists from which grand and petit jurors are to be drawn, as 
well as the manner of drawing, makes no provision in respect to the number of persons of which 
a grand jury shall consist. Sect. 808, Revised Statutes, requires that a grand jury impanelled 
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before any district or circuit court of the United States shall consist of not less than sixteen nor 
more than twenty-three persons, while a statute of the Territory limits the number in the district 
courts of the Territory *154 to fifteen. Comp. Laws Utah, 1876, 357. The grand jury which 
found this indictment consisted of only fifteen persons, and the question to be determined is, 
whether the section of the Revised Statutes referred to or the statute of the Territory governs the 
case. 
 By sect. 1910 of the Revised Statutes the district courts of the Territory have the same 
jurisdiction in all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States as is vested 
in the circuit and district courts of the United States; but this does not make them circuit and 
district courts of the United States. We have often so decided. American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 
1 Pet. 511; Benner et al. v. Porter, 9 How. 235; Clinton v. Englebrecht, 13 Wall. 434. They are 
courts of the Territories, invested for some purposes with the powers of the courts of the United 
States. Writs of error and appeals lie from them to the Supreme Court of the Territory, and from 
that court as a territorial court to this in some cases. 
Sect. 808 was not designed to regulate the impanelling of grand juries in all courts where 
offenders against the laws of the United States could be tried, but only in the circuit and district 
courts. This leaves the territorial courts free to act in obedience to the requirements of the 
territorial laws in force for the time being. Clinton v. Englebrecht, supra; Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 
18 Wall. 648. As Congress may at any time assume control of the matter, there is but little 
danger to be anticipated from improvident territorial legislation in this particular. We are 
therefore of the opinion that the court below no more erred in sustaining this indictment than it 
did at a former term, at the instance of this same plaintiff in error, in adjudging another bad 
which was found against him for the same offence by a grand jury composed of twenty-three 
persons. 1 Utah, 226. 
2. As to the challenges by the accused. 
 By the Constitution of the United States (Amend. VI.), the accused was entitled to a trial by an 
impartial jury. A juror to be impartial must, to use the language of Lord Coke, "be indifferent as 
he stands unsworn." Co. Litt. 155 b. Lord Coke also says that a principal cause of challenge is 
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"so called because, if it be found true, it standeth sufficient of itself, without *155 leaving any 
thing to the conscience or discretion of the triers" (id. 156 b); or, as stated in Bacon's 
Abridgment, "it is grounded on such a manifest presumption of partiality, that, if found to be 
true, it unquestionably sets aside the ... juror." Bac. Abr., tit. Juries, E. 1. "If the truth of the 
matter alleged is admitted, the law pronounces the judgment; but if denied, it must be made out 
by proof to the satisfaction of the court or the triers." Id. E. 12. To make out the existence of the 
fact, the juror who is challenged may be examined on his voire dire, and asked any questions that 
do not tend to his infamy or disgrace. 
All of the challenges by the accused were for principal cause. It is good ground for such a 
challenge that a juror has formed an opinion as to the issue to be tried. The courts are not agreed 
as to the knowledge upon which the opinion must rest in order to render the juror incompetent, or 
whether the opinion must be accompanied by malice or ill­will; but all unite in holding that it 
must be founded on some evidence, and be more than a mere impression. Some say it must be 
positive (Gabbet, Criminal Law, 391); others, that it must be decided and substantial 
(Armistead's Case, 11 Leigh (Va.), 659; Wormley's Case, 10 Gratt. (Va.) 658; Neely v. The 
People, 13 Ill. 685); others, fixed (State v. Benton, 2 Dev. & B. (N.C.) L. 196); and, still others, 
deliberate and settled (Staup v. Commonwealth, 74 Pa. St. 458; Curley v. Commonwealth, 84 id. 
151). All concede, however, that, if hypothetical only, the partiality is not so manifest as to 
necessarily set the juror aside. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in Burr's Trial (1 Burr's Trial, 416), 
states the rule to be that "light impressions, which may fairly be presumed to yield to the 
testimony that may be offered, which may leave the mind open to a fair consideration of the 
testimony, constitute no sufficient objection to a juror; but that those strong and deep 
impressions which close the mind against the testimony that may be offered in opposition to 
them, which will combat that testimony and resist its force, do constitute a sufficient objection to 
him." The theory of the law is that a juror who has formed an opinion cannot be impartial. Every 
opinion which he may entertain need not necessarily have that effect. In these days of newspaper 
enterprise and universal education, every case of public interest is almost, as a matter of 
necessity, *156 brought to the attention of all the intelligent people in the vicinity, and scarcely 
any one can be found among those best fitted for jurors who has not read or heard of it, and who 
  168 
has not some impression or some opinion in respect to its merits. It is clear, therefore, that upon 
the trial of the issue of fact raised by a challenge for such cause the court will practically be 
called upon to determine whether the nature and strength of the opinion formed are such as in 
law necessarily to raise the presumption of partiality. The question thus presented is one of 
mixed law and fact, and to be tried, as far as the facts are concerned, like any other issue of that 
character, upon the evidence. The finding of the trial court upon that issue ought not to be set 
aside by a reviewing court, unless the error is manifest. No less stringent rules should be applied 
by the reviewing court in such a case than those which govern in the consideration of motions for 
new trial because the verdict is against the evidence. It must be made clearly to appear that upon 
the evidence the court ought to have found the juror had formed such an opinion that he could 
not in law be deemed impartial. The case must be one in which it is manifest the law left nothing 
to the "conscience or discretion" of the court. 
The challenge in this case most relied upon in the argument here is that of Charles Read. He was 
sworn on his voire dire; and his evidence,[1] taken as a whole, shows that he "believed" he had 
formed an opinion which he had never expressed, but which he did not think would influence his 
verdict on hearing the testimony. We cannot think this is such a manifestation of partiality as to 
leave nothing to the "conscience or discretion" of the triers. The reading of the evidence leaves 
the impression that the juror had some hypothetical opinion about the case, but it falls far short of 
raising a manifest presumption of partiality. In considering such questions in a reviewing court, 
we ought not to be unmindful of the fact we have so often observed in our experience, that jurors 
not unfrequently seek to excuse themselves on the ground of having formed an opinion, when, 
on examination, it turns out that no real disqualification exists. In such cases the manner of the 
*157 juror while testifying is oftentimes more indicative of the real character of his opinion than 
his words. That is seen below, but cannot always be spread upon the record. Care should, 
therefore, be taken in the reviewing court not to reverse the ruling below upon such a question of 
fact, except in a clear case. The affirmative of the issue is upon the challenger. Unless he shows 
the actual existence of such an opinion in the mind of the juror as will raise the presumption of 
partiality, the juror need not necessarily be set aside, and it will not be error in the court to refuse 
to do so. Such a case, in our opinion, was not made out upon the challenge of Read. The fact that 
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he had not expressed his opinion is important only as tending to show that he had not formed one 
which disqualified him. If a positive and decided opinion had been formed, he would have been 
incompetent even though it had not been expressed. Under these circumstances, it is unnecessary 
to consider the case of Ransohoff, for it was confessedly not as strong as that of Read. 
3. As to the challenges by the government. 
The questions raised upon these assignments of error are not whether the district attorney should 
have been permitted to interrogate the jurors while under examination upon their voire dire as to 
the fact of their living in polygamy. No objection was made below to the questions, but only to 
the ruling of the court upon the challenges after the testimony taken in answer to the questions 
was in. From the testimony it is apparent that all the jurors to whom the challenges related were 
or had been living in polygamy. It needs no argument to show that such a jury could not have 
gone into the box entirely free from bias and prejudice, and that if the challenge was not good for 
principal cause, it was for favor. A judgment will not be reversed simply because a challenge 
good for favor was sustained in form for cause. As the jurors were incompetent and properly 
excluded, it matters not here upon what form of challenge they were set aside. In one case the 
challenge was for favor. In the courts of the United States all challenges are tried by the court 
without the aid of triers (Rev. Stat. sect. 819), and we are not advised that the practice in the 
territorial courts of Utah is different. 
*158 4. As to the admission of evidence to prove what was sworn to by Amelia Jane Schofield 
on a former trial of the accused for the same offence but under a different indictment. 
 The Constitution gives the accused the right to a trial at which he should be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; but if a witness is absent by his own wrongful procurement, he cannot 
complain if competent evidence is admitted to supply the place of that which he has kept away. 
The Constitution does not guarantee an accused person against the legitimate consequences of 
his own wrongful acts. It grants him the privilege of being confronted with the witnesses against 
him; but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses away, he cannot insist on his privilege. If, 
therefore, when absent by his procurement, their evidence is supplied in some lawful way, he is 
in no condition to assert that his constitutional rights have been violated. 
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In Lord Morley's Case (6 State Trials, 770), as long ago as the year 1666, it was resolved in the 
House of Lords "that in case oath should be made that any witness, who had been examined by 
the coroner and was then absent, was detained by the means or procurement of the prisoner, and 
the opinion of the judges asked whether such examination might be read, we should answer, that 
if their lordships were satisfied by the evidence they had heard that the witness was detained by 
means or procurement of the prisoner, then the examination might be read; but whether he was 
detained by means or procurement of the prisoner was matter of fact, of which we were not the 
judges, but their lordships." This resolution was followed in Harrison's Case (12 id. 851), and 
seems to have been recognized as the law in England ever since. In Regina v. Scaife (17 Ad. & 
El. N.S. 242), all the judges agreed that if the prisoner had resorted to a contrivance to keep a 
witness out of the 
 way, the deposition of the witness, taken before a magistrate and in the presence of the prisoner, 
might be read. Other cases to the same effect are to be found, and in this country the ruling has 
been in the same way. Drayton v. Wells, 1 Nott & M. (S.C.) 409; Williams v. The State, 19 Ga. 
403. So that now, in the leading text- books, it is laid down that if a witness is kept away by the 
adverse party, *159 his testimony, taken on a former trial between the same parties upon the 
same issues, may be given in evidence. 1 Greenl. Evid., sect. 163; 1 Taylor, Evid., sect. 446. Mr. 
Wharton (1 Whart. Evid., sect. 178) seemingly limits the rule somewhat, and confines it to cases 
where the witness has been corruptly kept away by the party against whom he is to be called, but 
in reality his statement is the same as that of the others; for in all it is implied that the witness 
must have been wrongfully kept away. The rule has its foundation in the maxim that no one shall 
be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong; and, consequently, if there has not been, in 
legal contemplation, a wrong committed, the way has not been opened for the introduction of the 
testimony. We are content with this long-established usage, which, so far as we have been able to 
discover, has rarely been departed from. It is the outgrowth of a maxim based on the principles 
of common honesty, and, if properly administered, can harm no one. 
Such being the rule, the question becomes practically one of fact, to be settled as a preliminary to 
the admission of secondary evidence. In this respect it is like the preliminary question of the 
proof of loss of a written instrument, before secondary evidence of the contents of the instrument 
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can be admitted. In Lord Morley's Case (supra), it would seem to have been considered a 
question for the trial court alone, and not subject to review on error or appeal; but without 
deeming it necessary in this case to go so far as that, we have no hesitation in saying that the 
finding of the court below is, at least, to have the effect of a verdict of a jury upon a question of 
fact, and should not be disturbed unless the error is manifest. 
The testimony shows that the absent witness was the alleged second wife of the accused; that she 
had testified on a former trial for the same offence under another indictment; that she had no 
home, except with the accused; that at some time before the trial a subpœna had been issued for 
her, but by mistake she was named as Mary Jane Schobold; that an officer who knew the witness 
personally went to the house of the accused to serve the subpœna, and on his arrival inquired for 
her, either by the name of Mary Jane Schofield or Mrs. Reynolds; that he was told by the accused 
she was not at home; *160 that he then said, "Will you tell me where she is?" that the reply was 
"No; that will be for you to find out;" that the officer then remarked she was making him 
considerable trouble, and that she would get into trouble herself; and the accused replied, "Oh, 
no; she won't, till the subpœna is served upon her," and then, after some further conversation, 
that "She does not appear in this case." 
It being discovered after the trial commenced that a wrong name had been inserted in the 
subpœna, a new subpœna was issued with the right name, at nine o'clock in the evening. With 
this the officer went again to the house, and there found a person known as the first wife of the 
accused. He was told by her that the witness was not there, and had not been for three weeks. He 
went again the next morning, and not finding her, or being able to ascertain where she was by 
inquiring in the neighborhood, made return of that fact to the court. At ten o'clock that morning 
the case was again called; and the foregoing facts being made to appear, the court ruled that 
evidence of what the witness had sworn to at the former trial was admissible. 
In this we see no error. The accused was himself personally present in court when the showing 
was made, and had full opportunity to account for the absence of the witness, if he would, or to 
deny under oath that he had kept her away. Clearly, enough had been proven to cast the burden 
upon him of showing that he had not been instrumental in concealing or keeping the witness 
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away. Having the means of making the necessary explanation, and having every inducement to 
do so if he would, the presumption is that he considered it better to rely upon the weakness of the 
case made against him than to attempt to develop the strength of his own. Upon the testimony as 
it stood, it is clear to our minds that the judgment should not be reversed because secondary 
evidence was admitted. 
This brings us to the consideration of what the former testimony was, and the evidence by which 
it was proven to the jury. 
It was testimony given on a former trial of the same person for the same offence, but under 
another indictment. It was *161 substantially testimony given at another time in the same cause. 
The accused was present at the time the testimony was given, and had full opportunity of 
cross-examination. This brings the case clearly within the well-established rules. The cases are 
fully cited in 1 Whart. Evid., sect. 177. 
The objection to the reading by Mr. Patterson of what was sworn to on the former trial does not 
seem to have been because the paper from which he read was not a true record of the evidence as 
given, but because the foundation for admitting the secondary evidence had not been laid. This 
objection, as has already been seen, was not well taken. 
5. As to the defence of religious belief or duty. 
On the trial, the plaintiff in error, the accused, proved that at the time of his alleged second 
marriage he was, and for many years before had been, a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter­Day Saints, commonly called the Mormon Church, and a believer in its doctrines; that it 
was an accepted doctrine of that church "that it was the duty of male members of said church, 
circumstances permitting, to practise polygamy; ... that this duty was enjoined by different books 
which the members of said church believed to be of divine origin, and among others the Holy 
Bible, and also that the members of the church believed that the practice of polygamy was 
directly enjoined upon the male members thereof by the Almighty God, in a revelation to Joseph 
Smith, the founder and prophet of said church; that the failing or refusing to practise polygamy 
by such male members of said church, when circumstances would admit, would be punished, and 
that the penalty for such failure and refusal would be damnation in the life to come." He also 
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proved "that he had received permission from the recognized authorities in said church to enter 
into polygamous marriage; ... that Daniel H. Wells, one having authority in said church to 
perform the marriage ceremony, married the said defendant on or about the time the crime is 
alleged to have been committed, to some woman by the name of Schofield, and that such 
marriage ceremony was performed under and pursuant to the doctrines of said church." 
Upon this proof he asked the court to instruct the jury that if they found from the evidence that 
he "was married as *162 charged — if he was married — in pursuance of and in conformity with 
what he believed at the time to be a religious duty, that the verdict must be `not guilty.'" This 
request was refused, and the court did charge "that there must have been a criminal intent, but 
that if the defendant, under the influence of a religious belief that it was right, — under an 
inspiration, if you please, that it was right, — deliberately married a second time, having a first 
wife living, the want of consciousness of evil intent — the want of understanding on his part that 
he was committing a crime — did not excuse him; but the law inexorably in such case implies 
the criminal intent." 
Upon this charge and refusal to charge the question is raised, whether religious belief can be 
accepted as a justification of an overt act made criminal by the law of the land. The inquiry is not 
as to the power of Congress to prescribe criminal laws for the Territories, but as to the guilt of 
one who knowingly violates a law which has been properly enacted, if he entertains a religious 
belief that the law is wrong. 
Congress cannot pass a law for the government of the Territories which shall prohibit the free 
exercise of religion. The first amendment to the Constitution expressly forbids such legislation. 
Religious freedom is guaranteed everywhere throughout the United States, so far as 
congressional interference is concerned. The question to be determined is, whether the law now 
under consideration comes within this prohibition. 
The word "religion" is not defined in the Constitution. We must go elsewhere, therefore, to 
ascertain its meaning, and nowhere more appropriately, we think, than to the history of the times 
in the midst of which the provision was adopted. The precise point of the inquiry is, what is the 
religious freedom which has been guaranteed. 
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Before the adoption of the Constitution, attempts were made in some of the colonies and States 
to legislate not only in respect to the establishment of religion, but in respect to its doctrines and 
precepts as well. The people were taxed, against their will, for the support of religion, and 
sometimes for the support of particular sects to whose tenets they could not and did not 
subscribe. Punishments were prescribed for a failure to attend upon public worship, and 
sometimes for entertaining *163 heretical opinions. The controversy upon this general subject 
was animated in many of the States, but seemed at last to culminate in Virginia. In 1784, the 
House of Delegates of that State having under consideration "a bill establishing provision for 
teachers of the Christian religion," postponed it until the next session, and directed that the bill 
should be published and distributed, and that the people be requested "to signify their opinion 
respecting the adoption of such a bill at the next session of assembly." 
This brought out a determined opposition. Amongst others, Mr. Madison prepared a "Memorial 
and Remonstrance," which was widely circulated and signed, and in which he demonstrated "that 
religion, or the duty we owe the Creator," was not within the cognizance of civil government. 
Semple's Virginia Baptists, Appendix. At the next session the proposed bill was not only 
defeated, but another, "for establishing religious freedom," drafted by Mr. Jefferson, was passed. 
1 Jeff. Works, 45; 2 Howison, Hist. of Va. 298. In the preamble of this act (12 Hening's Stat. 84) 
religious freedom is defined; and after a recital "that to suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his 
powers into the field of opinion, and to restrain the profession or propagation of principles on 
supposition of their ill tendency, is a dangerous fallacy which at once destroys all religious 
liberty," it is declared "that it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its 
officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order." In 
these two sentences is found the true distinction between what properly belongs to the church 
and what to the State. 
In a little more than a year after the passage of this statute the convention met which prepared the 
Constitution of the United States." Of this convention Mr. Jefferson was not a member, he being 
then absent as minister to France. As soon as he saw the draft of the Constitution proposed for 
adoption, he, in a letter to a friend, expressed his disappointment at the absence of an express 
declaration insuring the freedom of religion (2 Jeff. Works, 355), but was willing to accept it as it 
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was, trusting that the good sense and honest intentions of the people would bring about the 
necessary alterations. *164 1 Jeff. Works, 79. Five of the States, while adopting the Constitution, 
proposed amendments. Three — New Hampshire, New York, and Virginia — included in one 
form or another a declaration of religious freedom in the changes they desired to have made, as 
did also North Carolina, where the convention at first declined to ratify the Constitution until the 
proposed amendments were acted upon. Accordingly, at the first session of the first Congress the 
amendment now under consideration was proposed with others by Mr. Madison. It met the views 
of the advocates of religious freedom, and was adopted. Mr. Jefferson afterwards, in reply to an 
address to him by a committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (8 id. 113), took occasion to 
say: "Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God; 
that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship; that the legislative powers of the 
government reach actions only, and not opinions, — I contemplate with sovereign reverence that 
act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should `make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a 
wall of separation between church and State. Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of 
the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress 
of those sentiments which tend to restore man to all his natural rights, convinced he has no 
natural right in opposition to his social duties." Coming as this does from an acknowledged 
leader of the advocates of the measure, it may be accepted almost as an authoritative declaration 
of the scope and effect of the amendment thus secured. Congress was deprived of all legislative 
power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social 
duties or subversive of good order. 
 Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe, and, until 
the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic 
and of African people. At common law, the second marriage was always void (2 Kent, Com. 79), 
and from the earliest history of England polygamy has been treated as an offence against society. 
After the establishment of the ecclesiastical *165 courts, and until the time of James I., it was 
punished through the instrumentality of those tribunals, not merely because ecclesiastical rights 
had been violated, but because upon the separation of the ecclesiastical courts from the civil the 
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ecclesiastical were supposed to be the most appropriate for the trial of matrimonial causes and 
offences against the rights of marriage, just as they were for testamentary causes and the 
settlement of the estates of deceased persons. 
 By the statute of 1 James I. (c. 11), the offence, if committed in England or Wales, was made 
punishable in the civil courts, and the penalty was death. As this statute was limited in its 
operation to England and Wales, it was at a very early period re-enacted, generally with some 
modifications, in all the colonies. In connection with the case we are now considering, it is a 
significant fact that on the 8th of December, 1788, after the passage of the act establishing 
religious freedom, and after the convention of Virginia had recommended as an amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States the declaration in a bill of rights that "all men have an 
equal, natural, and unalienable right to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of 
conscience," the legislature of that State substantially enacted the statute of James I., death 
penalty included, because, as recited in the preamble, "it hath been doubted whether bigamy or 
poligamy be punishable by the laws of this Commonwealth." 12 Hening's Stat. 691. From that 
day to this we think it may safely be said there never has been a time in any State of the Union 
when polygamy has not been an offence against society, cognizable by the civil courts and 
punishable with more or less severity. In the face of all this evidence, it is impossible to believe 
that the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom was intended to prohibit legislation in 
respect to this most important feature of social life. Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred 
obligation, is nevertheless, in most civilized nations, a civil contract, and usually regulated by 
law. Upon it society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social relations and social 
obligations and duties, with which government is necessarily required to deal. In fact, according 
as monogamous or polygamous marriages are allowed, do we find the principles on which the 
government of *166 the people, to a greater or less extent, rests. Professor Lieber says, polygamy 
leads to the patriarchal principle, and which, when applied to large communities, fetters the 
people in stationary despotism, while that principle cannot long exist in connection with 
monogamy. Chancellor Kent observes that this remark is equally striking and profound. 2 Kent, 
Com. 81, note (e). An exceptional colony of polygamists under an exceptional leadership may 
sometimes exist for a time without appearing to disturb the social condition of the people who 
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surround it; but there cannot be a doubt that, unless restricted by some form of constitution, it is 
within the legitimate scope of the power of every civil government to determine whether 
polygamy or monogamy shall be the law of social life under its dominion. 
In our opinion, the statute immediately under consideration is within the legislative power of 
Congress. It is constitutional and valid as prescribing a rule of action for all those residing in the 
Territories, and in places over which the United States have exclusive control. This being so, the 
only question which remains is, whether those who make polygamy a part of their religion are 
excepted from the operation of the statute. If they are, then those who do not make polygamy a 
part of their religious belief may be found guilty and punished, while those who do, must be 
acquitted and go free. This would be introducing a new element into criminal law. Laws are 
made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief 
and opinions, they may with practices. Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a 
necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government 
under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously believed it 
was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be beyond the 
power of the civil government to prevent her carrying her belief into practice? 
So here, as a law of the organization of society under the exclusive dominion of the United 
States, it is provided that plural marriages shall not be allowed. Can a man excuse his practices to 
the contrary because of his religious belief? *167 To permit this would be to make the professed 
doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen 
to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances. 
 A criminal intent is generally an element of crime, but every man is presumed to intend the 
necessary and legitimate consequences of what he knowingly does. Here the accused knew he 
had been once married, and that his first wife was living. He also knew that his second marriage 
was forbidden by law. When, therefore, he married the second time, he is presumed to have 
intended to break the law. And the breaking of the law is the crime. Every act necessary to 
constitute the crime was knowingly done, and the crime was therefore knowingly committed. 
Ignorance of a fact may sometimes be taken as evidence of a want of criminal intent, but not 
ignorance of the law. The only defence of the accused in this case is his belief that the law ought 
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not to have been enacted. It matters not that his belief was a part of his professed religion: it was 
still belief, and belief only. 
In Regina v. Wagstaff (10 Cox Crim. Cases, 531), the parents of a sick child, who omitted to call 
in medical attendance because of their religious belief that what they did for its cure would be 
effective, were held not to be guilty of manslaughter, while it was said the contrary would have 
been the result if the child had actually been starved to death by the parents, under the notion that 
it was their religious duty to abstain from giving it food. But when the offence consists of a 
positive act which is knowingly done, it would be dangerous to hold that the offender might 
escape punishment because he religiously believed the law which he had broken ought never to 
have been made. No case, we believe, can be found that has gone so far. 
6. As to that part of the charge which directed the attention of the jury to the consequences of 
polygamy. 
The passage complained of is as follows: "I think it not improper, in the discharge of your duties 
in this case, that you should consider what are to be the consequences to the innocent victims of 
this delusion. As this contest goes on, they multiply, *168 and there are pure-minded women and 
there are innocent children, — innocent in a sense even beyond the degree of the innocence of 
childhood itself. These are to be the sufferers; and as jurors fail to do their duty, and as these 
cases come up in the Territory of Utah, just so do these victims multiply and spread themselves 
over the land." 
While every appeal by the court to the passions or the prejudices of a jury should be promptly 
rebuked, and while it is the imperative duty of a reviewing court to take care that wrong is not 
done in this way, we see no just cause for complaint in this case. Congress, in 1862 (12 Stat. 
501), saw fit to make bigamy a crime in the Territories. This was done because of the evil 
consequences that were supposed to flow from plural marriages. All the court did was to call the 
attention of the jury to the peculiar character of the crime for which the accused was on trial, and 
to remind them of the duty they had to perform. There was no appeal to the passions, no 
instigation of prejudice. Upon the showing made by the accused himself, he was guilty of a 
violation of the law under which he had been indicted: and the effort of the court seems to have 
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been not to withdraw the minds of the jury from the issue to be tried, but to bring them to it; not 
to make them partial, but to keep them impartial. 
Upon a careful consideration of the whole case, we are satisfied that no error was committed by 
the court below. Judgment affirmed. 
MR. JUSTICE FIELD. 
I concur with the majority of the court on the several points decided except one, — that which 
relates to the admission of the testimony of Amelia Jane Schofield given on a former trial upon a 
different indictment. I do not think that a sufficient foundation was laid for its introduction. The 
authorities cited by the Chief Justice to sustain its admissibility seem to me to establish 
conclusively the exact reverse. 
NOTE. — At a subsequent day of the term a petition for a rehearing having been filed, MR. 
CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. 
Since our judgment in this case was announced, a petition for rehearing has been filed, in which 
our attention is called to the fact that the sentence of the *169 court below requires the 
imprisonment to be at hard labor, when the act of Congress under which the indictment was 
found provides for punishment by imprisonment only. This was not assigned for error on the 
former hearing, and we might on that account decline to consider it now; but as the irregularity is 
one which appears on the face of the record, we vacate our former judgment of affirmance, and 
reverse the judgment of the court below for the purpose of correcting the only error which 
appears in the record, to wit, in the form of the sentence. The cause is remanded, with 
instructions to cause the sentence of the District Court to be set aside and a new one entered on 
the verdict in all respects like that before imposed, except so far as it requires the imprisonment 
to be at hard labor.   
 
[1] Supra, p. 147. 
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